


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PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE BALKANS

When it comes to the Balkans, democratization is seldom a topic. In a region plagued by ethnic conflict and state-building problems, often in some combination with one another, the usual paradigm of democratic transformation may seem far-fetched at best. For a polity to democratize, it should first be acknowledged as one by its entire population and granted the same recognition by the international 'powers', the historical contributors, due to their conflicting interests and relentless intervention, to what we call today 'Balkans'. To meet these two conditions simultaneously was proved an exceptional historical occurrence in South-Eastern Europe. As Barrington-Moore jr. once put it, small Eastern European countries should not even be included in discussions on social and political change, as 'the decisive causes of their politics lie outside their own boundaries.' In one form or another, and despite occasional years of respite, it is fair to say that Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia became finally able to decide on their own course only after 1990, and then only carrying essential legacies which were not altogether their own doing, such as borders. What we have witnessed ever since is an attempt to reshape the basic foundations these states are built upon, namely their political identities and cultures, so considerably more than just 'democratization'.

To assist this twofold transformation is no simple business. Many theories and preconceptions had to be revised in the process. Some conclusions of the first decade in democracy promotion in South-Eastern Europe can be read in this collection of papers. They were presented at SAR's international conference co-organized with New Europe College on May 6, 2002. The conference was supported by many generous sponsors, listed below. We thank them and all the participants for making this event happen. Special thanks are owed to editor of Journal of Democracy, Larry Diamond, who chose Romania as his first East European stop.

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ASSESSING GLOBAL DEMOCRATIZATION A DECADE AFTER THE COMMUNIST COLLAPSE

Larry Diamond*

The latest wave of democratization has been a fertile ground for disputes among transitologists. The criteria for a "consolidated democracy", one decade after the collapse of the communist regimes, are still those that define the liberal democracies: free elections, rule of law, constitutional dealing with ethnic and religious conflicts. The South-East European states, such as Bulgaria and Romania, are dealing with problems that may, in the short term, transform these countries into illiberal or pseudo-democracies. One measure of good democratic performance is the public support for public institutions; sadly, the Balkan countries score poorly on this indicator. Tackling endemic corruption, improving governance and bridging the gap between the state and the civil society are key solutions for acceding to the category of consolidated democracies. Issues such as horizontal accountability, transparentization and dealing with the conflict of interests should be top on the agenda for Balkan decision-makers.

Key words: accountability, corruption, democratization, good governance, institutions building, political legitimacy, transition

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We are now almost thirty years into the “third wave” of global democratization and a dozen years or so past the collapse of Soviet-bloc communism. How are the new democracies of this generation doing? What have we learned from their experience that can inform and revise our theories of democracy?

At a superficial level, the global state of democracy appears highly encouraging. Over the past quarter-century, democracy has steadily expanded in the world to the point where it is now the predominant form of regime. However, swirling beneath this expansion in the past decade has been a dangerous counter-trend, a proliferating disenchantment among mass publics who increasingly view their political leaders (across various parties and branches of government) as corrupt, self-serving, and unable to address their countries’ serious economic and social problems. Thus, in many developing and postcommunist countries, people are losing confidence not simply in elected officials but in democratic institutions.

Unfortunately, the rising cynicism of disaffected publics is not without considerable justification. Governance in many new democracies is simply inadequate to meet the challenges of both economic and political development. And in the typical authoritarian regime - as in large parts of the former Soviet Union - governance is even much more corrupt, arbitrary, and exploitative. Here is what I consider to be the principal lesson of this new generation of democratic experience. To become stable, effective, and valued, democratic actors and institutions must govern well. Unless, governance in emerging democracies becomes more open, accountable, lawful, and responsive, economic development is not going to be generated (or at least not sustainable) and new, formally democratic institutions are not going to be consolidated. Improving governance in corrupt, shallow, illiberal democracies - and pseudodemocracies (or what we now call “electoral authoritarian” regimes) - requires a number of very difficult institutional reforms. These reforms are difficult because they challenge vested interests.

Let me first review the state of democratic progress and the sources of democratic malaise. Then I will return to the question of reform.

Global Democratic Trends

The last quarter of the twentieth century has witnessed the greatest expansion of democracy in the history of the world. If we define democracy in the minimal sense, as a system of government in which the principal positions of political power are filled through regular, free, and fair elections, then about three of every five independent states in the world are democracies today. In the judgement of Freedom House, there were 121 democracies in the world at the end of 2001 - the highest number in history. I think some of these regimes, possibly as many as seventeen, may be better classified as “competitive authoritarian,” in the sense that elections, while competitive, are either not free and fair or do not confer on those elected full power to rule. Even if we count

democracies very conservatively in this way, electoral democracy is now the predominant form of government in the world. When the most recent, third “wave” of democratization began in 1974, only about 28 percent of the states in the world were democracies.¹ In total, there were only 39 democracies in 1974. Today, there are about three times as many.

With the growth in the number of democracies has come a parallel, albeit more gradual, expansion of freedom in the world. The proportion of states rated as “free” by Freedom House increased from one-third in 1985 to over 40 percent in 1991, and today it stands at about 45 percent, nearly the highest level ever.² The average freedom score (on the Freedom House scale from 7 as least free to 1 as most free) stood at 3.47 at the end of last year, a full point lower than that in 1974, when the third wave began.

Within just a few years of the implosion of the Soviet communist empire, democracies increased, as a proportion of all the world’s states, from about 40 to 60 percent. Since 1995, however, the overall number of democracies in the world has remained more or less constant.

The march of democratic progress has been one of the defining developments of the late twentieth century. By the mid-1990s, democracy was the only broadly legitimate form of government in the world, and many other regimes had liberalized their politics at least superficially. Indeed, today well over half of the remaining non-democracies of the world portray themselves as democratic by holding regular, multiparty elections.³ Few regimes explicitly eschew and condemn the basic principles of democracy. And most of the non-democracies have significant societal movements or critics seeking democratic political change. Internationally, there has also been a distinct trend toward the affirmation of democratic principles, which are increasingly being codified into international law through various international and regional treaties and resolutions.⁴

However, there have been four other major caveats to the democratizing trend. First, as democracy has spread rapidly in the world, it has become a shallower phenomenon. The quality of governance and the rule of law have actually deteriorated in some existing democracies, and the more recently established democracies have tended to be less liberal and more corrupt. Second, the spread of democracy has been far from uniform across regions and

1 The previous two waves of global democratic expansion were the first long wave, ending with the breakdown of many democracies in the period between World Wars I and II, and the post-World War II wave, ending with the “second reverse wave” that began in the early 1960s. See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

2 Adrian Karatnycky, “The 2001 Freedom House Survey,” *Journal of Democracy* 13 (January 2002): 99-112. Freedom house rates as “free” those states with an average score between 1 and 2.5 on the combined 7-point scale of political rights and civil liberties.

3 Of the 71 regimes that are not rated by Freedom House as democracies, 46 have regular multiparty elections and only 25 are politically closed in this respect. See Larry Diamond, “Elections without Democracy: Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” *Journal of Democracy* 13 (April 2002): Table 1.

4 See Thomas Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,” *American Journal of International Law* 86 (January 1992): 46-91; Roland Rich, “Bringing Democracy into International Law,” *Journal of Democracy* 12 (July 2001): 20-34.

sub-regions. While some regions of the world are now overwhelmingly democratic, others have been only very partially touched by the democratic trend, while the Arab world remains without a single true democracy. Third, many of the regimes (particularly in Africa and the former Soviet Union) that once appeared to be “in transition” from authoritarian rule have settled into varying shades and forms of authoritarian rule that fall well short of democracy.⁵ Finally - and cause for perhaps the greatest concern - many of the democracies that have come into being in the past two decades exhibit growing problems of governance that are eroding their legitimacy among the public and undermining their stability. The global democratic trend is now at greater risk of reversal than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Some signs of this include the ongoing economic and political crisis in Argentina, the political turbulence in Venezuela, the U.S. embrace of authoritarian regimes as allies in the war on terrorism, and especially mounting citizen disgust with corruption worldwide.

The result of shallow democracy and poor governance is that most democracies are failing to achieve the legitimacy and stability that come with consolidation. Democracy is consolidated when all major parties and organizations and the overwhelming majority of the mass public believe that democracy is the best form of government for their society - better than any alternative they can imagine - and when they abide by the rules and constraints of the legal and constitutional system. Two metaphors illustrate this phenomenon. One is that “democracy becomes the only game in town.” The other is that the actors play by the rules of the game, not only in the legal letter but in the normative spirit as well. Most of the new democracies of the third wave are still at a considerable distance from achieving consolidation. In the postcommunist world, it is generally believed that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and the Baltic states all have consolidated their democracies, but not the states of the Balkan region, certainly not Russia and Ukraine, and unfortunately, not Romania.

The Rise of “Illiberal” Democracy

The “third wave” of democratization has seen a growing divergence between the form of electoral democracy and the deeper structure of liberal democracy. The latter entails not only regular, free, and fair elections but also a strong rule of law, buttressed by an independent judiciary and other institutions of accountability that check the abuse of power, protect civil and political freedoms, and thereby help to foster a pluralistic and vigorous civil society.⁶

With the dramatic expansion in the number of democracies during the third wave, the phenomenon of “illiberal democracy” has markedly increased.

5 Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” *Journal of Democracy* 13 (January 2002): 5-21.

6 Civilian control of the military is also necessary. For a more detailed conceptualization, see Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 10-13.

In 1974, over 80 percent of the democracies of the world were “liberal” (as indicated by a Freedom House score of 2 or better on the combined 7-point scale of political rights and civil liberties), and all of them were rated “free” by Freedom House. Even in 1987, almost three-quarters of the democracies of the world had average freedom scores (2, 1.5, or 1) indicating liberal democracy. However, as democracy exploded with the demise of communism, liberal democracies declined markedly as a percentage of the overall number of democracies in the world. By 1991, less than 60 percent of the democracies in the world were “liberal,” and that proportion continued to fall with the expansion of democracy through the mid-1990s. The presence of democracy in the world today is broader but also thinner than a decade ago. There has been a striking rise of illiberal democracy. In fact, some of these regimes are only ambiguously democratic, and many of them function very poorly in protecting human rights, controlling corruption, and addressing economic and social problems.

The shallow and illiberal nature of so many existing democracies in the world demands concern for several reasons. First, human rights and the rule of law are ends in themselves, and a number of democracies (as well as all authoritarian regimes) fall seriously short of their obligations to foster and protect the basic rights of their citizens. Second, there is growing evidence of a strong association between the quality and the legitimacy of democracy in the minds of the public. Citizen support for democracy is more robust, and democracy is more stable, when there is greater civil liberty, restraint of power, justice, and accountability.⁷ Third, underlying this relationship is the strong connection between the quality of governance and the stability of democracy. Where democracy is less liberal, governance is poorer - more corrupt, wasteful, incompetent, and unresponsive. This alienates citizens, heightens the contentiousness of politics, disposes the country to recurrent crisis, and - there is mounting statistical evidence to suggest - greatly retards the ability to attract international capital flows, obstructing economic growth. Liberal democracy is thus a major foundation of the architecture of good governance that fosters and sustains broad-based development, wins citizen confidence, and thus consolidates democracy.

The Mounting Problems of Democratic Governance

Since the mid-1990s, two global trends have been colliding, making for a more turbulent and unpredictable world politically. One trend has been the surprisingly robust and resilient third wave of democratization, producing a record number of electoral democracies. The other trend has been a spreading democratic malaise in many parts of the world. In most countries outside Western Europe and the four other Anglophone states, democracy (where it exists) is not functioning very well. Serious deficiencies of governance are

⁷ See Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, Chapter 5, for a summary of some of the evidence from public opinion surveys in developing and postcommunist countries.

heightening public cynicism about parties and politicians in general, and diminishing public esteem for democracy.

Three generic problems of governance underlie this malaise and obstruct the consolidation of democracy. The most urgent and pervasive problem is the weakness and frequently the decay of the rule of law. No problem more alienates citizens from their political leaders and institutions and undermines political stability and economic development than gross, endemic corruption on the part of government and political party leaders, judges, and officials up and down the bureaucratic hierarchy. The more endemic the problem of corruption, the more likely it is to be accompanied by other serious deficiencies in the rule of law: smuggling, drug trafficking, criminal violence, personalization of power, and human rights abuses. Even in the wealthy, established democracies of North America, Europe, and Japan, scandals involving political party and campaign finance have eroded public confidence in parties and politicians. In the less established democracies, where the legitimacy of democracy is not so deeply rooted, political corruption scandals are much more likely to erode public faith in democracy itself and thereby to destabilize the entire system. This is particularly so where corruption is part of a more general syndrome involving the growing penetration of organized crime into politics and government, the misuse of executive and police powers to intimidate and punish political opposition, and the politicization and ineffectual of key institutions of "horizontal accountability," such as the judiciary, the audit agency, and even the electoral commission. In many countries today, democracy is weak and insecure because political leaders lack sufficient democratic commitment - "political will" - to build or maintain institutions that constrain their own power. And civil society is too weak, or too divided, to compel them to do so.

The second broad source of malaise is economic. Economic reforms - insofar as they have even been implemented - have not yet generated rapid, sustainable economic growth in most of the developing and post-communist states. A few states have experienced rapid growth, and some others are at least growing modestly. However, in most new and troubled democracies, economic growth is not rapid enough, and is not broadly distributed enough, to lift large segments of the population out of poverty or a very tenuous economic existence. In most of Latin America, in some parts of Africa (such as South Africa), and in some Asian countries (Pakistan, the Philippines), the problem is compounded by extreme levels of inequality in income and wealth (especially, in rural areas, land). Very little progress has been made in these countries in reducing poverty and tempering massive inequalities of income and wealth. It is inconceivable that democracy can be consolidated in these countries unless substantial progress is made toward reduction of poverty and inequality.

The third problem is the inability to manage ethnic, regional, and religious differences in a peaceful and inclusive way. Cultural diversity is not, in itself, an insurmountable obstacle to stable democracy. With all of its problems, India has learned how to manage this diversity through complex institutions of federalism. Spain largely contained its secessionist pressures with the adoption

of a system of asymmetrical federalism, and, like the United States, Canada, and Australia, Europe is learning to adapt its democratic institutions to assimilate immigrants from a wide range of other countries and cultures. The problem arises when one ethnic or religious group seeks hegemony over others, or when some minorities perceive that they are being permanently and completely excluded from power, including any meaningful control of their own affairs.

These three problems - indeed, crises - of governance intensify and reinforce one another. Highly visible corruption accentuates the sense of injustice and grievance associated with poverty, unemployment, and economic hardship. Corruption has also been a major obstacle to the successful implementation of economic reforms, especially privatization. Poverty and economic stagnation reinforce the resentment of discrimination and political marginalization of ethnic and cultural minorities like the Roma. The entrenchment of political corruption and clientelism as the principal means of economic advancement aggravates ethnic and nationality conflicts, by raising the premium on control of the state and rendering politics a more intense, zero-sum struggle for control of economic opportunity. The weakness of the rule of law makes it easier for leaders of different nationalities and sectarian groups to mobilize violence at the grassroots as part of their efforts to win power for themselves. It also facilitates electoral fraud and violence. Underlying all of this in many countries is a weak commitment to the public good and the rule of law. Citizens and élites have low levels of trust in one another and in the future. Thus, they strategize on how to take from a stagnant stock of resources, rather than on how to cooperate and produce to enlarge that stock. They focus on ends rather than means - securing power and wealth by any means possible, rather than doing so with respect for the constitution and the law.

These interrelated crises of governance account for the main sources of democratic insecurity in the world today. The accumulation of poor governance and deferred economic reforms led to the implosion of the Argentine economy and the resignation of its president amid public rioting and looting in December 2001. Each of the three crises of governance is visible in the current travails of democratic performance in Nigeria and Indonesia, as well as in the Andean region and many other smaller countries. The weakness of the rule of law and continued economic stagnation and decay now also threaten the prospects for building democracy in Russia, Ukraine, and other post-Soviet states. In these and other countries, not only are major political leaders ambivalent (at best) in their commitment to democracy, but democratic political parties and civil society groups lack the resources, the organizational strength, and the popular bases to promote successful democratic reforms.

The failure to govern effectively/ultimately takes a toll on the legitimacy and stability of democracy. The democratic malaise is particularly visible in the trends in public opinion in Latin America. The 2001 Latinobarometro survey recorded significant drops in support for democracy among most of the countries it surveyed in Latin America. Between early 2000 and April-May 2001, support for democracy as "preferable to any other kind of government,"

declined from 60 percent to 48 percent in the entire Latin American region. Support for democracy declined in a number of key countries in the region, from 71 to 58 percent in Argentina, from 50 to 36 percent in Colombia, and from 39 to 30 percent in Brazil. These decreases do not always give rise to parallel increases in support for authoritarian rule, but there is, at a minimum, growing apathy with and alienation from democracy. Even in Uruguay and Costa Rica, the most stable and clearly consolidated democracies in the region, support for democracy declined by five and twelve percentage points respectively.

Latin America's democratic malaise is driven by the accumulation of governance problems. Three in five Latin Americans overall rated their country's economic situation as "bad" or "very bad" in 2001. A growing proportion, now four in five, believe that crime and drug addiction have "increased a lot" in recent years, and the same proportion give the same response about corruption. Trust in major democratic institutions is very low and continuing to decline; only around one in five trust the national congress or political parties; trust in the judiciary has declined to under 30 percent.⁸ While support for democracy appears greater in the postcommunist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, those democracies also suffer high levels of disaffection, with only 22 percent trusting parliament and only 13 percent political parties in 1998.⁹ And in Korea, support for democracy declined sharply after corruption scandals and economic crisis in 1997, from 69 to 54 percent.¹⁰

At the root of public disillusionment is anger over corruption. Across Central and Eastern Europe (including Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus), surveys find that over 70 percent of the public, on average, believe that their new regime is more corrupt than its predecessor, and in every postcommunist country surveyed a majority of the public believes the national government is corrupt.¹¹ The Latinobarometro, surveying public opinion in 17 Latin American democracies since 1995, has consistently found similarly high levels of cynicism. When asked whether corruption has increased a little or a lot, remained the same, or decreased a little or a lot in the last 12 months, an astonishing 75 percent of Latin Americans said in 2000 that corruption has increased a lot. Another 10 percent said corruption has increased a little and less than five percent perceived any decline.¹² Even in countries with strong support for democracy, such as Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Argentina, most people think corruption has increased a lot. These figures reflect a pervasive perception that

8 "The Latinobarometro Poll: An Alarm Call for Latin America's Democrats," *The Economist* July 28th 2001: 37-38.

9 Marta Lagos, "How People View Democracy: Between Stability and Crisis In Latin America," *Journal of Democracy* 12 (January 2001): Table 3, 143

10 Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, and Doh Chull Shin, "How People View Democracy: Halting Progress in Korea and Taiwan," *Journal of Democracy* 12 (January 2001): Table 1, 125.

11 Richard Rose, "How People View Democracy: A Diverging Europe." *Journal of Democracy* 12 (January 2001): 101.

12 Data provided by Marta Lagos from the Latinobarómetro. The percentages saying corruption has "increased a lot" were 75% in 1996, 79% in 1997 and again in 1998, and 75% in 2000.

parties and politicians of all stripes are corrupt and self-interested, rather than serving the public good, and this perception is alienating many citizens from the democratic process. Tenuous democracies cannot become consolidated and regimes of all kinds cannot improve the quality of their governance and their capacity for sustainable economic development unless corruption is significantly diminished.

The next decade will thus be a time of great danger and opportunity for democracy in the postcommunist states and the broader world. If the crises of democracy are not addressed with lasting reforms to improve governance by reducing corruption, strengthening judicial, administrative, and political institutions, and professionalizing the state bureaucracy, especially economic management, the stability and viability of democracy will continue to erode, a number of shallow democracies will sink further into the gray zone of pseudodemocracy, and new forms of authoritarianism will emerge. On the other hand, improvements in governance, even incrementally, could buy time for democracy to gradually sink deeper roots in political party life and diverse areas of civil society, as well as in the culture of a country. The path to democratic consolidation thus lies through political reform, and the political civil society mobilization that may help to bring it about.

A Strategy for Reform

If democracy is going to be deepened and consolidated, a number of reforms will be needed. The key priorities, it seems to me, are four:

- controlling corruption and improving the entire apparatus of horizontal accountability;
- strengthening the rule of law and the way it affects the lives of individual citizens, not only through judicial functioning but through more professional, vigorous and democratic policing;
- strengthening and democratizing political parties, and deepening their roots in society;
- developing stronger, more professional and capable states that are better able to respond to rising societal demands for better governance.

The problem is that the need for reform is inversely related to the possibility of it. The same forces in the state and ruling party and allied businesses that generate bad governance through corruption and waste also have the power to block efforts at legal and institutional change. Where the rule of law is weak, government is opaque and unaccountable, and corruption is widespread, political power bestows enormous wealth and privilege, and incumbents do not wish to give it up or have it checked. Corrupt political leaders will not initiate reform, and they will not accept it unless they are forced to.

The crucial missing ingredient for reform to improve and consolidate

democracy is political will. "Political will" is the commitment of a country's rulers to undertake and see through to implementation a particular policy course. At its most resilient, political will here involves a broad consensus among ruling elites, across parties and sectors of government, in favor of democratic and good governance reforms. But consensus is always imperfect, and will is most important at the top levels of government (among major political leaders and senior civil servants). There, political will must be robust and sincere. That is, reform leaders must be committed not only to undertake actions to achieve reform objectives, but also "to sustain the costs of those actions over time."¹³

Without a robust commitment to fundamental reforms - to control corruption, open up the economy, enhance the rule of law, respect basic civil and political rights, and allow independent centers of power both within and outside the government - capital is not going to flow in, people are not going to invest, economies are not going to grow, and democracy is not going to become consolidated.

How can the will to bring about basic, systemic reform be generated? Such political will is generated from three directions: from *below*, from *within*, and from *outside*. Organized pressure from below, in civil society, plays an essential role in persuading ruling elites of the need for institutional reforms to improve the quality of governance. There may also be some reform-minded elements *within* the government and the ruling party or coalition who, whether for pragmatic or normative reasons, have come to see the need for reform (but are reluctant to act in isolation). Finally, *external* actors in the international community often tip the balance through persuasive engagement with the rulers and the society and by extending tangible benefits for improved governance and penalties for recalcitrance.

International assistance can help to develop the first two forms of pressure, and in fact has done so in a number of countries in the past decade. When political will for systemic reform is clearly lacking, the principal thing that foreign assistance can do is to strengthen constituencies for reform in civil society, including NGOs, interest groups, think tanks, and the mass media. Assistance can enhance these actors' understanding of key reform issues, their knowledge of other country experiences, their coordination with one another, their capacity to analyze and advocate specific institutional and policy reforms, and their mobilization of support and understanding in society.

But foreign pressure and assistance can only help on the margins. A key lesson from international efforts to stimulate governance reform is that fundamental reform is only sustainable when there is a "home-grown" initiative for it. If changes in policies and institutions are promised merely in response to international pressures, they will not be seriously and consistently implemented.

13 Derick W. Brinkerhoff, "Identifying and Assessing Political Will for Anti-Corruption Efforts," Working Papers no. 13, *Implementing Policy Change* project, USAID, January 1999, p. 3. See also Brinkerhoff, "Assessing Political Will for Anti-Corruption Efforts: An Analytic Framework," *Public Administration and Development* 20 (2000): 242.

The indispensable factor, then, is mobilization from below, from civil society. Civil society actors - NGOs, professional organizations, mass media, and not least, think tanks - must launch a broad campaign for governance reforms. They should generate public awareness and debate of the underlying problems of governance, document through public opinion surveys citizen disenchantment with government performance, identify priorities for reform and potential allies within the state, and form from among their different constituencies and sectors robust coalitions for reform. The tactical goal should be to induce government leaders to sit down with opposition and societal forces to fashion a package of reforms that learns from international experiences but fits the country's specific problems and history. If this package of reforms is going to overcome vested opposition and win adopting, it must have broad support in society.

Fighting Corruption: Promoting Transparency and Accountability

On the demand side, civil society mobilization must raise public awareness of the costs of corruption, change expectations about ethical behavior, and empower the public with information. Citizens must come to see that corruption obstructs development, heightens inequity, and damages the entire country. Public advocacy NGOs, think tanks, the mass media, and explicit anti-corruption organizations - particularly local chapters of Transparency International - have a large role to play in documenting the problem, educating the public, and pressing for specific institutional reforms. Linkages of all kinds are important here: between advocacy NGOs and the mass media; between NGOs and sectoral interest groups (such as business chambers, trade unions, and professional associations); between local actors and international business; and between national movements and international networks and conventions. Where state actors are themselves pushing reforms, civil society actors should seek to forge public-private partnerships to deepen and accelerate the process. Advocacy NGOs need not be focused on the corruption issue per se in order to have an impact. In many countries, environmental groups have galvanized public action by exposing the links between environmental abuses and political corruption.¹⁴ In many countries, chambers of commerce, business associations, and other advocates for economic reform chip away at the enabling environment for bribery and corruption by seeking to streamline state regulations, eliminate unnecessary controls, and make government more transparent.¹⁵

The mass media have a crucial role to play in the campaign against corruption. An important element of an anti-corruption assistance program

14 "Promoting Transparency and Accountability: USAID's Anti-Corruption Experience," Center for Democracy and Governance, USAID, January 2000, p. 11. Many of the examples that follow are drawn from this document.

15 Summaries of such programs supported by the Center for International Private Enterprise can be found at www.cipe.org.

must thus be to enhance the skill - but also the professional responsibility - of the media in investigating and reporting on acts of corruption. National media associations need to strengthen professional skills and norms and to advocate for legislative and administrative reforms to improve transparency and media openness.

On the supply side, civil society organizations and coalitions can do much to generate the reform ideas and proposals:

- Supporting legal and regulatory reform to reduce government's involvement in areas more efficiently handled by the private sector. Here economic reform and anti-corruption efforts converge.
- Streamlining and making more transparent government procedures (including budgeting and procurement) to reduce the opportunities for corruption.
- Elaborating and improving governmental institutions of accountability, and
- Introducing incentives for officials to act in the public interest.

A reform coalition can study and draft ethics and financial disclosure laws for public officials. It can support privatization of state industries. It can help to establish independent government oversight and auditing institutions, streamline regulations, standardize and computerize government financial management, improve contracting procedures, train in fraud investigation, and reform and strengthen judiciaries.

But anti-corruption initiatives do not succeed unless demand proceeds apace to stimulate and sustain political will for reform. Institutional reforms must include some kind of independent, authoritative, and resourceful counter-corruption commission, designed in conjunction with reform advocates in civil society, and clearly empowered to investigate, expose, and prosecute corrupt conduct.¹⁶ The entire structure of horizontal accountability - including the courts, public auditors, ombudsman's office, and human rights commission - must have similar autonomy, energy, and resources.

Societal pressure, working in alliance with the international community is crucial in generating the will for reform. Indeed, it could be said that in the new democracies of the postcommunist and developing worlds - where corruption is one of the leading threats to the survival and consolidation of democracy - there is no more urgent challenge than for civil society to craft an agenda for institutional reform and to build political coalitions that can, over time, get that agenda adopted.

16 Larry Diamond, "Fostering Institutions to Contain Corruption," World Bank PremNotes, 1999/06/30, report no. 21572, <http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDServlet?pcont=details&eid=00009494601010505342546>, and Michael Johnston, "A Brief History of Anticorruption Agencies," in Schedler, Diamond, and Plattner, *The Self-Restraining State*.

DEMOCRACY BY DECREE

*Gerald Knause**

After the special UN administration was instituted in Bosnia and Kosovo, the international community, political researchers and local citizens have been faced with a very serious problem, having both theoretical and practical consequences for the process of democracy building: government by decree. The magnitude of crises and the high number of issues that had to be solved at once allowed little time for a proper consultation of citizens, and for creating in the citizenry a proper demand for accountability and democratic procedures of decision-making. Sometimes the decrees were even published in English only since the Official Gazette is read mostly by foreigners. Such incomplete governance raises serious questions about the perspective of transferring the political responsibility from international institutions to local politicians.

Key words: Bosnia, international community, governance, Kosovo, legitimacy, peacekeeping, state building, UN

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The problem of Bosnia is of course that you can talk endlessly about the lessons learned from different concrete programs, but also that literally everything has been tried. The amount of resources that have been spent in Bosnia or Kosovo, the other area where my think tank has been doing and is doing a lot of work, about these two places is that the amount of resources are resources that really I think most democracy promoters elsewhere in the world would be dreaming of having. I mean in Bosnia in 1996 16,000 SFOR troops under the NATO command moved in and established a myriad of institutions devoted to human rights - 2,000 police monitors, under the United Nations, OSCE human rights and democratization officials, NGOs of any type and kind. And in the middle of all this there is this special institution, the Office of the High Representative with the task to establish what the 1995 London peace implementation conference in 1995 defined as establishing human rights at the highest international standards, reintegration of refugees, enabling the country to take its rightful place in Europe within the framework of democracy and the rule of law. Now the Office of the High Representative grew immensely in those last six years, which I realized when I worked for the Office of the High Representative and found myself suddenly and unexpectedly in the role of a modern day colonial official. I thought that the first time when I was being driven around in central Bosnia and on the seat beside me was the mayor of the municipality of Zagrovic, which is a little tiny place in central Bosnia where there had been some quite bad events during the war, and I was there and had in front of me the map in charge of redrawing the municipal boundaries, that was the job coming from the Office of the high Representative, so I thought it was useful to consult. So I got the mayor and we were sitting in that car, we were driving through those villages and I remember feeling that this was really quite absurd. I was to realize that in fact we were all doing these kinds of things. By 1998, the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and now the Kosovo as well UNMIK (United Nations ruling organism) had become engaged in consolidating executive decisions in all areas from police to telling political parties how they should be structured, to decide whether to remove elected officials or unelected officials, civil servants, to what should happen with the local government, creating coalitions at municipal level and cantonal level and federation. The international community was sitting in at the meetings of the state institutions, imposing laws, imposing institutions - 250 decrees in the course of the last four years coming out of the Office of the high Representative and 80 elected or unelected appointed officials being removed by that very Office without any procedures. I do remember that case when a friend of mine was running on the corridors and asking how to impose a law at the level of the federation. That hadn't been done before and nobody could tell him, so he made up the rules himself and sent the law to the Official Gazzette where in the end it was published. Later on in the laws it was written that this decree applies immediately and it was part of the decree which was to be published in the Official Gazzette. In Kosovo we had another problem that the

laws were passed by UNMIK and actually took months to appear because the Official Gazette was also run by UNMIK and many of them have not been translated until today into the language of the Kosovars.

Talking about the rule of law, I've always thought that one of the basic principles is that laws that apply to people should be known by them and from that very simple idea we started having discussions in the Office of the High Representative and then much wider with a whole range of people from the World Bank and USAID and the embassies and the Foreign Ministry about what we were actually doing. It was quite clear that one part of the mission was peace implementation and I'll talk very little about this today - I think peace implementation in Bosnia has worked extremely well over the last six years. But the more interesting part was that the other things that we were doing had nothing to do with getting the army out of politics, nothing to do with arresting war criminals and relatively little to do with getting refugees back. What we were doing led me to the same interesting question where I think Bosnia becomes relevant for this theoretical discussion on democratization theories - which were the concepts that were guiding us to a mission, what was legitimate, what were we supposed to impose, when was it good to remove elected officials because of corruption or obstruction, what were the procedures, what were the limits, what couldn't we do? The hundreds of international officials working on the ground in Bosnia and Kosovo, a whole Sarajevo generation of people then went to take the leading positions in East Timor and then in Kosovo, in Macedonia and moving around the world as nation-building efforts have proliferated during the last five years. Once one has been a few years in Bosnia, then all these people knew all these missions because ultimately at one stage or another it was a form of experience in the Balkans.

What I realized is that strange paradox that the concepts that we are using - good governance, democratization, human rights - can extremely easy be combined in one's head with completely arbitrary action. There was absolutely nothing that made us feel schizophrenic about removing an elected official for life from any form of public employment on the basis of no public evidence in the name of the rule of law and not the rule of man, which was exactly what was written in some of those decrees. And then we started wondering what is all about these concepts. If good governance can be combined in the mind of West European or American democratization officials so easily with arbitrary unaccountable action, we began to understand how you can be a local political leader and begin to talk about good governance and end of corruption and transparency and democratization and trying to do exactly the same thing, with one big difference, that usually didn't have the power of decree [...] But the theoretical question was more interesting because we've now been in Bosnia for six years, we had a second mission in Kosovo - we, the international organizations and institutions - and it doesn't seem to be getting any better. At this moment, the international community is contemplating radical changes to the country's judiciary, so radical that the Council of Europe in the internal discussion said, well, we don't really feel good about this because Bosnia is just

joining the Council of Europe and if you fire all the judges and redesign the judicial system by decree over a 4-month period and in addition impose the criminal code and if you do all this within a year, because so long you have donor funding, it might set a bad precedent.

Now, that argument is not going to win the debate because we realize only for that international organizations when they get too much power they actually behave very similar to any other institutions in such circumstances. But there we cannot leave it as such, because it would be too simple to suggest that the solution is for international organizations to adjust, they are the problem and that's of course clearly not the case. The problem then becomes of defining something that I think is going out of fashion because it's a very difficult debate, the preconditions of democracy. Not wanting to think about preconditions because it is such a touchy issue has led us say that ultimately everything is a precondition for democracy. I mean in those practical early morning meetings between the ambassadors in Sarajevo, between the principals of international organizations in Kosovo, when the pillar heads sat together, literally whatever you wanted to do you could always find a way to link it to an essential precondition for stability and democratization. And of course there are corrupt local elites, electorates that we don't really know because they've been intimidated and this whole nexus of organized crime, corruption, incompetence, obstructionism really forces international actors to step in and take decisions. What developed is really strikingly similar to the rhetoric of William Howard Tuft, the first American governor to the Philippines. When he went to the Philippines with the objective of establishing Anglo-Saxon institutions, he never meant to involve the participation of what he considered to be the corrupt local elite. And this is also very similar to the arguments of the British liberals in the early 19th century, when, John Stuart Mill, gave his great description of how important it is for individuals to realize themselves in liberty. He also made a very strong argument for progressive superintendence, the argument being that certain countries or civilizations were simply not ready for self-rule and that what they need is vigorous despotism. This mode of government is *as legitimate as any other*. [...]

Now that is strange that in many ways our thinking, our conceptual language that seems to have developed so far, seems to be so near, despite the current focus on corruption and governance and democratization and human rights, can so easily, so with 19th century benign British colonialism activity.

And that raises two problems. The first problem is the extreme case of failed states. If that's going to happen, not very often, but from time to time, I think there's a real challenge, a real frontier for the people thinking of democratization theory. On one hand democratic countries engage in trusteeship when the objective is establishing democratic government, on the other, benign experience of Bosnia and Kosovo shows us that the national organizations, with all the rhetoric, are no more willing to be controlled or limited in their freedom of movement than any other political actor from anywhere else. The practical question is whether we do actually have the tools

to do it differently and this is where I point to the long-term engagement, the issue being that if you want to build on what exists, if you follow the World Bank recent recommendations and the World Development Report that institution-building can only work where it builds on existing structures, then what you also have to accept is that it's going to be a lot more knowledge-intensive.

One of the most striking things is how little attention is being paid in many of these international missions to actually identify local opportunities, finding out what the local context is. In Bosnia and Kosovo and in many other contexts, we have very intrusive interventions by people who know very little about the country and about procedures, how to establish procedures of feedback, of general transparency and accountability, of admitting when things don't work. And all of this requires quite a shift. When I read the World Development Report I thought that means to have much more staff in the field. It would be much more complicated, it would have to explain more if it wants to build on what exists and have participatory mechanisms. It would be much more expensive and there is a big problem for the democratization work I think that goes beyond Bosnia that taking seriously our principals is actually going to be a lot more difficult and for that reason a lot of donors and governments that want to have quick results are going to resort to quick solutions which in the case of these protectorates has been the ruling by decrees. The final result is that we don't know how to go on. We have these two countries which are relatively stable, Kosovo and Bosnia, where we've had an enormous number of elections, a lot of money spent on democratization, all the human rights legislation in place, but where the international actors have completely crowded out the space for local politics and where a big issue is now how to move from establishing the peace to establishing a functional political and democratic life.

THREE LESSONS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

*Thomas Carothers**

Some lessons have been learned - or should have been - by the providers of assistance for democratization in the post-communist world. First, while the international community was instrumental in ensuring the elections are free and fair, party building was a disappointing affair. In spite of the large amounts of resources invested, for example, in the right-wing coalitions in Romania and Bulgaria, these organizations remained blatantly unprofessional and suffered major electoral setbacks. Second, an NGO sector has been built, but its sustainability and accomplishments are still in question. Third, media assistance helped many independent publications stay alive and improved the skills of journalists, but left unaddressed the issues of motivation and political control, especially in that part where stakes are highest: television stations. Finally, and encompassing all of the above, the donors should understand that the process is as important as the end points in the transition process - or even more. How you do it - responding to real needs in societies, engaging local partners, following strict democratic procedures - should take precedence over achieving milestones and predefined end-points.

Key words: assistance programs, civil society, Eastern Europe, legitimacy, party building, end of transition

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Democracy aid in the 1990s consisted of a series of assistance programs around what is by now a familiar range of issue areas and institutions. With respect to who is doing it, the answer turned out to be: lots of organizations are doing it, both governmental and nongovernmental, public and private, North American and West Europeans and others. And with respect to why they were doing it, all the sinister theories turned out to be replaced by the unfortunately boring conclusion which was that people were just actually trying to promote democracy. The underlined and sort of conspiratorial ideas that there was some deeper agenda partly I think didn't prove as true.

I think we should start looking at the lessons learned by noting that there were three kinds of cases in the last 10 years and they are quite different from each other. The broadest category are the countries which made some kind of transition to pluralism in 1989 or 1990 and have been struggling to make it work since then. The second category are the countries where non-democratic leaders, usually semi-authoritarian leaders or authoritarian in the case of Belarus, held on for some or most of the 1990s and the international community tried to mobilize efforts to orchestrate their downfalls, such as in Serbia, Croatia, Slovakia, Belarus. This is a quite different profile of democracy assistance than the first category of countries. Then, the third category are the countries that experienced severe civil conflict and the international community has moved essentially into what might be considered an international trusteeship rule, such as Bosnia and Kosovo and, to a lesser extent, Macedonia. And these presented also a quite different profile of democracy assistance efforts.

I'm going to focus my remarks on the first category, the broadest category, but I'll make a brief comment of the other two categories, as well. The efforts to mobilize against semi-authoritarian leaders, the international community did learn that it was able to play a significant role, but I think the most important lesson, which I'm not sure it learned, but maybe it has, at least partly, is that the success of such efforts was really based upon the skill and the courage and the entrepreneurship of the local actors [...]. Truth should be told, that the real victories were internal, the external assistance was only an extra-help, it was not the cause of the political change itself. That's actually quite a profound lesson and one in that the United States still struggles with, as it confronts desires for political change in other parts of the world. In situations of trusteeship, I think the ultimate lesson is turning out to be that to promote democracy through a trusteeship experience involves a basic contradiction that has not been resolved.

Turning then to the main category of cases, let me mention just a few lessons about what democracy aid has proved it can and can't do, by looking at some of the basic areas in which it has attempted to do things in the last 10 years. To start with, democracy promoters have been able to make some real contribution to make elections more free and fair, that has been, as you know, a huge improvement in the quality of the elections in the region and international aid has played some role in that. At the same time, however, democracy promoters have not been able to make sharp differences with political party development and in some cases that meant a high degree of frustration. The

example of Romania is very relevant in this regard - the great deal of assistance from the United States and a few other countries went to the Democratic Convention across the 1990s and today the political forces that were at the heart of that movement, particularly the Peasants' Party, are in an extremely weak condition. Similarly, in Bulgaria there was an amount of US assistance to the UDF, some feel it was quite beneficial, others don't, but clearly there's a broader problem in Bulgaria with the US commitment to the UDF as a political force in the 1990s. And one can number other cases as well. So, in elections, like I said, some significant contributions have been made, but on political parties there is a more doubtful record.

With respect to civil society, which of course has been one of the areas where democracy promoters have talked a very great deal about, they have clearly made a large contribution to helping build NGO sectors, made up of advocacy groups, think tanks and some other organizations. It's absolutely true that external aid has played a significant role in the construction of NGO sectors in Eastern Europe. It's less clear, however, whether or not, first of all, this NGO sector is sustainable over the long term. Arguments have been made about the danger of equating NGO sectors with civil society and this is a question that still needs further examination and debate. And then, thirdly, there are questions about even with these NGO sectors in place, whether or not they really meet the demands of the citizenry or are mechanisms to channel their interests to the state. So NGO sectors have been built, but their sustainability and accomplishments are still in question.

With respect to media, which was an area of fair amount of Western assistance in the 1990s, assistance has clearly helped to professionalize some journalists and many journalist training programs did change the lives of a number of individual journalists. The assistance also helped independent publications stay alive and many independent publications or some magazines should thank international assistance for still being there. But this aid has not been able to do much about the problematic state of the most important media, which is, of course, television. As we know, the political control of state television is still a major problem in most of the countries in the region and private ownership of electronic media has proved to be problematic in various political ways, as well. The international aid has not really been able to do much about that.

On the side of the state, which is the third pillar after elections and political parties, on the one hand, civil society on the second, the international assistance in the 1990s was directed to legislatures, judicial sectors and local governments. Just very briefly, we can say that with legislatures there was just a very slow and in some cases nonexistent record of improvement. We see today legislatures that are very poorly valued institutions in their societies despite endless study visits and technical assistance. [...] As regards the local government, I think here one sees a bit more progress in some cases I think even in Romania. Here we see international donors, I'd say particularly from United States, but also Western European donors, starting to make some progress, but again the record

has been slow and disappointing to many people, but I don't think not without hope.

I think there are three broader lessons that cut across sectors. People ask me what people really learned or what they should have learned, these are the three lessons that I would point to, although they are not very satisfying.

The first lesson: it is actually much less important what you do than how you do it. This has been the hardest thing for donors to understand. It really doesn't matter what institutions you worked with or what people you worked with, it depends on whether you can really find the methods of true partnership. You can genuinely empower people, you can create a relationship of trust between a donor and a recipient, you can show you are there for the long term, you can get inside the fabric of society and be responsive to real needs. If you can do those things, it really doesn't matter what you do, because then you are going to do something good for the people and the society and creating something good. But that's the hardest lesson for the international bureaucracy and the large aid agencies to learn, because it involves the most radical proposition as they essentially change the nature of themselves or the organizations or of how they do business.

The second lesson is that creating processes of change is much more important than achieving end points. There's been an obsession with end points, partly because of the end of history syndrome and the people's minds that end points are so definable now in terms of targets, models and institutions that we like to see in place. The programs have been very much structured around achieving end points, rather than creating processes of change. Again, it is much more important to stimulate processes of change in people's minds and in their actions than to start trying to get people gravitate around certain kinds of institutional behavior. So, when you go to national legislatures for example and say *If you just had a committee system, you would be organized, you'd have agenda, so let's train you to have a committee system.* That's a classical institutional end point program. They can have the committees and the national legislature doesn't change one bit, because you haven't altered changed anything substantial.

The third lesson is that exporting particular models, which I've been critical of in a lot of my work, is actually less of a problem than I initially thought. And the Eastern Europeans have been bombarded with models over the last 10 years - French models, American models, Canadian models, all kinds of models - and it turns out they like having a lot of models because they have a sort of eclecticism about their transitions and they are determined to make their own choices. Actually in some cases it's helpful to have a lot of models, as long as they are given the space to make their own choices. But so many people are acting in these societies from the outside that the heterogeneity of models has helped alleviate the problem of allowing an eclecticism of models and encouraging that is actually in some ways a good thing.

When we look at the state of democracy today, what we see is that looking ahead at the next 10 years the major issues and problems are often linked to the fact that democracy aid has a lot of trouble. So when I talk about *the end of*

transition paradigm, one of the implications of that approach for democracy promoters is that the idea of a sort of three-part model that they had in the 1990s is focused on elections, building civil society and gradually change and rebalance the nature of the state. What people did best in the 1990s, which was to promote free and fair elections and build NGO sectors is not going to be that relevant to the essential challenges of the next 10 years. It doesn't mean that it is not important to keep having free and fair elections and to continue to have vital and active NGO sectors. But the period of constructing those institutions has already been achieved. The problems we are facing now are not going to be solved by simply the existence of those institutions. And so there's a real exhaustion in some way of programmatic ideas because people like to keep on doing what they did best, because they've proven they're good at it and that it is hard to face the new problems. When we look at the problems we've been discussing here, they are generally things that democracy assistance in the first 10 or 12 years didn't focus on very much, for example the general problem of renovating political elites and trying to get a sense in the society of regeneration of the political elites, that people can believe in. This is a kind of problem that really hasn't been focused on in democracy assistance. Similarly, making governments responsive to citizens at a day-to-day level, tackling the recalcitrant bureaucracy and so on hasn't been very much a part of a democracy agenda, because you noticed when I talked about the state-oriented programs - legislatures, judiciary, local government - they are not executive branch programs. The executive branch was largely left untouched by democracy assistance in the 1990s, which is puzzling. When you think back, you wonder why that was the case. Well, it was so because a lot of assumptions of democracy promoters were that the executive branches were too strong and that the communist system was necessary to reorder the balance of the state and of other sectors. Therefore, we'll let the World Bank, we do administrative reform and others will work at the executive branch ministries, but the democracy assistance community was absent in some ways from that, which I think it's been a mistake. And then, reform of police and in some countries intelligent services was badly left behind and this again has not been a focus of very much attention. Democracy promoters don't like to work with the police, they have guns, they are often not speaking English, they are not like NGOs, they are not much fun to work with. But if you ask people what they would like, they would like greater personal security and police could actually help them in some ways and that's been an area badly neglected. And then, of course, the issue of ethnic tensions was one that didn't work very well in the democracy assistance framework, it didn't fit into the three-part model I have talked about and then it blew up in the face of the Western community again and again in former Yugoslavia across the 1990s.

So, to conclude, the challenges that democracy promoters and democracy itself still face are quite large. Democracy does have some achievements that you can use to move forward. [...] There will be a special challenge when we look at the basic fact that the United States to a large extent is just pulling out of

democracy assistance in this region and the European aid is not focused on democratization per se, but more on preparing for enlargement, which is actually quite a different task - it has some relationship with democratization, but actually it is quite different. So, neither of the two largest donor actors, generally speaking, United States and Western Europe, are present in Eastern Europe at a time when we witness in fact a crisis of democratic governance and democratic legitimacy.

LEGAL REFORMS AND IMMATURE DEMOCRACIES: A DEVELOPMENTAL CHALLENGE THE RISK OF INSTITUTIONAL IMPORTS

*Leonid Polishchuk**

In the last decade the post-communist world was subject to various attempts to build institutions, largely by implanting with little adaptation imports from the Western world. Most of the time, these well-intended efforts have failed, as we can see in the case of Russia. It is about time the international assistance shifted its focus from the transfer of institutions to creating genuine domestic demand for them. Property rights are an area where such a shift would be welcome.

Key words: assistance, institutions, knowledge, oligarchs, privatization, property rights, Russia, transition

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Successful transition hinges on the ability of a post-communist nation to establish and maintain key institutions of the competitive market economy. In early years of reform the emphasis was made on *supplying* such institutions by reformist governments, even if the *demand* for new institutions was weak. Establishing legal and regulatory foundations for the new economic order was the top priority of international donors; it is symptomatic that the latter preferred to work with the executive branches rather than with legislators who often opposed donor-sponsored reforms, reflecting a lack of appreciation of the proposed changes by domestic constituencies. At times, the task of economic institution-building was in conflict with another track of post-communist transformation – establishing and strengthening institutions of representative democracy.

A good illustration of ambivalent attitude to publicly provided market-augmenting institutions is an initial lack of demand for secured property rights. Early on in transition none of the major social and economic forces were champions of property rights protection and institutions that support property rights, such as efficient corporate governance, third party contract enforcement, etc. Small businesses were focusing on gap-filling activities, making arbitrage profits and operating mainly in spot markets, which did not require institutional foundations necessary for more sophisticated transactions. Traditional enterprises were opposed to restructuring and layoffs that would have inevitably ensued, were the corporate governance laws properly followed. Newly emerging financial and industrial conglomerates also resisted efforts to establish transparent and enforceable property rights regimes, as this would have restricted opportunities for extra-market appropriation of economic assets. The general public often resented the outcomes of chaotic privatization which were perceived as socially unjust and thus lacking legitimacy.

Without grassroots demand, endorsement and support, supply-driven reforms often failed to produce the expected outcomes. Ability of governments to implement the rules enacted *de jure* was severely constrained by a lack of necessary cadre and expertise, inertia of old practices, corruption in law-enforcing agencies and courts, and above all – by rejection of the superimposed rules of the game by the main players and stakeholders. Limited enforcement capacity of the state was overstretched, leading to rampant non-compliance with virtual impunity. Those few inclined to go by the book were putting themselves at a competitive disadvantage by bearing the cost of compliance without reaping the benefits of operating in a rule-based economy.

However, over time the appreciation of the institutions that underpin modern market economies has started to grow even in the countries heretofore notorious for their neglect of the formal rule of law. Several factors are contributing to these profound changes in institutional preferences and public mood. First, once a bulk of economic assets and resources have been by various means put under private control, further unrestricted contest for property rights becomes economically self-defeating, turning participants into victims of a large-scale “tragedy of the commons”. This makes those who have secured controlling stakes in the new market economies willing to “draw a line”,

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collectively endorse the status quo and henceforth abide by formal rules. Second, to move beyond the niche- and pre-existing capacity-filling stage, private businesses need investments, including those from sources external to a given firm. Such investments would be forthcoming only if the institutional regime provides sufficient assurance of contract enforcement and investor rights, thus stimulating more-than-arm's length transactions.

More generally, economic and political stabilization increases planning horizons of economic agents. Long-term transactions, unlike those conducted on spot markets, are much more sensitive to the quality of institutional environment, and potential beneficiaries of such transactions become agents for a rule-based economy. Finally, over time the ability of the state to enforce rules and ensure compliance grows, and an efficient publicly supplied institutional regime becomes a distinct possibility. This raises interest in government policies as increasingly relevant and potentially beneficial for businesses.

All of the above trends feed growing *demand for the rule of law*. Earlier prevalent institutional surrogates, such as informal sector operations, private contract enforcement, etc., are increasingly perceived as constraining economic development and growth. This creates a grassroots pressure for reforms – a major political resource which can accelerate transition and establish functional institutions in which broad constituencies of beneficiaries would have ownership and stake. Public enforcement of thus established rules would be augmented by private one, when officially imposed sanctions for non-compliance are compounded by ostracism, rebuke, undermined reputation, etc.

However, these opportunities come with their own problems and challenges, as political systems of nascent democracies are often failing to materialize the growing demand for market-supporting institutions and policies into the necessary laws and regulations. Sometimes, in defiance of common wisdom, a widely shared perception of an imminent “advent” of a rule-of-law-based economy creates policy and legislative gridlocks.

An explanation should be sought in intensified lobbying pressure to craft the new legal order in a way that would serve organized interests. Once there are common expectations that long-term rules of the game are to be established and credibly enforced, this greatly raises stakes in influence activities, as political actors are vying to secure for their constituencies favorable legal regimes that would release massive gains capitalized over the many years the law is expected to be in effect. Vice versa, political opposition to laws which could infringe on the interests of a lobby-represented constituency becomes much more vigorous in order to prevent losses that will also be capitalized for the life of the law.

Recent evidences show that when transition nations become ripe to establish a functional legal system, acute political conflict over the way the rule of law will be crafted could dramatically slow down legal reform, and at times bring it to a standstill, especially over potentially divisive issues. Countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are following the continental legal model, where parliaments have a virtual monopoly over law-making, and this makes major legal reform efforts vulnerable to lobbying pressure.

But perhaps most disturbingly, narrow interests have strong advantages in molding the law over broad-based constituencies which are politically disorganized, dispersed, lack economic resources for effective lobbying, and the clout necessary to have their preferences and needs incorporated into a new legal compact. Development of representative democracy in post-communist countries is lagging behind the needs to accommodate the growing demand of transition economies for legal bases.

Often, general public shows little interests in the extensive law-making agenda of the government, which further exacerbates the danger of a capture of legal reform by narrow interests. The media is not providing the necessary coverage of this process either, preferring to cater to prevailing popular demand for tabloid-type journalism. Media outlets with narrower circulation, which comment on policy matters, do not have the readership necessary for commercial viability, and are subsidized by private sector entities, thus losing their impartiality. Think tanks that are mushrooming across the region give clear preference to communicating their policy analyses to powers that over presenting such analyses to the general public. Transparency laws that have been enacted in many countries of the region to provide opportunities for public debates of draft laws, regulations, and pending policy decisions, are not used to their full extent due to a lack of political organization of large stakeholder groups, and of culture of civic participation in policy making process. Overall, for the general public the legal reform process is unfolding behind a “veil of ignorance”, which undermines the accountability of executive and legislative branches to voters, and thus increases susceptibility of policy makers to influence activities.

A lack of public involvement in the legal reform could lead to distributional distortions of the new legal order that would favor the groups capable of political organization at the critical time of intensive law-making efforts. Economic efficiency of such legal regime is also likely to be compromised, because the interests that dominate the legal reform do not fully internalize the costs of distortions resulting from lobbying. Among the potential casualties are small and medium sized enterprises which often lack political representation and which would be confronted with barriers to competitive entry raised by large incumbents.

Political representation and influence of presently unorganized large social and economic groups is likely to grow over time, and when these groups will have accumulated sufficient clout, and realized that the legal regimes are biased against them, they will demand a redress. Such delayed accommodation, however, is undesirable, as it undermines the stability and credibility of the newly established legal system.

To prevent such failure of the nascent political markets in the transition region, civil society activists need to step up their efforts to raise public awareness of the ongoing legal reform efforts, to support grassroots self-organization initiatives and movements, to make full use of the opportunities

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presented by the transparency and freedom of information provisions, etc. This is also a field for potentially fruitful international cooperation, as it would put domestic legal reform processes into a region-wide comparative perspective. Comparative analyses of legal regimes and public policies in various transition countries, including those that are scoring better in terms of participatory democracy, would allow to get early warning of impending capture of the legal reform by narrow interests, and mobilize the public against such trends.

Case study: Russia

I think we all agree that over time the percentage or the sheer of knowledge in international assistance to transition countries has been declining and that shouldn't come as a surprise because in the early years of the transition there was a great demand for very basic fundamental institutions which were developed and set elsewhere, so that these countries hadn't their own experience of such basic institutions as market institutions, stock exchanges, tax systems, so on and so forth. However, over time, the percentage of knowledge and the share of knowledge was declining and my question is what sort of intellectual contribution from elsewhere, from the outside of a transition country is still required. People usually disagree about a large number of things concerning post-communist transition, but if there is something that anyone agrees about that is the conviction that economic prosperity should be domestically grown. It's certainly impossible to supply from outside of the country all the necessary resources. Another thing which was a part of the common wisdom about transition was that economic prosperity is contingent to the reliability of institutions – institutions which are required for a competitive market economy. But then the question was whether the institutions that are required should also be grown locally or should be implanted from elsewhere. I think the first attempt over at least the first half of the last decade was to as much possible implant institutions. Sometimes this approach worked, most of the time it did not. In Russia, for example, there is a vast cemetery of failed reform efforts, where institutions were attempted to be implanted from outside, without any concern for local conditions and peculiarities. I think it is incidental that as far as assistance in democracy development was concerned, much of the assistance was concentrated at the legislative part of government. However, as far as the economic reform was concerned, much of the technical assistance concentrated at the executive branch of government, for a variety of reasons – Parliaments were not usually particularly receptive to prescriptions of Western experts and the prevailing mode was to rely on a small core of reformers that were trusted to push through the reform and it comes as no surprise that such reforms were usually rejected by the legislature. As a result, people became to realize that it is quite important if the society is mature enough to adopt some of the institutions in question and for that matter if the society requires these institutions. And that changed the focus of technical assistance from delivering institutions, as an immediate objective, to perhaps

creating demand for such institutions and, as a result, to enhance the chances that these institutions will get rooted and will function efficiently.

In this context, I would like to bring to attention an attempt to create demand for a particular institution, again I'm talking about Russia, attempt that in my opinion failed nonetheless. I think it is instructive for us to have look at this. The idea in question is Russian privatization. Most of you remember that in early 1990s a bulk of Russian assets have been privatized in a very rapid and in some way nontransparent, chaotic way in a year and a half. Although many people had misgivings about the efficiency and legitimacy of such a privatization, the main justification was that most of the national economy privately owned was supposed to create a constituency for secure property rights, because, naturally, private owners would expect that the government would support and enforce their property rights. So, in this case, the creation of a demand for a particular institution was a very specific objective that those who were behind this effort had in mind. Well, that didn't happen and, despite of the fact that much of the economy has been privatized, until quite recently secure property rights have not been provided in Russia. What this privatization created instead was a pattern of oligarchic capitalism and these oligarchs were not the ones to secure the property rights.

I would argue that at least over the last couple of years the situation is changing in Russia. In fact, it has changed quite significantly in that people are becoming more appreciative of the role of public institutions and of the rule of law in general. Granted if you look at the current attitudes to public institutions, to the government and, a notable exception, the president, these attitudes can still be described as mistrust and contempt. But at least there is a feeling in the society that public institutions start to matter. The society has passed the survival mode, there is more stability and predictability and people are becoming increasingly aware and concerned about how the rules of the game in the society should be structured not in the short run, but for the years to come. And that creates awareness of public institutions and feeling and hope that maybe the society can develop an efficient system of rule of law, that will be conducive to economic growth and will be useful for the market economy. Why these changes of attitude have occurred, have happened, I think is a separate story and I have some explanations. What I would like to do instead is to point out that this new situation creates new opportunities, new challenges for policy makers and for the international community and that, I think, will allow us to address the question we asked in the first place, that is what sort of intellectual contribution post-communist transition could require at this stage. Opportunities are quite clear – there is a chance that politics will be finally taken away from opportunistic and often corrupt elites and put back in the hands of the people. This in itself is a very important end, but it is also a very useful means, because that will probably allow to customize the institutional framework of the country to the needs of the society and that in itself should probably provide an efficient outcome of the post-communist transition.

THE BALKANS: DIFFERENT, BUT WHY AND HOW?

*Venelin I. Ganev**

After more than a decade of study of postcommunist transitions the contention that there are profound differences between "Balkan" and "Central-European" countries has attained the status of an unassailable truth. And yet, comparative studies that purport to describe and explain these differences are often littered with simplistic clichés, disturbing stereotypes and analytical "black boxes."

Key words: Balkans, communist legacies, culture, East/West comparison

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Even a cursory look at the literature on post 89 Eastern Europe will quickly reveal that ambitious and seemingly sophisticated cross-regional comparisons amount to little more than an explicit endorsement of a set of "common wisdoms" that, as Maria Todorova magnificently demonstrated in her "Imagining the Balkans," have been in stock for at least two centuries. It makes a lot of sense, therefore, to ask why the attempts to explore diverging trajectories of postcommunist development have been so distinctly underwhelming.

Naturally, scholars and intellectuals who ponder this somewhat saddening puzzle are likely to focus on the enduring appeal of the hostile "animus" and the persisting prejudices at work in, to use a fancy expression, "the construction of the Balkans as "Europe's other." And the saliency of this approach cannot be denied. But it is also conceivable that the major problem is the choice of analytical tools for examining the undeniable differences between the Balkan countries and the rest of Eastern Europe. In other words, the trouble is not so much with the substantive findings offered in the literature - findings that relentlessly and somewhat tediously replay the theme of how the "developed" is superior to the "backward." The more fundamental issue concerns the types of analytical strategies employed for establishing dissimilarities. And the major problem in that regard is the indiscriminate and at times downright confusing use of the notion of "legacies." It is precisely the invocation of legacies - or the claim that diverging patterns of postcommunist development are "deeply rooted" in different historical pasts - that in fact functions as a license for resurrecting stereotypes. And it is precisely when the big talk about ineffable *longue durees* is unleashed that explanations of the variety of postcommunist experiences degenerate into empirically rudimentary and analytically crude claims.

It is advisable, then, to use the treacherous notion of legacies with caution and prudence. Here are four commonsensical recommendations that may help streamline the on-going effort to explain why the Balkans are "different":

A. THE LAW OF DIMINISHING RETURNS OF GOING BACK TO HISTORY

Insofar as explaining differences in the postcommunist era is concerned, a "law of diminishing returns of going back to history" seems to be afoot. Put differently, the more recent the historical period linked to post 89 "variations," the more promising the research projects and the more convincing the explanations are. Conversely, the more distant the legacies under consideration, the greater the probability that complex evidence will be rather inelegantly simplified in order to fit a pre-conceived explanatory scheme. Understandably, from that perspective the most important decade is the 1980s - a decade that, for the most part, remains surprisingly under- or one-sidedly researched. What were the processes of stratification in communist parties on the Balkan countries as compared to the rest of Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe?

What was happening in state bureaucracies - what networks of influence emerged, how did patterns of *de facto* control over resources shift, and what, if any, were the institutional repercussions of attempts to "optimize" the working of planned economies? Did any "alternative groups" emerge in society, what were the resources that they acquired, and what were their strategies for interacting with communist party-states? Surely these questions seem much more interesting than trite reflections on the differences between the Habsburg and Ottoman political spaces.

B. DISAGGREGATING "LEGACIES"

One compelling insight that comes out of the literature on postcommunism is that the very concept of "historical legacies" is too amorphous and indeterminate to be usefully deployed in comparative studies. It has to be disaggregated in order to fit particular projects and serve concrete analytical purposes. Over the last 2-3 years several outstanding authors have provided solid guidelines in that regard - one may think of Stephen Hanson's attempt to delineate various dimensions of "the Leninist legacy" and hypothesize about how these dimensions mold postcommunist political and social practices; of Herbert Kitschelt's effort to link dissimilarities of party systems to differences in levels of coercion and strategies for bureaucracy-building employed under communism, and Anna Grzymala-Busse's research on how different patterns of cadre-recruitment in the 1980s shaped the national political arenas that emerged in the 1990s. In the light of such sharply focused analytical interpretations of postcommunist differences broad references to "Balkan history" appear eminently unhelpful. That is why it is incumbent upon those who talk about "legacies" *tout court* to identify with a fairly high degree of exactness the factors and causal chains that underpin their explanations of variation in postcommunist development.

C. THE IMPERATIVE OF SCALING DOWN ANALYTICAL LEVELS.

If and when differences between, say, Hungary and Romania are established, it would be prudent **not** to locate these differences on the highest analytical levels. This is so because, firstly, trained comparativists will be hard pressed to produce evidence that there is "significant variation on the dependent variable," in other words that the process of "democratic consolidation" has generated qualitatively different outcomes in "Central Europe" and in the "Balkans." But the scaling down of analytical claims is also necessary because, secondly, the propensity for grand generalizations may do a disservice to the scholarly community: important opportunities for fine-tuning research programs and enriching analytical repertoires will be missed.

For example, empirical findings pertaining to difference are as a matter of

course transposed into claims about "levels of democratic consolidation," "the strength of civil society" or "progress towards the rule of law." The same evidence, however, might be much more convincingly analyzed within more craftily devised analytical frameworks. For example, one may forego the exciting talk about "consolidated" and "unconsolidated" democracies and discuss instead the varying degrees of diffuseness in the party system in the context of free and fair democratic elections. While from that vantage point the differences between Hungary and Romania will still be palpable, the researcher will not be impelled to invoke the contrast between "true" and "bogus" democratic regimes to explain them. Likewise, the diverging outcomes of reforms aimed at institution-building - e.g. the fact that Poland has a bureaucracy that functions better than Bulgaria's - may be examined from the point of view of various elite strategies employed in the political struggles of the 1990s rather than by the simple juxtaposition of "rule of law-based" and "neo-authoritarian" political regimes. Finally, contrasting patterns of postcommunist reforms may be better explained by looking at the incentives of key players operating in concrete institutional settings rather than by impressionistic theorizing about the strength and weakness of "civil societies."

In other words, the attempt to straightjacket comparative projects into the worn-out debate about how "good" political regimes differ from "degenerate" ones is hardly going to generate genuine knowledge and understanding. In contrast, more focused comparative analyses may well engender the insights we need in order to map more thoroughly the variety of postcommunist experiences and the dimensions of transformative changes after 1989.

D. ACKNOWLEDGING THE ROLE OF ACCIDENTS

One final point that may be raised is that, at least so far, the role of accidents in explaining differences between postcommunist political systems has been unduly neglected. A methodological corollary of the due acknowledgement of the formative role of accidents is that we should not jump to the conclusion that observable differences across regions are necessarily caused by "deep structures" or "culture." A competing hypothesis, well worth considering, is that these differences might be the outcome of unpredictable chains of events triggered by unexpected accidents. One accident in particular stands out in the context of cross-regional comparisons: the collapse of Yugoslavia. Whether or nor this collapse was structurally and historically determined is obviously not an issue that may be considered here. There is little doubt, however, that for the neighboring countries - Bulgaria and Romania in particular - this spectacular development was an accident that fell upon, rather than was in any meaningful way "caused" by, them. More concretely the UN-imposed embargo on former Yugoslavia led to considerable strengthening of criminal elites, affected the behavior of strategically located bureaucrats and precipitated the weakening of postcommunist state apparatuses. In the absence of this rapidly emerging and fairly unique "structure of incentives," the

institutional framework that evolved in Yugoslavia's Balkan neighbors might have been rather different.

It would be downright delusional, indeed, to believe that the brief methodological sketch adumbrated above will miraculously revitalize the somewhat stagnant field of cross-regional comparative postcommunist studies. My humble hope is that the main message is clear: is and when differences among postcommunist countries are examined, the history of these countries should not be perceived exclusively in terms of legacies that are "deeply rooted," homogenous across time, all-encompassing and "structurally determining." When exploring how the present is linked to the past, it would be wiser to interpret legacies as a set of dynamically changing factors that have a heterogeneous impact at various times and in different social settings, give rise to specific effects - and are often galvanized by accidents.

The benefits of such an attitude may go beyond the boundaries of scholarly research. As cynics will be quick to point out, the past decade has yielded numerous examples of how comparative studies proceed, in a Clausewitzian style, as a continuation of foreign policy by other means: the ultimate goal of many a scholar has in fact been to convince "the West" that his country is more "European" - "more democratic," "more marketized," "more institutionalized" - than its neighbors (usually the neighbors on the East). Against this intellectual background, a recalibrating of scholarly attention towards more subtly defined dimensions of difference and analytically more astute choices of comparative frameworks might generate desirable effects. Undeniably, at least some cross-regional studies of Eastern Europe have been dominated by what we may call, à la Albert Hirschmann, *la rage de vouloir différencier*. Perhaps it is time that this passion were tamed by a counter-passion - the passion to compare. Should such a shift of attitudes occur, it may provide a solid basis for collaboration and respect in an area often marked by competition and mutual resentment.

CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS: THEORY, EVIDENCE, IMPLICATIONS

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The only way to offer universality for one's scientific judgement is to use other disciplines that can contribute to that judgement - or, at least, this seems to be the latest consensus among scholars. Economics is a complex domain which cannot function well without the help of other sciences. Cultural variables are relevant for the economic studies because various forms of cultural behaviour have to be tested by economists for the success of developing and implementing economic strategies. Although economics has the arrogance to consider itself self sufficient, quantitative data must be sustained for accuracy by qualitative interpretations supplied by sociology or anthropology. One can, after using cultural data, find new research questions and raise more accurate theories. This article argues that multidisciplinary studies are the best cure for superficial and unfounded conclusions

Key words: economy, culture, multidisciplinary, development, social capital, epistemology

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Culture occupies an ambivalent position in development economics. If one considers the work of recent Nobel Prize winners-Gary Becker on social interactions and endogenous preferences (Becker, 1996), Douglass North on institutions as cultural byproducts (North,1990), and Amartya Sen on famines, social choice and capability (Sen, 1998)-one finds economists of quite different stripes all acknowledging that economic and cultural phenomena are related. There are entire journals devoted to aspects of this interface.² In development economics, culture makes regular appearances-in the social capital literature³ in studies that direct attention to gender discrimination, social exclusion, or the marginalization of indigenous groups; in studies of conflicts between ethnic groups. In their daily work lives, moreover, most economists are routinely interacting with colleagues from different cultures, and not infrequently find themselves remarking upon seemingly novel aspects of these colleagues' behavior.

But economists treat culture in very different ways. Deepak Lal's (1998) work on culture and long term growth performance, for example, takes a culturally static approach to historical data. Culture is perceived by most economists, however, as a residual category that is both immeasurable and immune to policy interventions in the near term (hence a realm best left to "softer" social scientists in sociology and anthropology) but having some explanatory power nonetheless. Sometimes a placeholder for culturally-specific attributes is left in the individual utility function-as in Becker's endogenous preference function that incorporates personal and social capital (1996), or worked in to both preferences and constraints as in Akerlof and Kranton's identity variable (2000); sometimes game theoretic models reflect culturally-specific behaviors, as in Platteau (1995) or Bloch and Rao (1999). Sometimes culture is studied not as a behavior but as a category of goods such as art or music or tourism, with specific demand and production functions (Klamer 1996). Sometimes cultural goods or attributes are grouped with intangible environmental goods, and brought into the welfare function by the various pricing methods. The accuracy, empirical basis, and time-relevance of these approaches may differ considerably.

For the most part, economists view culture with professional suspicion and regard it to be too amorphous to be amenable to rigorous analysis. In late 1996, for example, *The Economist* magazine ran a dismissive review article on "cultural explanations" of economic life, arguing that "culture is so imprecise

2 For example the *Journal of Cultural Economics*, *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, *Review of Social Economy*, *Journal of Economic Issues*, and *Economic Development and Cultural Change*.

3 It is helpful here to distinguish between culture and social capital, since there are several efforts currently attempting to incorporate social capital into the development agenda (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). Social capital can be viewed as the set of networks where groups build internal solidarity (the "bonding" function) and links with other groups (the "bridging" function) (see Narayan 1999). While this does have a lot to do with norms, values, identity, social relations, and other "cultural" phenomena, these matter for social capital only in so far as they contribute towards the bonding and bridging functions. Culture thus refers to a wider concept of how individuals and groups view themselves and the world, how they construct meaning and beliefs, and importantly, how these systems of meaning and belief are reproduced. Cultural practices also build up identities (Taylor, 1989).

and changeable a phenomenon that it explains less than most people realize".⁴ Despite contributions from influential individual economists, culture is hardly a mainstream topic in development economics. At best, culture can be likened to a visitor whom people greet warmly and appreciate while she stays and speaks, but who would never be invited to join the team. The point of this paper is to critique theoretical and empirical studies on the cultural dimensions of development, and on the basis of this to suggest a constructive, coherent, and multi-disciplinary strategy for taking culture seriously, as an issue with profound significance for development. We aim, in short, to show why and how culture should be invited onto the team.

The structure of the paper is as follows. We first address definitional and conceptual issues. Second, several points of empirical intersection between culture and development economics are reviewed. Third, we outline key principles for multidisciplinary research on development that takes culture into account. Finally, we sketch out how development policy and projects might be improved by given greater credence to culture and cultural issues. We should note that we do not, and cannot, do justice to the long and distinguished literature on the interactions between culture and economic development in anthropology.⁵ Our focus is primarily to sketch a few basic issues about this relationship that would be of use to development economists and policy makers.

I. Defining and Conceptualizing Culture

Two ways of considering culture

Culture has a dizzying array of definitions. Nearly fifty years ago Kluckhohn and Kroeber (1963 [1952]) counted 164 definitions of culture and civilization in the anthropological literature; this figure will have increased substantially since then.⁶ However there are two broad ways of considering culture that have a long intellectual heritage, and are relevant to the task at hand.

The first considers culture as collective identity. To paraphrase Appadurai (1996), culture can be thought of as the set of attributes that allow people to mobilize differences between themselves and others. We should note that this definition goes well beyond a narrow focus on culture as a factor in determining

4 The Economist was reviewing Samuel Huntington's influential "clash of civilizations" thesis (Huntington, 1996), namely that certain primordial values and beliefs are ingrained in particular regions ("civilizations") of the world. Huntington argues that longstanding but explosive "faultlines"-located on the borders between different groups-are being challenged anew by forces of globalization and modernization (see also Harrison, 1992; Sowell, 1994; Fukuyama, 1995; and Barber, 1995, and Harrison Huntington and Landes, 2000). This work is similar to but distinct from "political culture" theory-pioneered by the empirical research of Almond and Verba (1963) and continued most recently by Inglehart (1997)-which seeks to detect long-term changes in attitudes and values across countries.

5 It would be akin to writing a survey paper on the analysis of markets in economics.

6 See Kuper (1999) for a survey of the distinct western conceptions of culture that have arisen since the late 19th century.

ethnicity or social exclusion; It includes notions of identity, ethnicity, kinship, marriage systems, public and private rituals, and the other such structures, beliefs, and practices. Many of these attributes are place-based and very routine, such as how you buy, dress, eat, speak, produce and sell. They may be linked together as a framework of meaning or a "collective cast of mind" (Kuper 1999: 227). In this definition, every person usually has several cultures, corresponding to the groups of which they are a part (Sen 1998b).

The second considers culture more narrowly as artistic expression - for example in music, painting, architecture, wood-carving, or dance. This is the definition that often comes to mind when the word 'culture' is mentioned. The 'collective identity' and 'artistic expression' approaches to conceptualizing culture have obvious overlaps-indeed the second is essentially a subset of the first-but for the purposes of this paper we will use the term culture in the first, broader, sense.

Adopting this approach is helpful because it provides a more direct link between the empirical and ontological significance of culture for development, including the way that donors and development agencies are likely to deal with culture operationally (Davis, 1998). First, understanding culture as collective identity facilitates an awareness of cultural values/identities into the design, implementation, and evaluation of development projects. In Bangladesh, for example, where Islamic traditions frown on birth control and the charging of interest on loans, careful attention to cultural concerns has enabled that country to be an international leader in family planning and microfinance programs. Second, it permits special consideration to be given to unique artistic endeavors such as built heritage, tourism, and handicrafts, where these are explicitly seen an element of an overall poverty reduction strategy. Third, by considering the place-based nature of many cultures, it helps to identify the processes and structures of decision-making that will best support those cultures. Critics of the Bank-and of "development" more generally-are quick to note that neglecting these aspects is one of the primary reasons why development projects too often have unnecessarily harmful impacts.⁷

Why does culture matter?

There are both intrinsic and instrumental answers to this question. Culture is important in its own right, entering into the framework of development because it mediates what World Bank president Wolfensohn (1998) referred to as "things that matter" - in other words, it directly affects well-being or quality of life. Culture also affects the efficacy of developmental interventions by affecting the incentives of beneficiaries. Empirical cross-cultural studies of utility (interpreted both as emotional happiness and as life-satisfaction) show that income is more weakly related to utility or well-being than has often been

7 Arturo Escobar (1995: 167) writes, for example, that "peasant resistance [to rural development strategies] reflects more than the struggle for land and living conditions; it is above all a struggle over symbols and meanings, a cultural struggle."

assumed.⁸ Other significant determinants of well-being include relationships, meaningful work, status, and religion. Development activities that are sensitive to culture may impact these variables positively, hence raising the well-being of the poor independently of the economic effects of the same activities.

The direct relevance of culture to economic development can also be seen in those cases where "development" itself undermines cultures. Satellite dishes in remote villages, for example, beam in foreign images of beauty, sexuality, consumption, and alternative lifestyles (Barber, 1995). Similarly, powerful international companies can capture indigenous intellectual and cultural property (e.g. medicines and music) without either sharing the financial gains or assuming responsibility for the immense disruption to local life their actions may cause. Norchi (1998) presents the fascinating case of a potential "cure" for malaria discovered by villagers in the Andaman Islands (off the coast of India), the rights to which were subsequently "purchased" by a global pharmaceutical company. After concerted international pressure was brought to bear, the company in question returned millions of dollars to the Andaman Islands, but the abundance of riches completely overwhelmed the local economy, turning once peaceful and cooperative neighbors into hostile adversaries.

Attention to culture has been identified as instrumental to economic development for a number of reasons:

More cultural sensitivity, better models, less project failures

Human behavior does not respect disciplinary boundaries. Therefore, economic models that ignore the cultural context within which human beings operate are incomplete. Since economics is the most influential disciplinary lens through which development policy is formulated, policy interventions are often designed with imperfect conceptual frameworks. Economic models also tend to imbed Western notions of identity and behavior. For instance, anthropologists have argued that Indian individuality differ markedly from Western individuality, a caricature of which is the homo oeconomicus model that underlies most economic models (Mines, 1994). Models of inter-household behavior usually assume the existence of a Western nuclear family (e.g. Becker 1981). In order to work as more accurate models of non-Western families these need to be adjusted to reflect culturally derived preferences and constraints (and other social or psychological variables).

For example, through significant cross-cultural study in simple societies, Bowles and Gintis (1999) have found that reciprocity and revenge are common across cultures, and argue that these need to be factored into the economic behavior of homo oeconomicus across the world.⁹ Many more development economists adjust the model to particular local or sectoral observed behaviors.

⁸ See the November 1997 issue of the *Economic Journal* (Vol. 107), which discussed the controversy about economics and happiness (articles by Ng, Dixon, Oswald and Frank). See also Csikszentmihalyi (1997), Frey and Stutzer (1999), Myers and Diener (1997), Lane (1991), Argyle (1998), Inglehart (1997), Diener (1995), Diener and Suh (1997), Veenhoven (1994), and Narayan (forthcoming).

⁹ Gintis 1999; see also Stark 1995.

For instance Platteau (1994a and 1994b) finds markets systems to be embedded within socially defined norms and rules of interaction. Ignoring these cultural "endowments" can result in poorly designed development policies that may have unintended social and economic consequences. Other studies examine the impact of culturally derived constraints and structures on domestic violence (Bloch and Rao, 1999), gender specific returns to land productivity (Udry, 1996), and information structures in marriage markets (Bloch, Rao and Desai, 1999).

A number of economists outside the field of economic development are also trying to come to grips with the role of culture in economic decisions. Grief (1994), an economic historian, has explicitly attempted to model the role of cultural factors in shaping the emergence of trading institutions in medieval times. At a more theoretical level, Bhikchandani et. al (1992) have attempted to understand the role of information flows in determining conformity and other "cultural" behaviors. Cole et al (1992) model how social norms can affect saving behavior and growth, while Kandori (1992) has worked on the role of social norms in strategic behavior.

In all of these examples economists have needed to shift their focus to cultural contexts or behaviors in order to formulate models of economic relationships. We will discuss later the source of economists' insights into culture, and a possible code for strengthening and regularizing economists' introduction of cultural assumptions and models.

Qualitative Data and "Participatory" Econometrics

Economic models have often justified their neglect of factors such as collective identity, belief and meaning on the grounds that the set of simple assumptions about individual rationality made by most economists are sufficient for predictive purposes.¹⁰ As Milton Friedman put it:

The relevant question to ask about the assumptions of the theory is not whether they are descriptively realistic, for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently good approximations for the purpose in hand. And this question can be answered only by seeing whether the theory works, which means whether it yields sufficiently accurate predictions.¹¹

But "accurate predictions" assume the existence of a technology that is able to determine "accuracy." In particular it assumes that an econometric result has been identified in a manner that excludes the possibility of all observationally equivalent alternative explanations. As all econometricians know this is extremely difficult. In practice, Econometrics is a fallible science that inherently reflects biases in Economic Theory, and in the person of the Econometrician. Thus, if the theory misses a crucial aspect of behavior, so will the prediction,

10 Sen (1982, 1993), Hirschman (1998), Bowles and Gintis (1995)

11 Friedman (1994: 188).

and the methods available for testing that prediction. This means that while an econometric model may give the impression of precision, it may in fact be "precisely wrong." Wrong models may result in incomplete or incorrect understandings of reality, which in turn would result in imperfect policies.

How does one collect culturally sensitive data? How does one correct for these inherent biases and make econometric analysis more congruent with ground level realities? In other words, how does one make econometrics more participatory? Part of the problem in analyzing secondary data is the disconnect that exists between the econometrician and the data. The data is usually collected by someone else, and the econometrician's analysis of the data is thus based upon a theoretical understanding that, following from the arguments developed above, may be culturally biased and therefore incorrect. One way to correct this is by reducing the distance between the econometrician and the data, i.e.: have the analyst be a central part of the data collection process.

Moreover, the structured questions that usually constitute a survey instrument may themselves reflect the biases that are present in theoretical models and in the person designing the questionnaire, and therefore insensitive to culturally determined nuances in behavior. This is where the anthropological toolkit may be useful. In particular, using open-ended interviews, focus groups, and other qualitative data collection methodologies will help make econometric work more culturally sensitive, grounded and participatory (Rao 1997, Rao 1998).

Qualitative information on its own may not be enough for the purposes of informing policy. It is an intimate and detailed form of inquiry that consequently may become unwieldy with a large sample. When large samples are necessary, when the targeted population is large for instance, qualitative data should supplement quantitative data where the survey instrument has been informed by a qualitative investigation. It should also be kept in mind that qualitative data are just a form of data and that there is no inherent contradiction in using qualitative data collection techniques with random, representative samples. Very large samples may, however, make the cost of qualitative data collection and analysis prohibitive.

To summarize, qualitative information is able to complement the quantitative analysis in at least the following ways:

- 1) by informing the construction of the survey instrument;
- 2) by suggesting hypotheses that could be modeled and tested against the survey data, and by providing an alternate source of evidence against which statistical results can be compared and validated;
- 3) by asking open ended questions that permitted a discussion to be more informative by allowing a respondent more freedom in determining its direction;
- 4) by understanding people's motives, desires, aspirations, expectations.
- 5) by providing a personalized context and texture to statistical work with anecdotes and excerpts from conversations;

- 6) by understanding the nature of community interactions, and how people related to one another.

Intrinsic motivation

The economic value of intrinsic motivation - people doing a task for the sake of doing it rather than for an external incentive such as to be paid - is well-established.¹² Certain activities done from intrinsic motivation have lower supervision or free-rider costs, greater productivity, or better distribution effects, and are highly fulfilling. One kind of intrinsic motivation is identity-expression: when one offers hospitality not in order to get social approval or obtain private returns but rather because offering hospitality is central, expressive, of one's identity (perhaps as a midwesterner or as a muslim or hindu or christian).¹³ Economic development can, and regularly does, introduce economic incentives that, under certain conditions, predictably crowd out intrinsic motivations, leading to inefficient outcomes.¹⁴ This need, then, for economists to beware of the potential negative affects of economic incentives, relates partly to the need to adjust the motivational model of homo oeconomicus discussed above, and also to an additional need for economists to appreciate the role of participation in policy creation (we will return to this point).

Increased trust, cooperation, and reciprocity

The role of trust and trustworthiness in the creation of effective institutions is becoming empirically well-established.¹⁵ In addition, cooperation is instrumental to both production and for distribution, and affects the intra-household allocation of resources, remittances, coping strategies, risk management, and morale. Yet traditional cooperative behavior within a community can be threatened and weakened during the process of modernization. Attending to culture at all levels of interaction can both reinforce cooperative behaviors and help mitigate distrust. This is a vital consideration in settings where communities refuse to cooperate with external agencies or governments because of suspicion or miscommunication.

Cooperation, reciprocity, and solidarity have deep economic payoffs in the form of lower transaction and enforcement costs, greater sustainability, and so

12 On the economic value of intrinsic motivation see Sen (1994, 1997) and Lane (1991). On the negative effect of incentives on intrinsic motivation, see Alkire and Deneulin (forthcoming), Deci (1971), Deci and Ryan (1985, 1987), Ellerman (forthcoming), Enzle et al (1991), Frank (1991), Frey (1997), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), Hogarth and Reder (1987), Kohn (1998), Kreps (1997), Legrand (1997), Lepper and Greene (1978), Lindbeck (1997), and Titmuss (1970).

13 Flanigan and Rorty (1990). This is in distinction to Akerlof and Kranton's notion of identity, which is associated with following prescriptions.

14 Frey and Versand (1999) survey the empirical evidence.

15 See especially Alston, Eggertsson and North (1996) on institutions, and Knack and Keefer (1997) and Knack (1999) on social capital.

on.¹⁶ Indeed, as Rao (2000a) argues, the poor make extraordinary expenditures—up to six times their annual incomes—on cultural events such as weddings and festivals precisely because they want to maintain and enhance their status, and communicate information about changes in mobility, their willingness to be "good" citizens, and to participate in webs of obligation. These expenditures are also extremely important as elements of strategies to cope with risk and poverty, especially in environments where market-driven improvements in urban employment may reduce a village family's dependence upon its traditional networks.

Increased ability to predict growth trajectories

In a paper on the process of economic change, Douglass North asks, "Why are countries poor if we understand the processes that make for growth?"¹⁷ He argues that the new growth economics literature understands the basic economic determinants for growth, but does not recognize two additional determinants of growth: the institutional framework and the cultural heritage (religion, morality, and norms). Cultural heritage, North argues, determines the institutional structure and its path of change. Hence in North's view, a realistic economic prognosis needs to understand "the interplay between parts of the economy that shape economic performance,"¹⁸ one of which is collective identities and their associated cultural values and beliefs.

Direct revenue from cultural assets

Cultural activities are involved in significant industries such as tourism, music, art, jewelry, construction materials, and apparel, when these are seen to be linked to collective identity.¹⁹ Fostering such industries can have direct and significant economic returns. They have a potential (often unrealized) to be especially beneficial for the poor, since such activities are characteristically labor intensive and employ traditional skills that may be already present in the labor force. Yet the links between 'culture economics' and development economics are weak, and the application of culture economics to developing countries is in the early stages.

There is a potential danger in turning cultural "things" into commodities that should be kept in mind.²⁰ By turning an artifact with ritual and religious meaning into a craft for sale in boutiques, the artifact is being divested of its cultural meaning. If there is a demand for the commodity, this may raise incomes, but at the same time it could reduce its intrinsic cultural value.

16 See, among others, Bowles and Gintis (1998), Coase (1960), Elster (1989a, 1989b), Greif (1994), Fehr and Gächter (1998), and Kurien (1994).

17 North (1997: 1) see Lal (1998)

18 North (1991: 9)

19 Sinclair (1998), Klammer (1996), Peacock and Rizzo (1994), Throsby (1994).

20 Appadurai (1988) is a collection of articles exploring different aspects of this.

Similarly, the sale of ritually meaningful music and dance to foreign tourists could "freeze" its artistic development by increasing the incentives to produce it in a manner that generates the highest tourist revenue. Therefore, an economic analysis of the income potential of cultural "assets" should be balanced with a careful anthropological understanding of the negative externalities of that might result from the commodification process.

Rents from knowledge: intellectual property and patent rights

Economically valuable cultural property relates to identity-expressive activities such as music, poetry, craft, folklore and literature (Towse 1999). It also encompasses traditional knowledge about medicinal properties of plants, or agricultural practices.²¹ Global producers threaten to appropriate the downstream economic benefits that can arise from this knowledge and its productive use (Norchi, 1998), hence legal protection can enable poor communities to realize economic profits.

Prevention of costly conflict.²²

Development activities whose benefits accrue to particular cultural or ethnic groups can unwittingly contribute to the preconditions of conflict (Uvin, 1998). A proactive understanding of the cultural beneficiaries of activities, and of potential cultural flashpoints between groups, is a necessary preventative measure.²³ Also, the protection and even rebuilding of cultural heritage in post-conflict situations has a crucial psychological role. As the heading from a World Bank Evaluations Department Report put it, "Culture is Not a Luxury", for "cultural heritage has the power to inspire hope and remind people of their creativity;"²⁴ its restoration can help people heal.

These few examples suggest different nodes at which culture intersects with the issues of development economics. Policy prescriptions that ignore the cultural dimension do so at their peril.

II. ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONALLY RELEVANT RESEARCH

What relationship do these various levels, ends, and means of culture have for economic inquiry and subsequent policy-making? We identify three general rules: multi-disciplinarity, specificity regarding the use of the culture term, and a clear awareness of the need for economic and anthropological analysis and

21 Warren et al (1995); see also Kumar (1996), Felker et al (1997), and Appfel-Marglin and Marglin (1990, 1996).

22 Conflict, as Hirschman (1994) correctly notes, can in fact be a "pillar of democratic market society" when it is conducted fairly and becomes a basis for institutional renewal. Conflict becomes destructive when it is grounded in an environment that ignores due process and basic civil liberties, and where different social groups are isolated from one another (Horowitz 1985, Collier, 1999; Varshney, 1999).

23 Olson, 1982; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Collier, 1999

24 Kreimer et al (1998), p 32.

policy recommendations to be supplemented by political and/or participatory processes.

1. Multi-disciplinarity: An Answer to the Need for Further Information

First, by now it should be clear that sound economic analyses and policy recommendations require information on culture - in order to adjust economic models of individual or group behavior to be sufficiently adequate predictors of actual behavior in a particular setting, in order to assess the empirical/economic significance of a statistical relationship, in order to predict long term growth performance, and so on. Where is this information on culture to come from? It might be the case that a top economist could recognize this need for further information and diligently resort to quite ad hoc or amateur analyses of culture, or else embark on considerable further study. Alternatively, one could develop stronger mechanisms of partnership between disciplines (Bamberger 1999). It is this partnership across disciplines that many have come to commend.²⁵

Anthropologists make it their business to study culture, and much can be learned from this literature. Yet new research requires multiple disciplinary angles. If economists are seriously going to get into the business of understanding culture, it would be helpful to learn from the methods and theories of anthropologists and culture theorists and others who make culture their primary business. In particular, qualitative methodologies may be particularly useful in informing more realistic economic models which can be then be tested econometrically to determine their generalizability (Ensminger, 1996; Rao, 1997).

There is a further issue - an issue, if you will, of the culture or 'collective' identity of respective social science disciplines themselves. Clearly there could be clashes between the sharply contrasting disciplinary cultures of economics and anthropology/sociology, and again between these and others, such as those who write intellectual property laws, or study political conflicts. In order to improve the effectiveness of policy analysis it might be necessary for all members of, for example, a multi-disciplinary research team, to suspend these suspicion and make an effort to understand the other's language and to appreciate the historical and intellectual underpinnings of the other disciplines.

2. Specifying Culture

Related to this, a far more explicit and transparent specification of 'cultural' terms is necessary. When culture is brought in to the analysis it is often treated as a black box without much regard to its internal logic. There is thus a crucial need to better understand how 'concern for culture' is to be introduced into

²⁵ Scitovsky (1995), Hirschman (1998), Veblen, Lawson, Bowles and Gintis, Lutz, Sen.

development economics - even to mobilize around a common professional code. Yet the code must not require economists to become anthropologists - for that would hardly be a popular recommendation - but only to handle non-economic data more expertly. One approach, based on Huntington, would be to generate, for example, distinctive 'cultural assumptions' or 'models of human behavior' and have economists apply the relevant model depending whether the data originated from the Far East, South Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and so on (or related to men vs women, or rural versus urban populations). But this approach (however much it has been used in the social sciences) disregards two things: 1) that cultures change over time, and 2) that groups (whether identified along geographical, gender or ethnic lines) have internal heterogeneity even at one point in time.²⁶

Rather than adopting the Huntington approach, then, we would propose that economists consider a few characteristics of the relationship between an individual and any culture at time.

First, culture is not a static bundle of "endowments" but a dynamic, endogenous process that evolves according to its own incentives and constraints while being influenced by and, in turn, influencing local and global economic and political processes. Second, culture is more than just ethnicity. Unlike ethnicity culture does not, to quote Appadurai "stress simply the possession of certain attributes (material, linguistic or territorial) but the consciousness of these attributes and their naturalization as essential to group identity."²⁷ For example, one may recognize national cultures, cultures among feminists, cultures among ironworkers, cultures among the 'older generation', and even the culture of particular families. Third any one person has a set of different identities which may have different cultures associated with them - e.g. mother, Bosnian, Jewish, clerk, urban poor (Sen, 1998b) - and the relative importance of each identity may fluctuate over time.

Fourth, culture links individuals to households to communities. Thus, at the most atomistic level, we could think of how the psyches and preferences of individuals are affected by notions of group identity (Kakar, 1979; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). At the household level, families may develop ritual traditions or household-specific norms and values that allow them construct a sense of family identity. Households are of course fundamentally shaped by their links to other households through marriage and kinship systems. Social cohesion within a set of households is achieved through festivals, weddings and other ritual and ceremonial events. Greater social cohesion builds social capital and allows households to cooperate with each other to protect themselves against income risk, natural disasters, and other exigencies. "Culture" thus provides the

²⁶ Sen (1996) argues this clearly in his New Republic article "Our Culture Their Culture".

²⁷ As Peters (1999: 400) astutely notes, "ethnicity is not a primordially given essence, but the outcome of complex sociocultural and political processes of labeling and identifying people... [A problem with much of the macroeconomic work on ethnicity is that it] conflates the terms ethnolinguistic diversity, ethnic diversity, ethnicity, ethnic fractionalization, ethnic identity, and ethnic groups, all of which refer to quite different social phenomena."

mechanisms, beliefs and meanings that allow a set of households to define themselves as a community.

Fifth, cultures function at different levels. Distinct communities, which may vary in size from small sub-castes to large ethnic groups, have to live and work with each other in villages and cities; indeed, various cultural and social institutions exist to allow communities to interact with one another and to define themselves as co-members of a larger political entity (Varshney, 2000). For instance, a village may have an annual village festival where different groups come together to worship a local goddess (Fuller 1992, Rao 2000b). A historical or religious site may provide a focus for the coordination problems that exist in bringing different groups together, and help them define themselves as a larger entity. At the macro level a nation-state may develop "macro-cultures" of national identity, public rituals, etc. These sentiments are an important means by which the very notion of a country or region is constructed and reproduced (Anderson, 1982). Importantly, they can be mobilized and harnessed for a variety of political purposes; defending "our culture" from "their culture" (Sen, 1996) can be used to promote patriotism, protectionism, and violence, just as more inclusive forms can be drawn upon to support peace, pluralism, and reconciliation.

Culture, then, does not exist *sui generis*, but is socially produced and reproduced to meet both intrinsic and instrumental goals. Furthermore, culture shapes not just the goals to which people aspire (ends), but also how they seek to realize them (means). Such diversity requires careful deployment of the term culture. What does this mean in terms of a professional 'code'? DiMaggio argues that economists who make assertions regarding cultural influences must clarify two things: "what he or she means by 'culture'" and what is "the scope of phenomena to which one's assertion applies" (1998:28). Failure to do so - because of ungrounded assumptions that a behavior for population A at time t_1 will be the same for population B at time t_2 - is a common oversight. This general rule, then, is a plea for transparency in the definition of, and empirical basis for, statements about 'culture'.

3. Definition vs prescription

Finally, there is need for very considerable caution in using empirical studies regarding cultural behavior as a basis for normative policy prescriptions about cultural behaviors. This is not only because of the inherent problems with the reliability of empirical evidence, but also because of the political economy of such policies. For example, if a culture seems particularly desirable for some reason (either intrinsically or instrumentally), the policy recommendation might be that the culture be protected.

Yet policies that are designed to protect people's cultures, or to prevent social disintegration, could turn around and become a reverse form of colonialism. This may seem hard to picture, especially because 'cultural' programs are advanced, normally, by persons who are most concerned with the 'voice' of beneficiaries. Still, someone is bound to bring up the fact, sooner or later, that "apartheid was based

on an anthropological theory." In fact, Kuper (1999: xiii) points out that the intellectual architect of the apartheid system in South Africa, W.W.M. Eiselen, "had been a professor of ethnology." His studies led him to predict that "if the integrity of traditional cultures were undermined, social disintegration would follow. [Hence] Eiselen recommended that government policy should be aimed at fostering 'higher Bantu culture and not at producing black Europeans.'... Segregation was the proper course for South Africa, because only segregation would preserve cultural differences." This kind of an outcome would be a very bad dream indeed. Yet it is best prevented not by a knee-jerk rejection of culture, nor by avoiding the use of anthropological studies for policy purposes altogether,²⁸ but rather by integrating policy recommendations with participatory and political processes.

The way ahead is sketched by Sen (1999), when he elaborates the need for participation when a proposed project entails a change in collective identity, or affects technologies, heritage or cultural assets:

When an economic adjustment takes place, few tears are shed for the superseded methods of production and for the overtaken technology. There may be some nostalgia for specialized and elegant objects (such as an ancient steam engine or an old-fashioned clock), but in general old and discarded machinery is not particularly wanted. In the case of culture, however, lost traditions may be greatly missed. The demise of old ways of living can cause anguish, and a deep sense of loss...

This is an issue of some seriousness, but it is up to the society to determine what, if anything, it wants to do to preserve old forms of living, perhaps even at significant economic cost. Ways of life can be preserved if the society decides to do just that, and it is a question of balancing the costs of such preservation with the value that the society attaches to the objects and the lifestyles preserved. There is, of course, no ready formula for this cost-benefit analysis, but what is crucial for a rational assessment of such choices is the ability of the people to participate in public discussions on the subject. We come back again to the perspective of capabilities: that different sections of the society (and not just the socially privileged) should be able to be active in the decisions regarding what to preserve and what to let go. There is no compulsion to preserve every departing lifestyle even at heavy cost, but there is a real need-for social justice-for people to be able to take part in these social decisions, if they so choose.²⁹

Thus the last point is that given that culture is intrinsically valuable to people - it is part of well-being or utility itself - when there is a trade-off

28 Klitgaard (1995: 193) notes that anthropologists at present seem averse to giving policy advice: "Polly Hill's anthropological critique of economics is typical in saying: 'Just as an art critic seldom gives artists practical advice on how to improve their work, so it would seem the height of arrogance for an anthropologist like myself to make practical suggestions on working methods or subject matter to economists.' (1986, xi)." Klitgaard argues that this attitude is a departure from the earlier agenda of anthropology and sociology, which was indeed policy oriented, as we have seen.

29 Sen 1999:241-2 italics ours

between more efficient outcomes or a greater income gain, and a cultural loss, the relative weights of the income versus the cultural loss, and the resulting choice, lies outside the professional competence of the economist and is to be referred to political leaders or to public debate.

III. CONCLUSION

Culture clearly matters for economic development, in many ways and in varying degrees. In this review we have sought to show that it makes the most sense not to discuss culture as a single homogenous entity that is the exclusive possession of particular national or ethnic group (Sen, 1996; Rueschemeyer, 1999), but as a dynamic and fluid process in and through which people define who they are, what they desire, and how they seek to realize their goals. We are still a long way from understanding how culture "works" (cf. Bohannan, 1994), and it may well be in the nature of things that it remain that way. Nevertheless, from casual experience to formal analysis, it is evident that culture exerts real and present effects on development outcomes and development projects, and ignoring it has potentially measurable consequences. Taking culture into account does not necessarily require gazing deeply into the eyes of the subject, but does require integrating information about culture into development economic analyses in an informed, defensible way. We invite scholars, policymakers, and practitioners from all backgrounds to contribute to the on-going dialogue needed to move the agenda forward, and to keep culture 'on the team'.

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WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS...AND WALLETS... OF THE PEOPLE?

Economic Self-Interest and Support For EU Accession in
Candidate States

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Abstract

Scholars on both sides of the Atlantic are increasingly interested in explaining volatility in popular support for the European Union's eastward enlargement. While a rich body of research documents attitudinal trends in existing member states, remarkably less effort has been devoted to integrating what we know about citizen preferences in candidate states into the mainstream political science literature. Despite expectations that the EU's allure would produce strong and steady enthusiasm for accession among central and eastern European publics, considerable cross-national and temporal variation exists. Seeking to explain some of that variation, this article gauges the relationship between egocentric, pocketbook evaluations of economic conditions and support for EU membership. Drawing upon evidence from ten Europe Agreement countries and focusing particular attention on Romania, Hungary, and Estonia, the analysis casts significant new light on the debate between two alternative approaches-the "individual opportunities" and "state guarantees society" perspectives.

Key words: EU, accession support, enlargement, individual opportunity, state guarantees society

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
In 1989 Jacques Delors argued that for Europe's experiment in economic and political integration to succeed it would be necessary to "win the hearts and minds of the people."¹ It is unlikely that Delors at that time could have anticipated how his words would resonate more than a decade later, not just in western Europe but throughout the new and consolidating democracies in central and eastern Europe. The thirteen countries now actively negotiating entry into the European Union contain electorates that, at one extreme, are fervently eager to join the EU, and, at the other extreme, are tepid in their support for entering a rich club that may swallow them whole. Far from the heady days of the early 1990s, when newly democratized central and eastern European countries enjoyed a near euphoric public consensus that eventual participation in the EU would be desirable, recent years have witnessed increased volatility.

Although a well-established political science literature addresses attitudinal variation in support for EU membership among western publics, core questions remain unanswered in the accession countries. One such question concerns the explanatory weight of individual-level economic evaluations for understanding support for EU membership-e.g., do personal financial expectations alter preferences for membership? Drawing upon evidence from ten Europe Agreement countries, this study finds clear support for the argument that egocentric, prospective pocketbook evaluations are strongly and positively related to support for EU membership.


DYNAMICS OF SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

A cross-sectional assessment of popular perceptions about potential EU membership reveals the extent of attitudinal variation that currently exists within and across candidate countries. As evidenced by the applicant country Eurobarometer survey data presented in *Figure 1*, in no country case does the number of respondents who believe their country's membership in the EU would be "a bad thing" outnumber those who perceive membership would be "a good thing." Still, although 59% of the entire thirteen-country sample evaluates membership positively (in striking contrast to the 48% in existing Member States), there remains considerable ambivalence as well as a host of countries (Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovenia, Malta, Estonia, and Latvia) wherein fewer than half the survey populations rated the promise of EU participation as "good." Super-majorities exist in Romania (80%) and Bulgaria (74%), and solid positive perceptions are registered in Poland, Cyprus, Slovakia, Turkey and Hungary. For our present purposes, the most revealing finding from these descriptive data is that the range of average country perceptions is a substantial 47 percentage points. There is, to be sure, considerable cross-national variation worthy of our attention.

¹ Jacques Delors, "A Necessary Union," speech delivered at College of Europe (Bruges, Belgium, 17 October 1989).

Figure 1. Support (%) for EU Membership October 2001

More instructive are longitudinal indicators of attitudinal variation. *Figure 2* provides a measure of net support for entry into the EU (e.g., how respondents would vote in a national referendum) in select countries since 1995. The data reveal the early strength of support for EU membership, not long after nascent democratic governments in numerous central and east European countries first launched bids to become part of the wealthy and stable club to their west. Yet, the trajectories of support have not been uniform since the mid-1990s. In Romania, where support has been high from the outset, the trend has been distinctly upward. Conversely, in Poland preferences for the country's EU accession started high but dropped precipitously. Both Slovenia and the Czech Republic began with much more modest popular enthusiasm for entry into the EU, and each has seen that position maintain the status quo. Hungary, beginning with a similar level of support as Slovenia, has seen that support rise considerably by the end of 2001, thus exemplifying yet another trend. Estonia, finally, has been a consistent laggard. Such variation, it is safe to argue, demands explanation.

Figure 2. Referendum on EU Entry (% in Favor Minus % Against)

The road to a "Europe of the 28" is one along which public opinion will likely play an increasingly significant role in shaping the speed and character of European integration. Those who wonder whether the seeming inertia of integrationist pressures will lead deterministically to some inevitable United States of Europe need only look so far as Denmark, Norway and Switzerland to be reminded that public sentiments can indeed slow down-if not halt-such plans. Denmark has twice been the "mouse that roared" (Downs 2001) rejecting the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992 and then vetoing the government-endorsed proposal to participate in the EU's single currency zone in September 2000. Norwegian voters in 1994 turned down their government's latest bid to gain entry into the EU, and more recently Swiss voters in 2001 rebuffed plans to commence negotiations on EU membership. Given the instability and unpredictability that have seemingly complicated the plans of EU architects in western Europe, it seems reasonable to accord analytical weight to opinion dynamics in the central and eastern European countries (CEECs). Clearly, within the CEECs accession will have to pass the test of popular approval (Kolankiewicz 1994; Cichowski 2000).

EXPLAINING SUPPORT FOR EU ACCESSION

A burgeoning literature seeks to isolate the determinants of individual and mass preferences for EU integration (cf. Anderson 1995; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Franklin, Marsh and McLaren 1994; Gabel and Whitten 1997). Despite such efforts, however, "little is known about how citizens in these political member countries (CEEC's) reason and develop preferences about how they view potential membership in the European Union" (Anderson and Tverdova 2000, 3). Much of the extant literature addresses public opinion in the existing member states of the EU; however, findings from studies conducted in these states may not be readily transferable to the CEECs. Beyond the issue of exportability, the existing body of understanding is often fraught with internal inconsistencies and contradictions. Cumulative research findings, in short, are inconclusive (cf. Inglehart, Rabier and Reif, 1991; Hewstone, 1986; Handley, 1981; Feld and Wildgen, 1976; Shephard, 1975). Thus, the state of the art in attitudinal studies derived from data in the EU member states cannot simply be superimposed on the accession states and accepted a priori as an accurate explanation of popular preferences. An emerging literature on support for EU accession in central and eastern Europe reveals the complexity of opinion formation in this region, and it confirms the necessity of empirically testing hypotheses considered conventional in studies of the more established western countries (cf., Phinnemore 1999; Cichowski 2000; Grabbe and Hughes 1999; Kucia 1999). It is to this important new body of literature that the present article seeks to contribute.

No Shortage of Explanatory Factors

Popular support for EU membership can be compared to a Hydra; scholars have argued and attempted to explain such support on the basis of a variety of factors, each of which might appear at first glance to be genuine. Because "public opinion has grown from a relatively minor role in the integration process to a principle focus of political and scholarly attention" (Dalton and Eichenberg 1998, 252), the universe of potential explanatory factors is increasingly crowded. Gabel's (1998b) is perhaps the best and most useful survey of the principal theoretical schools. Among the many rival approaches he identifies is that which stresses the importance of cognitive mobilization-educational achievement and information availability yield citizens well equipped to evaluate (and ultimately endorse) the EU's complexities (Inglehart, Rabier and Reif 1991). According to this thesis, "as a citizen's cognitive mobilization increases, she is more familiar with and less threatened by the topic of European integration" (Gabel 1998, 335). Ideology and political affinities-particularly support for free market principles and democratic governance-also emerge as potent determinants of individual preference formation (Anderson 1998; Cichowski 2000). The CEECs have witnessed considerable instability in left/right ideological attachments over the last decade, and perceptions of the free market and its

competitive pressures have likewise exhibited volatility; as such, this variable is an important one in any explanatory model. Some evidence does indeed exist to suggest that supporters of Left parties are less favorable to European integration than supporters of Right parties (Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987). There is, moreover, evidence that citizens may see support for the EU as a plebiscite on the performance of their incumbent national government (Franklin, Vander Eijk and Marsh 1995). Further, a sectoral interests approach captures some of the explanatory power of occupational variables in the study of EU support. Immersion into the European Union is likely to hold variable benefits for citizens depending upon their employment in agriculture, commerce, service and other sectors. All told, cognitive, ideological/political and occupational variables are worthy of inclusion in any study of preferences for EU membership, although studies are not always consistent in assessing their impact.


Our interest in this article, however, is in explicitly economic determinants of support for EU membership. After all, according to Preston (1997), EU membership is ultimately associated with economic well being, and as a "rich elite club" (Fagin 1999, 187) the EU is sure to attract the aspirations of eligible neighboring countries. Economic derivatives of support for EU membership have indeed drawn scholarly attention; however, the lion's share of this attention has been devoted to linking aggregate measures (inflation, unemployment, and GDP growth) with opinions about the EU rather than linking evaluations of individual economic conditions to preferences for EU membership. Where individual-level economic evaluations have been considered, they have tended to focus on assessments of the national-rather than the household-economy. The differences between sociotropic and egocentric economic evaluations have not yet been fully explored in this context, which is surprising given Gabel and Whitten's recognition that "individuals, not national publics, perceive economic conditions and form political attitudes" (1997, 82). Gabel is among the few who systematically explore the explanatory potential of individual-level economic assessments, and his work in particular serves as a stepping stone for the present endeavor. Among the existing member states, Gabel finds, there is evidence that citizens base their evaluations of EU membership "on the welfare they personally derive from European integration" (1998a, 11). The expectation of personal financial improvement as "a source of variation in public opinion research" (Gabel 1998a, 123) ties the debate over EU accession to the study of EU enlargement "as a function of people's self interest" (Anderson and Tverdova 2000, 1).

We situate economic influences on preferences for EU membership within a general model (*Figure 3*).² The "funnel of causality" predicting support for EU membership assumes that the society's underlying political divisions--from which individual citizens draw their value orientations--are first a function of socioeconomic conditions: economic structure, social divisions such as

² This model draws inspiration from the early sociopsychological models of voting (see Campbell et al. 1960, 1966). See also Dalton (2002).

ethnicity or religion, and historical patterns such as regional divisions, urban/rural cleavages, and legacies of the previous regime. These forces, we contend, do structure group loyalties and basic value orientations, but at the mouth of the funnel they are at least somewhat removed from the actual decisions of citizens in accession states over whether or not to support entry into the EU. As the causal funnel narrows these basic values condition individual ideological and political affinities (e.g., left-right self-placement and partisanship), as do the performance and messages offered by political parties and the incumbent government. Whereas conventional voting models would argue that these ideological and political affinities would feed directly into candidate/party choice in elections, for the purpose of explaining preferences for EU membership we suggest that economic factors can have an even more proximate impact. Domestic economic conditions--which are clearly themselves at least partially functions of internal and external political choices--shape citizens' perceptions about their lot, both individually and collectively as a society. These perceptions and evaluations held by myopic voters (and therefore subject to influence by the media and the EU's own publicity campaigns) will determine individual support for EU membership.

Figure 3. The Funnel of Causality Predicting Support for EU Membership



We have suggested that economic evaluations and self-interest should enjoy a privileged place in models seeking to explain support for EU accession. Why, though, should they matter? The underlying logic of economic self-interest can, we contend, be viewed from two perspectives--the "state guarantees society" perspective and the "individual opportunities" perspective.

The "State Guarantees Society" Perspective

According to one line of reasoning, those individuals in the CEECs who perceive their personal financial circumstances to be improving will "vote" for the status quo (i.e., against EU accession), while citizens who feel that their financial standing is declining will support EU membership. This view is advanced by McManus (1998) who maintains that due to the risks involved with an uncertain status in highly competitive EU markets, citizens who already enjoy prosperous and improving pocketbook finances hesitate to support integration into the EU. Entry into the EU, McManus envisions, can threaten prosperity simply because it represents a deviation from the status quo—those privileged by the status quo, it follows, will then be less sanguine about the virtues of joining the EU club. Conversely, people who negatively evaluate their personal pocketbook finances and who anticipate a future reduction in economic standing are likely to view the EU as an opportunity for improvement. The EU, in this vision, is the guarantor of economic salvation and security. Those expecting personal financial downturn prefer state (or, in this case, supranational) guarantees. As such, these persons are more likely to have preferences for their country to join the Union (Franklin, Marsh and McLauren 1994; Franklin, Marsh and Wliezen 1994).

The Individual Opportunities Perspective

An alternative line of reasoning suggests that, rather than turning their backs on the EU, people who evaluate their prospective pocketbook finances positively are likely to support EU membership. Conversely, citizens who perceive that their condition is in decline will prefer to uphold the status quo. Dalton's (1991) work supports this view that those with greater economic comfort tend to be better able to absorb risk. Less dependent upon public authority for their economic security, these persons can turn to opportunities (e.g., EU integration) to parlay their existing prosperity into even greater riches. In EU membership, these economic optimists see "greater investment opportunities provided by more open financial markets" (Gabel 1998b, 337) as well as low inflation. The flip side, according to Dalton, is that "...the more pessimistic one's economic outlook the more likely one is to prefer a 'state guarantees' society" (1991, 12). Inglehart also sustains this posture in his work, which analyzes the individual opportunities/state guarantees society dichotomy (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 1990).

Our interest in this article is to tease out and test some of the nuances associated with these alternative perspectives. There would appear to be prima facie evidence to support the assertion that people with a favorable financial outlook will support the institutionalization of favorable relations with wealthy neighbors (i.e., they will be inclined to support joining the EU). There already

exists much earlier evidence that citizens from the COMECON countries benefited from trade with the European Community (Ransom 1973). This finding from an earlier era could logically be extended to the post-Communist CEECs where such perceived benefits would be transferred into support for membership in the EU. It is not, moreover, an uncommon layman's observation in these countries that people who anticipate economic hardship will indeed prefer state protection. For many years in these countries, the state has been associated with job security, health benefits, housing, free education and the like. It would be rational for such persons to seek to maintain financial security rather than risking the unknown (e.g. EU membership). Such generalizations, however, deserve systematic empirical investigation-not just anecdotal, if compelling, support.

HYPOTHESIS AND DATA

This article tests the relationship between perceived economic self-interest and support for EU accession. In particular, our interest is in prospective evaluations of individual economic condition and the relationship, if any, these evaluations have for citizen willingness to support entry into the EU. We therefore hypothesize that there should be a direct and positive relationship between anticipated household earnings and support for entry into the EU in a hypothetical national referendum. Citizens in central and eastern European countries who perceive their personal financial situation to be improving are more likely to support EU membership; citizens who perceive their personal financial situation as deteriorating are, thus, less likely to vote for EU membership. We recognize that this hypothesis represents but one piece in a much larger puzzle of how to explain citizen reactions to the prospects of joining one of the world's most ambitious experiments in economic, social, and political cooperation. We find, though, that this piece is pivotal-egocentric, prospective evaluations of the pocketbook economy may constitute a crucial mechanism that triggers citizen choice.

Our empirical investigation focuses on a discrete time period (1995-2001) and on a limited set of illustrative country cases (e.g., Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia). This particular time frame places the inquiry almost squarely in the middle of the region's decade-plus effort to consolidate democratic, market-oriented systems. It is also necessitated in a very practical sense by the fact that 1995 and 1996 represent the only two years in which the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer surveys included the three key questions related to our study-e.g., retrospective economic evaluations, prospective economic evaluations, and vote intention in a hypothetical referendum on EU membership. The ten Europe Agreement countries provide variation on the dependent variable (e.g., support for EU membership) and also represent varying degrees of national readiness to enter the EU (Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia

generally receive high marks from the European Commission for their readiness, while Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, and Bulgaria do not).³ Following our broader empirical analysis, we focus squarely on support for EU membership in three countries—Romania, Hungary, and Estonia—that represent three distinct longitudinal trends. Support for EU membership is operationalized using a key survey item in the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer series: "If there were to be a referendum tomorrow on the question of (our country's) membership of the European Union, would you personally vote for or against membership?" The variable is coded 1 for "vote for membership" and 0 for "vote against membership." We operationalize our principal independent variable—egocentric, prospective evaluations of the economy—using the same Eurobarometer surveys: "And over the next 12 months, do you expect that the financial situation of your household will...get a lot better; get a little better; stay the same; get a little worse; get a lot worse."⁴

DEMOGRAPHICS, IDEOLOGY, AND ECONOMICS: A FIRST-CUT EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

We draw initial inferences about our hypothesized relationship from correlational analysis of our two focal variables as well as additional theoretically relevant survey indicators. The first finding that leaps out immediately from Table 1 is that simple demographic variables provide at best a mixed bag of results—education (the centerpiece of the cognitive mobilization approach to understanding preference formation) is weak and inconsistent; income (by itself a proxy for socioeconomic status) is relatively weak and of marginal statistical significance. Somewhat surprisingly, in eight of the ten countries respondent income level fails to produce a consistent, statistically significant association with support for EU membership across the two survey time points. While sectoral interests (primarily agricultural interests and those of pensioners) as manifested by occupational status yield marginal albeit statistically significant correlations, it would be difficult to contend that occupation should be accorded significant analytical priority in explaining EU support. There is a considerably stronger and more stable association between ideological acceptance of free market principles and support for EU membership across both time points; indeed, this is the single most robust correlation registered in the table. So, too, does democratic satisfaction demonstrate linkage with support for EU membership. Worthy of most note—given the goals of this article—are the correlations linking egocentric (i.e., self-oriented) and sociotropic (i.e., collective or society-oriented) evaluations of the economy with support for EU membership. Respondent anticipation of his/her future financial situation in

³ European Commission, *Agenda 2000*.

⁴ The Central and Eastern Eurobarometer public opinion surveys, conducted from 1990-1997 and then replaced in 2001 with the Applicant Countries surveys, are remarkably inconsistent in administering the same battery of questions on EU membership and economic evaluations.

the coming 12 months, which reveals a modest association with support for EU membership, is statistically significant and greater in magnitude than retrospective economic evaluations and (at least in 1996) sociotropic evaluations as well. Importantly, the direction of this relationship is consistent with our expectations and demonstrates some increasing weight over time. Although not statistically the most important relationship, this initial linkage between the two variables is suggestive of what may be a substantively important and theoretically relevant relationship.

Table 1. Measures of Association with Support for EU Membership (Pearson Correlation Coefficients)

	1996 Support for EU Membership		Support for EU Membership	
	r	N	r	N
Economic Evaluations				
Retrospective	.080**	6716	.093**	6331
Prospective	.093**	6261	.173**	5967
Sociotropic Evaluation				
Country Moving in Right Direction				
	.116**	5951	.157**	5661
Sectoral Interests	.029*	6752	-.007	5889
Private Sector				
State-Owned Enterprise	.028*	6752	.039**	5889
Agriculture	-.052**	6752	-.034**	5889
Civil Service	.009	6752	-.014	5889
Pensioners	-.046**	6752	-.026*	5889
Satisfaction with System Transformation				
Democratic Satisfaction	.148**	6559	.159**	6197
Favor Free Market	.216**	5911	.215**	5632
Cognitive Mobilization				
Education	.052**	6745	.000	6359
Income				
Bulgaria	.106*	588	.107*	493
Czech Republic	.115*	444	.110*	489
Estonia	.038	544	-.049	456
Hungary	.171**	549	.020	549
Latvia	.000	605	.103*	474
Lithuania	.142*	482	-.052	407
Poland	.042	732	.109**	760
Romania	.029	858	.074*	948
Slovakia	.043	514	.028	479
Slovenia	.001	642	.068	609

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Source: Central and Eastern Eurobarometer Nos. 6-7, 1995-1996.

Toward a Model of Support for EU Membership

Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable - support for EU membership - we employed a logit model to test the relative explanatory weight of the principal independent variable--prospective economic evaluation--alongside other theoretically relevant rival and control variables. The model is tested using data from the 1996 Central and Eastern Eurobarometer survey, and the results (Table 2) reveal a positive and robust relationship between anticipated pocketbook gains and support for EU membership, even when controlling for the effects of other key factors. Indeed, expectations that household finances will improve in the next 12 months account for one of only four statistically significant relationships in the model. What is important to recognize here is the fundamental message that anticipated gains yield support for entry into the EU; conversely, projected losses diminish support for accession to the EU. These results add further defense to our contention that economic optimists and "winners" interpret EU membership at least partially through the lens of individual opportunity. Had, instead, economic pessimists and "losers" been the ones casting their hypothetical referendum votes in favor of entry into the EU then the explanatory weight of the "state guarantees society" approach would have been enhanced. Given, though, that such is not the case we suggest that the data lend new and meaningful credence to the "individual opportunities" approach.

Table 2. Impact of Egocentric, Prospective Evaluations of the Economy on Support for EU Membership (Logistic Regression Results)

	β	SE	Sig.
Egocentric, Prospective Evaluation of Economy	.270	.043	.000
Democratic Satisfaction	.322	.058	.000
Preference for Free Market	.950	.086	.000
Urban	.066	.083	.426
Agriculture	.102	.103	.326
Private Sector Employee	-.213	.200	.288
State Enterprise Employee	.296	.112	.008
Pensioner	-.250	.162	.121
Constant	-.489	.160	.002

N=4,834 Model Chi Square = 334.015 (sig at .000 Model Accuracy = 84.0%

Source: Central and Eastern Eurobarometer No. 7, 1996. ICPSR Study No. 2296

The results also make clear the potency of generalized support for the free market as a predictor of support for EU membership. Such support, alongside respondent satisfaction with the way democracy is developing in his/her country, is clearly crucial to individual-level preference formation and is consistent with

the expectations of an individual opportunities (and not a welfare oriented) understanding of current opinion dynamics in the CEECs. While many observers draw inferences about support for EU membership based upon occupational status and urban/rural location, these data fail to provide significant fodder for such reasoning. Despite the rich agricultural tradition of many CEECs, citizens engaged in agricultural pursuits do not demonstrate discernibly different preferences for EU accession. Somewhat puzzling is strength of the variable capturing employment in a state enterprise, as this appears superficially to run counter to a market-based, opportunity oriented explanation of EU support. Upon closer inspection, however, there is reason to believe that not all of those laboring in state enterprises see in EU membership the dangers of privatization, salaries eroded by inflation, and even unemployment. To the contrary, as the most consistent targets of EU-sponsored incentives to reform, workers in this sector may slowly be learning that the presumed security of the old system was illusory and that in EU pressures to harmonize productivity and wages lie opportunities for greater prosperity.

DIVERGENT TRENDS IN FOCUS: ROMANIA, ESTONIA, AND HUNGARY

Can our focus on economics, self-interest, and citizen expectations inform an understanding of cross-national variation in support for EU entry? We identify Romania, Hungary, and Estonia as countries representing three distinct national trajectories: Romania--high support and increasing; Hungary--modest support and increasing; Estonia--low support and decreasing. Hampered again by the inconsistency with which Eurobarometer surveys included similar questions over time, we are restricted in our search for answers to comparison of data from the 1996 and 1997 studies (the only two that asked respondents to identify the single-most important reason why they would vote for/against EU membership if a referendum were held tomorrow). These data, nevertheless, prove to be instructive.

Table 3 provides response frequencies for respondents giving both positive and negative preferences for EU membership. These responses are then collapsed into five categories (economic evaluations, system transformation, interests, cognitive, and other). What leaps out immediately is the prominence of economic evaluations relative to issues of system transformation (e.g., democratization). The EU as a boon to the economy appears consistently--and somewhat surprisingly--more salient than the EU as a guarantor of peace, human rights, and democracy. Important, too, is that most respondents are not justifying their support for EU membership based upon the promise of financial aid (i.e., the EU as a crutch); rather the opening of markets, elevation of living standards, and prospects for general progress capture the lion's share of the responses. This diminishes the EU-as-safety-net (i.e., "state guarantees society") approach articulated earlier. Our primary interest here, though, is in cross-national differences, and in this regard it is necessary to note

the dramatic differences between Estonia and Romania in terms of the frequency of respondents who profess that they would vote against EU membership because it would "worsen the economy, be too expensive and bring no benefits." Whereas only slightly more than 1% of the Romanian sample in 1996 cited economic degradation as their primary rationale for casting the hypothetical referendum vote, almost 18% of the Estonian respondents so indicated. Moreover, the decline (by two-thirds) in Hungary of those similarly indicating their economic anxieties is consistent with that country's recent increase in popular support for entry into the EU. Postmaterialist concerns with the scientific, cultural, and educational cooperation that linking with the EU would likely entail are at best marginal for these respondents (as primary preference catalysts), and while Romanians seem little concerned with losing identity upon entering the EU Estonians clearly do (with the Hungarians cutting that characteristic in half by 1997). All told, it is clear (a) that economic considerations carry the greatest weight in preference formation, (b) that expectations of gains-rather than the desire to cushion losses-are the signal characteristic of economic evaluations, and (c) variation across time and across countries can be accounted for by volatility in economic considerations and only less so by political and cognitive factors.

Table 3. Primary Reason for Indicating Vote "For" or "Against" Referendum on EU Membership

	Romania		Estonia		Hungary	
	1996	1997	1996	1997	1996	1997
Economic Evaluations						
Positive						
EU Will Improve Economy/ Open Markets	7.7	9.3	12.9	16.9	16.4	16.2
Financial Aid	4.9	10.3	5.9	7.5	5.6	7.5
Higher Living Standards	19.3	9.1	3.9	6.0	2.7	3.1
General Progress	33.0	36.2	18.8	17.3	30.0	33.2
Total	64.9	64.9	41.5	47.7	54.7	60.0
Negative						
Economy Will Worsen, Too Expensive, Brings No Benefits	1.1	2.9	17.6	14.1	11.4	4.3
System Transformation						
Positive						
Open Borders/Broader World Outlook	4.0	5.4	3.1	3.2	3.4	2.4
Wish for Integration	15.3	9.4	4.5	7.7	3.6	5.7
EU Brings Strength	1.4	1.4	4.5	2.8	4.2	3.9
Will Bring Peace, Human Rights and Democracy	4.2	4.3	8.6	9.3	3.9	6.0
Total	24.9	20.5	20.7	23.0	15.1	18.0
Negative						
EU Brings Instability	0.6	0.5	2.4	3.0	2.8	0.1

	Romania		Estonia		Hungary	
	1996	1997	1996	1997	1996	1997
Interests						
EU Acts in Own Interests	0.4	1.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	1.1
Cognitive						
Positive						
Will Bring Scientific, Cultural, and Educational Cooperation	0.5	1.1	0.6	0.8	-	0.8
Negative						
Loss of Identity	0.4	1.0	7.6	4.8	6.1	2.6
Other						
Positive	0.9	1.0	0.8	0.4	0.8	5.3
Negative	-	0.1	-	1.6	0.5	2.0
N/A	6.3	8.1	7.8	3.6	5.6	8.8
Total	7.2	9.2	8.6	5.6	6.9	16.1

Source: Central and Eastern Eurobarometer Nos. 7-8, 1996-19

Romania

That Romania's citizens are looking to the EU for opportunity rather than a handout is an empirical reality that may startle some. Widely considered (along with Bulgaria) to be among the economic laggards of ex-Communist Europe, Romania "to the ordinary outsider... means little more than street children, rabid dogs, Gypsy beggars and post-communist decay."⁵ With average wages hovering (at best) around \$150 and 40% inflation eroding much of that, it would not be difficult to expect that Romanians would seize upon the prospect of EU financial aid as a welcome bailout. Corruption is endemic. The country's president, the ex-Communist Ion Iliescu, by almost all accounts came up short during his first term in office (1989-96), leaving most Romanians poorer than they had been under the previous regime. Moreover, almost a decade after signing its Association Agreement with the EU and a free trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association, Romania's transition away from a command-style economy draws few laudatory comments from the European Commission: "Romania cannot be considered as a functioning market economy and it is not able to cope with the competitive pressures and market forces within the Union in the medium term."⁶ By March of 2000, Romania had completed negotiations on only six of the 31 chapters of the Acquis Communautaire—the corpus of existing European Union law to which all applicant countries must assent prior to entry. Given such a dire predicament, it is indeed worth noting that the country ranks among the most ardent advocates for entry into the EU but also that Romanians are such economic optimists (35% of Romanian respondents to the 2001 Applicant Countries

5 "The End of the Tunnel, Perhaps," *The Economist* (26 July 2001).

6 European Commission, *2000 Regular Report on Romania's Progress Towards Accession* (Brussels, 2000).

Eurobarometer profess optimism that their household financial situation would improve over the next 12 months—the highest percentage of any of the 13 applicant countries). Rather than lament the possible dislocations that might accompany marketization and Europe-wide competition, those Romanians "who work in the country's burgeoning and surprisingly resilient private sector think the job losses that tend to go with privatisation mean that the government is getting serious about killing off state behemoths that have long been draining public coffers."⁷ Hope is a powerful political motivator, and it is clear that instead of bemoaning their plight or casting a woeful eye toward the EU's largesse, our data suggest Romanians perceive their lengthy journey toward membership in the Union through the lens of opportunity.

Estonia

In many ways Estonia is Romania's antithesis. With impressive economic growth rates averaging 7%, comparatively low inflation (4.2% in 2001), and corruption modest by its neighbors' standards, Estonia certainly ranks among the most successful countries to have emerged from the former Soviet Union. Unlike Romania, Estonia is widely considered a front-runner to join the EU. In its 2000 Regular Report on Estonia's application for membership, the European Commission judged that "Estonia is a functioning market economy and should be able to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union in the near term, provided that it stays with its present reform path."⁸ Given this relative success story, it appears at first blush incongruous that citizens in the small Baltic state would be so consistently tepid in their support for entry into the EU. Indeed, Eurobarometer surveys conducted since the early 1990s repeatedly demonstrate Estonians' generally lukewarm responses to the EU (the 2001 study found 31% of Estonians' "first reactions about the European Union" were negative, while only 4% of Romanians similarly described their initial impressions). In deciphering these discrepancies, it is clear that economics matter—as reported above in Table 3, considerable numbers (17.6% in 1996, 14.1% in 1997) of Estonian respondents reported their primary reason for opting against membership in the EU was that with accession the country's "economy will worsen" and the transition will be "too expensive and bring no benefits." It may be that "For many Estonians, surrendering hard-won sovereignty to another supranational body grates too. 'In some senses we would rather be like Norway: in NATO but not the EU,' admits Tunne Kelam, a leading conservative."⁹ For our present purposes, however, what is critical to note is that despite the lukewarm support for EU membership at the aggregate level, at the individual level our central hypothesis still holds—1995 and 1996 Eurobarometer data yield positive and statistically significant correlations

7 "A Flicker of Hope," *The Economist* (29 November 2001).

8 European Commission, *2000 Regular Report on Estonia's Progress Towards Accession* (Brussels, 2000).

9 "Estonia's Latest Challenge," *The Economist* (11 March 1999).

between egocentric, prospective evaluations of the economy and support for Estonia's membership in the EU. Thus, even in the least hospitable case for testing our theoretical expectations that opportunity-not dependence-drives support for European Union accession we can derive considerable support.

Hungary

Popular support for Hungary's bid to join the EU demonstrates more volatility over the course of the 1990s than does that of either Romania or Estonia. Measured in 1995 at roughly the same level of support as existed in Estonia, popular acceptance of Hungarian entry into the Union has-unlike in Estonia-risen markedly. Indeed, most studies find that Hungary ranks behind only Romania and Bulgaria in terms of mass-level enthusiasm for EU membership. Yet, unlike Romania and Bulgaria, Hungary is not presently in dire economic straits. The country of 10 million enjoys a respectable growth rate of close to 4%, with unemployment tolerable at 5.6% and inflation still manageable at 9.2%. One of the most open economies among the entire set of applicant countries, Hungary sends 75% of its exports to the EU. Much of the economic expansion can be attributed to the ex-communist Socialists who managed the country's market conversion and put the economy back on track between 1994-1998, only to witness it grow even faster under the young conservative Prime Minister Viktor Orban. Already a member of NATO, Hungary enjoys the high priority placed on its early entry into the EU by most existing Member States. The Commission, too, found as early as 1997 that Hungary functioned soundly as a market economy-a viewed that has been upheld in all subsequent Commission reports. The country's aggressive privatization program began to bear fruit after 1995, and much of Hungary's relative prosperity and burgeoning middle class emerged in the latter part of the decade. This transformation over the course of the 1990s corresponds with the survey data we have presented above, indicating that with improvements in domestic prosperity Hungarians-in contrast to Estonians-- have come to associate EU membership with continued economic advancement and general progress. We find, further, that our original hypothesis that individual-level economic optimism yields EU support is also sustained: the bivariate correlation linking egocentric, prospective economic evaluations with a vote in favor of Hungary's EU entry is 0.213 ($p < 0.001$, 1996 Eurobarometer data).

CONCLUSION

Hope is a slippery variable for political scientists. However, the anticipation of better things to come can clearly shape preferences and opinions. As has been well documented in the existing literature on economic voting, citizens in democratic societies render judgments on pressing political issues not simply through some facile reward-punishment mechanism but also based upon the anticipation of things to come. This article's findings support the hypothesis

that citizens in the central and eastern European countries currently seeking entry into the EU make decisions about their future in the EU based in part on egocentric, prospective evaluations of their financial situation. Survey respondents who perceive that their future includes financial improvement are more likely to support the drive for EU membership than are their counterparts with a self-perceived negative financial outlook. We suggest that these data and findings cast important new light on the "individual opportunities" versus "state guarantees society" dichotomy found in the literature. Irrespective of income and education levels, those expecting personal economic downturn prefer state guarantees, while those who expect economic improvement prefer opportunities through EU accession. The task for pro-Europe incumbent governments in candidate countries as well as for the European Union itself, then, is-- to put it crudely--to create hope.

The analogy to American politics is tempting. In 1980 then-President Jimmy Carter looked a wary American public in the eye, informed his citizens in an election year that the United States was in the midst of an "economic malaise," and warned that the only way out of stagnant growth, high inflation, and mounting unemployment would be through sacrifice, austerity, and painful lifestyle changes. Challenger Ronald Reagan, reading the same economic data, disagreed--far from malaise, Reagan contended, it was "Morning in America." Voters, longing for hope, agreed with Reagan. Little more than a decade later and in the throes of an economic downturn, another aspiring presidential candidate, Bill Clinton, made great political use of his origins from the small Arkansas town of Hope and chose as the musical motif of his candidacy the song, "Don't Stop Thinking About Tomorrow." The voters responded. Our intention here is to render no judgment on the merits of the respective approaches of Carter, Reagan, or Clinton. Nor do we make the case that American campaign rhetoric necessarily informs our present concern with EU enlargement. However, it is clear that in politics perception is a crucial intervening variable. If the objective in central and eastern Europe is to mobilize citizens to take "a leap into the unknown" (to recall Robert Schuman and Jean Monet's characterization of the European Coal and Steel Community), then the perception of better things to come--rather than the guarantee of cushioning against those things--is crucial to this end. This attention to the perceptions, attitudes, and preferences of citizens in central and eastern Europe deserves further scrutiny, as a disproportionate amount of scholarly attention has heretofore been devoted only to what publics and governments in existing Member States think about the addition of new members to their club. We contend that if successful enlargement is indeed to occur, it will not only be because applicant countries have satisfied the EU's Copenhagen Criteria for accession; it will, most importantly, because the prospect of EU membership has won the hearts, minds...and wallets...of central and eastern Europe's people.

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POLITICS OF OBLIVION IN POSTCOMMUNIST ROMANIA

*Adrian Cioflâncă**

The fall of authoritarian regimes in South America, Eastern Europe and other parts of the world was not followed by open and articulated debates on the recent past, for fear they would destabilize the societies and postpone the healing of old wounds. Instead, the societies preferred the policy of oblivion - not unlike the Western Europe after World War II. A number of theories and arguments are listed in this article that may explain why in Romania lustration was never a realistic option and the uncovering of the agents of former secret police was largely blocked.

Key words: guilt, human rights, lustration, repression, revolution, secret services, social memory, transition

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Nowadays, memory is a key word in historical studies. Memory seems to be for history a useful tool for auto-investigation, replacing old favorites - nature, culture, language, image, *mentalités* - that challenged the historical traditional view and helped reworking history boundaries.¹ Once again, (traditional) history - "the official memory a society chooses to honor"² - with its essentialist, generalizing, descriptive, exclusionary perspective appears to be no longer valid, from the scientific point of view, and no longer appropriate, from the cultural point of view. In this context, memory (a set of social negotiated beliefs about the past, a system of signs, symbols and practices with cognitive, evaluative and mobilizing functions)³ provides an alternative perspective, a plural, sensitive, empathic, reflexive one.

Scholars generally agree that the rediscovery of memory by historians - part of the "cultural turn" in historiography - reflects an important epistemological change and a significant modification in the relationship between past and present. The acceleration, fragmentation, democratization and privatization of history are phenomena that, according to Pierre Nora, explain the emergence of memory as one of the most important issues in current scientific debates.⁴ The reexamination of memory in historical studies may be described as a fuller awareness of new realities, rather ignored before. First, it expresses a fuller awareness of the realities of change. Because of the higher rate of cultural change, *les milieux de mémoire* (the environments of memory) desintegrated and the contemporary world have apparently lost the presence of the past.⁵ As a result of the postmodern challenge, the collective memories bequeathed by the traditions of modern culture are fading away and tradition loses its power of appeal. The historical discourse is no longer auto-referential. Under these circumstances, the increasingly concern for memory expresses the need to reaffirm the ties to a world that was in the past. Now, it is memory - as an imaginary *topos* immune to the processes of change - which provides, therapeutically, a sentiment of continuity and identity, by reconnecting us with the past. But - this is the second point - it makes the connection between past and present in another way than history does. The so-called crisis of history at the end of the twentieth century is frequently interpreted as the end of the teleology of history and of the linear conception of time. Plural, fragmented, competing times are to be described and memory is the best instrument for that.

1 Kerwin Lee Klein, winter 2000. *On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse*, in "Representations", no. 68, p. 128.

2 Patrick H. Hutton, 1993. *History as an Art of Memory*, Hanover and London: University Press of New England, p. 9.

3 For a definition of social memory see Adrian Neculau, *Memorie colectivă și uitare, în Memoria pierdută. Eseuri de psihologia schimbării*, Iași: Polirom, 1999, p. 179-198; see also another Romanian contribution: Ticu Constantin, *Memoria socială: cadru de definire și modele de analiză*, in "Psihologia socială", no. 7/2001, p. 137-157.

4 Pierre Nora, *Memory: From Freedom to Tyranny*, paper prepared for the international conference "Memory and History: Remembering, Forgetting and Forgiving in the Life of the Nation and the Community", Cape Town, August 9-11, 2000 (www.celat.ulaval.ca/franco/CAPE2/nora.htm).

5 Idem, *Between Memory and History: Les Liens de Mémoire*, in Jacques Revel, Lynn Hunt (eds.), *Histoires. French Constructions of the Past*, New York: The New Press, 1995, p. 632; see also idem, *Les Liens de Mémoire*, vol. I, Paris, 1984, p. XVII-XLII.

The study of collective (or public, social, cultural) memory helps historians to retrieve alternative traditions, to realize that information about past is lodged in other places than they have previously imagined. Thirdly, history helped by memory rediscovers not only new times, but also new historical actors. In the second half of the twentieth century, historians had to consider plebeians and societies more than kings, presidents, politicians and diplomats. That implied a revolution of sources, the state-sponsored memory stored in official archives becoming partially irrelevant. Plural discourses about past have been gathered to enlarge our perspective on old times. An interesting hypostasis of the phenomenon of democratization - this is the last point - is that not only historians are allowed to speak publicly about past, but also particular individuals with lived experiences.

Since the 1970's, a radical critique of old institutionalized memory practice has developed, especially in Western Europe. That implied denationalization, dematerialization and deritualization of memory.⁶ As a result of globalization, memory has simultaneously become more global and more local. On the one hand, Holocaust, Gulag, Hiroshima or Chernobyl, phenomena that people rather forget about, are now themes of global debates. On the other hand, national memory arouses less interest, local, ethnic, family memory appearing instead as more important. Dematerialization of memory is the effect of so-called anti-monument movement. Critics argue that traditional memory sites actually discourage engagement with the past and induce forgetting rather than remembering. Alternatively, they want that remembering to become part of the everyday life, thus closing the gap between official and individual memory. Finally, critics dispute the communicative efficiency of traditional commemorations, which were largely made for, but not of the people. From this point of view, the solution is a general and real participation to the construction of social memory.

All these changes of paradigm have affected the politics of memory. As part of the process of denaturalization of memory, governments contribute to the construction of social representations of the past. But they have to do it in a more sophisticated and democratic manner than before, according to the new public sensibilities and apprehensions.

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Paradoxically, the issue of forgetting was rather ignored in the debates about memory, for a long period of time. Only recently, oblivion, the art of forgetting, has become topic of serious debates.⁷ Political reasons made this possible. Scholars discovered that, from the political point of view, oblivion is more advantageous than remembering. The relative stability of Western Europe since 1945 has in part due to a colossal act of collective, consensual forgetting - of the divisions between wartime partisans and collaborators, and of traumatic

6 John R. Gillis, 1994. *Memory and Identity: the History of a Relationship*, in John R. Gillis (ed.), *Commemorations. The Politics of National Identity*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, .p. 3-24.

7 Adrian Forty, Susanne Küchler (eds.), 2001. *The Art of Forgetting*, Oxford, New York,.

events such as Holocaust.⁸ The dissolution of postwar taboos in the eighties and nineties changed this attitude. Symptomatically, the fall of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe, South America and other parts of the world was not followed by open and articulated debates on recent past. It is true that - as Tzvetan Todorov puts it - the tyrannies of the twentieth century tried to delete, impose monopoly on or control memory thoroughly,⁹ but it is also true that the removal of the totalitarian conditions was not equivalent to the return to "real", "genuine" memory. In fact, we can see that the "post" governments prefer politics of oblivion and forgiving to politics of remembering, restoring or disclosing the real past.

This is valid also for Romania, which has great problems - now, twelve years after the fall of the Communist regime - in coping with the recent past. The incumbents and the society seem not to be interested in disclosing and openly debating facts and controversial issues regarding the communist period. Apparently, those responsible for crimes and abuses benefit from a general tacit, *de facto*, amnesty, which is the result of a pact of silence - an authentic social contract - concluded between politicians and citizens. On the other hand, the politics of memory the postcommunist governments hardly implemented, under the pressure of the civil society - the limited access to the communist and political police archives, the partial disclosure of the collaborationists of the regime, the trials of some nomenklatura leaders, etc - proved to be inefficient in the intended "moral purification" of the population.

In Romania, the most intensive debate on recent past focused on the topic of Securitate files and the disclosure of the communist regime's collaborationists. This heated debate finally transformed in politics of memory by the so-called "Ticu Dumitrescu Law" (Law no. 187/ December 9, 1999, granting access to the files of Securitate as political police). The implementation of the law was quite difficult, and the activity of the National Council for Studying the Securitate Files (CNSAS), the institution legally designated to administrate the secret files, was highly contested. Unfortunately, CNSAS have been rather awkward publicly, defining its social function and consequently, had missed the chance to attract public support and recognition for its actions.¹⁰ But something more important is to be mentioned here. This approach - the consideration of the communist past as a problem exclusively related to Securitate - transmits, as Daniel Barbu noticed, two insidious messages: that forced adhesion to communism is problematic, not the voluntary one, and that the invisible face of communism is problematic, not the visible one.¹¹

8 *Ibidem*, Tony Judt, *A regîndi istoria postbelică a Europei*, in "Lettre Internationale", no. 35, autumn 2000, p. 91-93.

9 Tzvetan Todorov, 1999. *Abuzurile memoriei*, traducere de Doina Lică, Timișoara: Editura Amarcord, p. 9.

10 Adrian Cioflâncă, *Instituția nimănui*, in "Monitorul", October 25, 2001, p. 6A; see also a refined analysis on CNSAS: Andi Mihalache, *Mitologii spontane la sfîrșit de mileniu*, in "Sfera politicii", no. 91-92, 2001, p. 26-32.

11 Daniel Barbu, 1999. *Republica absentă. Politică și societate în România postcomunistă*, București: Nemira, p. 99, 228; Adrian Cioflâncă, *Memoria ca simulacru*, in "Monitorul", April 4, 2002, p. 6A.

Because of deep political intrusion, politics of memory as such transformed, in fact, in politics of oblivion. The same is applicable for other laws - The Law of Archives and the Law of State Secrets - which are conceived in a constricting manner and are actually impeding access to information about recent past.¹²

Consequently, the actual distortion of social memory is the result of the communist socialization, but also of the politics of oblivion used after the fall of the totalitarian regime.

Further on, I will focus on the latter, which implies, on the one hand, a social functional amnesia and, on the other, publicly performed strategies of forgetting. For the first case, the most important question is why the oblivion is generally preferred, and, for the second, which are the publicly established instruments for repressing or diverting inconvenient, embarrassing memory.

Five general explanations may be indicated as sources of the social preference for oblivion:

- 1) **The sentiment of nostalgia.** The polls indicate a strong sentiment of nostalgia for the communist period¹³ ("an era of stability and order, with relatively good leadership"), especially for the seventies.¹⁴ In contradiction with what Michel Foucault called the "repressive hypothesis", a hypothesis largely credited in Romania, the communist regime displayed not only a negative power, but also a positive one. The totalitarian regime was not only a repressive mechanism, which interdicted or repressed, but also a positive power, which urged to action and mobilized energies. A correct history of communism is conjointly one of repression and mobilization. Regarding the positive face of the communist power, it is the fact that many Romanians benefited from the communist opportunities. At least half of the Romanian population took direct advantage from the communist modernizing facilities - the generalization of the modern working methods, the village-to-town massive migration, the constitution of a dominant technical elite, the enforcement of the protective state roles, etc.¹⁵ Psychologically, it is hard to remember a successful youth in catastrophic terms; nostalgia is more convenient and therapeutic.
- 2) **The sentiment of shame.** In 1989, the Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu was pretending that the entire population belonged to the communist organizational structures, one way or another.¹⁶ Even if the Romanian dictator exaggerated, it's a fact that the inclusion of the

12 See "Sfera Politicii", no. 93-94, 2001, with the theme "Politics and secret".

13 See, for example, *Barometrul de opinie publică*, CURS, November 1999, p. 46, 69; Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Denisa Măndruță, *Was Huntington Right? The Foundations of Democracy and Democratic Institutions in the Public Opinion of Eastern and Central Europe*, in "Romanian Journal of Political Science", vol.1, n.1, January 2001, p. 59-92.

14 Alina Mungiu, 1995. *Românii după '89. Istoria unei neînțelegeri*, București: Humanitas, p. 125-129.

15 Daniel Barbu, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

16 "Scinteia", 3.06.1989, p.3.

Romanian society in the communist organizations was broader than in any other eastern communist country.¹⁷ Because of the specificity of the neo-patrimonial Romanian communist regime,¹⁸ the sentiment of shame touched not only the party members, but also everyone who participated in the rituals of power and cultic pageants.¹⁹

- 3) **The sentiment of guilt.** Privately, Romanians admit they weren't too courageous in the past regime, allowing, by their cowardliness, abuses against other Romanians. But, publicly, they do not assume such responsibility because they perceive blame as connected to punishment.²⁰
- 4) **The absence of decommunization and the continuity of elite.** The Romanian postcommunist governments haven't implemented politics of decommunization such as lustration politics in former Czechoslovakia. Thus, the informal communist networks survived after revolution and granted a retrospective legitimacy for communism.²¹ 63 percents of the current leaders were also leaders before 1989.²² This elite is uninterested in (likely compromising) revelations about the recent past.
- 5) **The Leninist legacy.** Recent studies prove the deep impact of the communist socialization process.²³ One of the most important consequence is the persistence in reading the past through communist paradigms.

The politics of oblivion are publicly supported by an impressive display of arguments, expressed by politicians from both sides of the political scene. I made an inventory of such arguments:

- 1) **The perversity thesis:** the adversaries of remembering use this argument to assert that disclosure of the recent past won't lead to reconciliation, but to social turbulence; that it will lead not to the moral health of the community, but to paranoia and anxiety.
- 2) **The futility thesis** points out the lack of pragmatic effects of revealing the past.

17 Ken Jowitt, 1992. *New World Disorder. The Leninist Extinction*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, p. 88-120; Mihnea Berindei, *România lui Ceaușescu - un naufragiu planificat*, I, în "22", no. 46, November 17-23 1998, p.10.

18 Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan, 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press,

19 Vladimir Tismăneanu, 1999. *Fantasmele salvării. Democrație, naționalism și mit în Europa post-comunistă*, Iași: Polirom,, p.145; Adrian Cioflâncă, *The Festive Display of Power. Cultic Pageants vs. Change in the Last Year of Ceaușescu's Regime*, paper lectured at a regular workshop organized by Europa Institut Budapest, June 20, 2000.

20 Daniel Barbu, op. cit., p. 98.

21 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, *Politica după comunism. Structură, cultură și psihologie politică*, București: Humanitas, 2002, p. 60.

22 Dan Chiribucă, Mircea Comșa, *Elite vechi, elite noi, în Fețele schimbării. Români și provocările tranziției*, București: Nemira, 1999, p. 252.

23 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, *Politica după comunism...*, passim.

- 3) **The jeopardy thesis:**²⁴ revealing the past, the opponents of memory say, would be a very dangerous action for the unity and solidarity of the community.
- 4) **The distance thesis:** "we are too close to the events, so we cannot be objective" - this is the essence of this argument; because the actors of recent past are still alive, because the archives are not completely open, because the facts could be politically instrumentalized and so, the advocates of forgetting urge for temporary ignorance.
- 5) **The priorities thesis:** this argument disqualifies the necessity of exploring the past by stressing upon the pressing priorities of the present.
- 6) **The progressive thesis** describes the interest for the past as obsolete and capitalizes on the importance of the future.
- 7) **The criteria thesis:** "which are the criteria for establishing who was responsible for the communist troubles?" - this is the main question of this thesis, which asserts, following an old suggestion of Vaclav Havel, that it's impossible to find out the truth because the line of responsibility pervades each of us, rather than separates between "us" and "them".
- 8) **The collective responsibility thesis:** the advocates of oblivion allege that there is no reason to look for specific responsible individuals, because everybody was guilty for the communist past, one way or another.
- 9) **The witch haunting thesis:** according to this argument, imported by Romanians from Adam Michnik, the archeology of the past won't clear up the social life, but, on the contrary, it would provoke social hysteria.
- 10) **The humanist thesis:** that is, everybody deserves a second chance.
- 11) **The Christian thesis:** in this view, we would have to forget because forgetting is equivalent to forgiving.
- 12) **The context thesis:** a context, which is always "complex" and "dominated by tough rules", provides an excuse; and communism is the most excusable context.

It is not worthy to discuss upon the validity of these arguments because this is not the point. It is their social impact that counts. The extraordinary recurrence of the thesys I mentioned in the public debates is, in my view, a strong indicator of their success. On the other hand, I counted only few elaborate and well-known arguments on support of the politics of memory.²⁵

24 These first three theses are topics of the rhetoric of reaction; see Albert O. Hirschman, *The Rhetoric of Reaction. Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991.

25 Adrian Cioflăncă, 2001. *Trebuie oare să uităm de trecutul comunist?*, in "Monitorul", March 19, , p. 4A.

The arguments in favor of oblivion are frequently integrated in more sophisticated **techniques of de-responsibilization**. These techniques have been part of a populist policy of legitimization conducted by the postcommunist governments looking for larger popular support. We could say that, besides the tacit amnesty I mentioned before, the de-responsibilization of the population for supporting or admitting the communist rule was a constituent of the social contract concluded between the Romanian society and the postcommunist governments.

I mention below nine techniques:

- 1) **The focus on the responsibility of Ceausescu:** this neo-Khrushchevite method have been used mainly by president Ion Iliescu and his group to excuse the Party elite, the members of the Party and the rest of the population for endorsing the regime.
- 2) **The extra-territorialisation of guilt:** this technique helped for looking for culprits in other places - in the Soviet Union, in the cynical West, among Russians, Jews, "terrorists", etc.
- 3) **The preference for the foucauldian "repressive hypothesis":** in Romania, there is a strong tendency to describe the communist period as an era of uninterrupted terror; in this view, the Romanians were only victims, but never collaborationists.
- 4) **The description of communism as accident:** in this version, communism was an unhappy interlude in the otherwise heroic and triumphal Romanian history.
- 5) **The anonimization of communism:** describing the former regime in abstract, impersonal, anonymous terms as "totalitarianism", "dictatorship", "communism", this technique avoids a differentiated discussion about victims and perpetrators, about different degrees of guiltiness.²⁶
- 6) **The depoliticization of communism:** this strategy describes the communist regime as a depoliticized environment or even paradise, with people happily and freely looking for private business.
- 7) **The historicization of past:** this is a technique of reducing tragedies and lived memories at the scale of History, of domesticating, sublimating them as events among others in the national metanarrative.²⁷
- 8) **The teleologization of communism:** this kind of memory attributes

26 Daniel Barbu, op. cit., p. 99; Jörn Rüsen, *Secondary Traumatization - How History May Come to Terms with Senselessness*, paper for CEU Summer University: "History and Memory: The Twentieth Century in Retrospect", Budapest, July 9-20, 2001.

27 All the postcommunist societies of Eastern Europe use, in different degrees, this post-traumatic technique, see Christoph Reinprecht, *Social Memory in the Transformational Process of East-Central Europe*, in "Anthropology of East Europe Review", autumn 1994, volume 12, no. 2, (http://condor.depaul.edu/~rrotenbe/aecer/aecer12_2/reinph1.html).

to communism high and tough goals (especially, of modernizing or eudaemonic nature or referring to foreign policy) which excuse abuses and other "minor" sacrifices.²⁸

- 9) **The mythologizing of reality:** this constitutes, in fact, a large category of other techniques that distort, cosmeticize facts and endow them with mythological functions.²⁹

All these are about politics, but not only. Unfortunately, historiography tends to reproduce these techniques in dealing with the history of communism. The revolution of memory I described at the beginning is not a present phenomenon in Romania. History is still strongly nationalized, state-focused, official, highly selective, immobile, essentialist. For the time being, historians generally tend to prefer official sources and to ignore memory as vivid source.

In Jörn Rüsen's view, the boom of memory in humanities is a chance for the historical studies to consider all its three dimensions - cognition, politics and aesthetics. A limitation of the historical interest is a limitation of the social impact of the historical writing.³⁰ Rüsen also points out that "historical studies is by their logic a cultural practice of detraumatization".³¹ Romania has just lived a trauma, the communist totalitarianism, and this is a chance for historians to assume a role of cultural therapy, teaching people to come to terms with the past.

28 Jörn Rüsen, 1997. op. cit.; Leslie Holmes, *Post-Communism. An Introduction*, Cambridge: Polity Press, , p. 44 sqq..


29 We attended a "parade" of these arguments and techniques in June 2001, when the incumbents proposed - unofficially, in order to test the reaction of the public opinion - a legislative project meant to offer amnesty to those involved in the '89 revolution, in inter-ethnic conflicts and in events of social turbulence (riots, violent strikes or the famous "mineriade" - the riots of the Romanian miners). President Ion Iliescu, who seemed to be the initiator of that legislative project, saluted the idea of amnesty, saying the Romanians have to get into normality by erasing the residuals of the past and all the obstacles which are staying against "national reconciliation". The initiative was not well received by the Romanian press and the Prime Minister Adrian Năstase hesitated to endorse the idea. That is why the project was withdrawn until more favorable times (Mediafax News Agency, June 4, 2001). As designed by the government, the amnesty was supposed to have the following features: 1) Amnesty without truth: In order de forget, the Romanians have to know what to forget. According to the theory, the amnesty requires a rational forgetting - that is, to know the truths and to store them in an orderly manner. The amnesty is a classified memory. In the Romanian case, the events which are supposed to be the subject of the amnesty - the '89 revolution, the "mineriade", the inter-ethnic conflicts - are embarrassing mysteries. And it is difficult to store mysteries or phantoms. The initiators of the amnesty law invoke the South African precedent. But in the South African case, the amnesty was theoretically granted instead of full confession. In the Romanian case, amnesty would mean the incineration of the past truths - not putting them in the middle ground. 2) Amnesty without perpetrators: In order de forget, the Romanians have to know whom to forget. The supporters of the politics of oblivion also invoke the precedent of the Latin American amnesties. But a very important difference between the two cases - which is rather hushed up in the public debate - is that in the Latin American case the perpetrators and the victims were two well-known distinct groups. In Romania, nobody established the culprits (with few marginal exceptions). 3) Amnesty without request: The amnesty doesn't imply gratuitous forgetting. As Alain Besançon put it, amnesty should succeed to a symbolical request and to a declaration of mea culpa. Otherwise, a groundlessly oblivion is risky because it would be the stimulus for irresponsibility. In Romania, we have no perpetrators, so we have no requests. 4) Amnesty without reconciliation: For being socially effective, amnesty should be the result of a real public pressure. In Romania, the pressure was simulated by parliamentary means.

30 Jörn Rüsen, *Lo(osing) the Order of History. Some Aspects of Historical Studies in the Intersection of Modernity, Postmodernity and the Discussion on Memory*, paper for CEU Summer University (cited before).

31 Idem, *Secondary Traumatization*

Elena Ștefoi în dialog cu Andrei Pleșu și Petre Roman, *Transformări, inerții, dezordini*; 22 de luni după 22 decembrie 1989, Iași - Polirom: 2002, 248 pagini, preț 149.000 lei

Pierre Nora recunoștea la un moment dat rolul memoriei ca știință complementară și chiar integrată istoricului. Istoria orală este în măsură să ofere o completare documentelor scrise și în plus o doză de încredere publicului laic în acest domeniu. Destul de neglijat în primul deceniu postcomunist, rolul memoriei și al istoriei orale începe să recapete importanța care i se cuvine. Mare parte dintre cei care au jucat un rol important în rearanjarea vieții politice la începutul anilor 90 simt acum nevoia să împărtășească din evenimentele care le-au influențat viața odată cu preluarea puterii. Faptul că aceștia rescriu acum istoria prin intermediul memoriei orale poate constitui un început pentru a dezvălui ceea ce în decursul anilor a căzut cumva în desuetudine din cauza nenumăratelor mistificări și interpretări intenționate răuvoitoare. Adevărul, căci despre el este vorba și anume adevărata istorie a tensionatelor evenimente din primii ani postrevolutionari constituie subiectul acestor interviuri. Scriitoarea Elena Ștefoi s-a angajat la un astfel de demers la inițiativa fostului premier al primului guvern de după revoluție, Petre Roman și a ministrului culturii din același guvern, omul de cultură, Andrei Pleșu. Doi oameni cu personalități și cu structuri intelectuale diferite inițiază o discuție, bine coordonată de Elena Ștefoi, savuroasă și plină de informații din culisele politice. Dincolo de partea savuroasă conținută implicit în poveștile transmise oral, putem constata că interlocutorii dezvăluie destul de consistent modul în care funcționa politica românească în tensiunea primelor luni de după revoluție. Povestea unui guvern care se zbătea să-și găsească legitimitatea în ochii populației, în contextul propagandei și a jocurilor făcute de structurile încă active ale fostei Securități, în împrejurările neelucidate încă ale modului în care fusese posibilă răsturnarea regimului comunist, considerat inamovibil de către aproape toți reformatorii care reușiseră instaurarea noilor guverne, de orientare democratică, în Centrul și Estul Europei, este de fapt povestea dramei României care, după 12 ani nu a reușit să descopere mecanismele, aproape oculte, care au



determinat numeroasele acțiuni antidemocratice (escapadele minerilor în București) ce au continuat seria de evenimente care au subminat credibilitatea României în Vest.

Dialogul între Pleșu și Roman se vrea de fapt o reanalizare a revoluției din 1989, privită acum după mai bine de doisprezece ani, dintr-o perspectivă poate mai obiectivă, determinată de asumarea trecutului ca spațiu temporal deosebit de important pentru a oferi o aură de onestitate vieții politice. Poate părea surprinzător faptul că două persoane cu trecut esențialmente diferit, una care a cunoscut represiunea comunistă în mod direct prin asumarea rolului de disident (Andrei Pleșu) iar cealaltă, cu un trecut comod sub regimul comunist, se întâlnesc și formează, împreună cu alții, de la intelectuali la muncitori, cea mai eterogenă echipă guvernamentală pe care a cunoscut-o România. Suspiciunile de apartenență ideologică față de mulți dintre membrii guvernului, discrepanțele decizionale generate de lipsa de instituții puternice au purtat echipa Roman precum a fost purtată acea "plută a Meduzei" cum bine o denumesc Elena Ștefoi. Interlocutorii recunosc infantilitatea multora din gesturile politice din primii ani (1990-1992), greșelile unor oameni de stat (Ion Iliescu) care s-au grăbit în a oferi legitimitate simbolică celor care au înăbușit Piața Universității sau gesturile mai mult sau mai puțin intenționate din Alba Iulia cu prilejul serbării zilei naționale a țării, atunci când Petre Roman mulțumește celor care se manifestă destul de violent împotriva minorității maghiare. După mai bine de un deceniu acestea sînt greșeli asumate și scuzate acum prin prisma lipsei de experiență. Rolul lui Andrei Pleșu în aceste manifestări este unul recunoscut și întărit de către fostul ministru al Culturii și anume, acela de a fi fost un critic implicat în desfășurarea de facto a evenimentelor. În postura sa de ministru al culturii, Pleșu a avut nu neapărat un rol marginal în desfășurarea evenimentelor ci mai mult un rol nemediatizat datorită importanței mari acordate portofoliilor economie sau externe. A putut astfel constata disfuncționalitățile cabinetului și a încercat, prin sfaturi utile adresate premierului de atunci și partenerului de dialog de acum, Petre Roman, să aducă o oază de lumină în gîndirea politică. Se poate constata după parcurgerea acestei cărți că într-adevăr, puterea politică de atunci a avut o mare problemă de legitimitate și datorită acestui fapt, s-au luat măsuri, unele populiste, altele nu tocmai democratice, cu scopul de a-și apropia electoratul. Lipsa de profesionalism a politicienilor de atunci, scuzată de noul situației dar perpetuată totuși pînă în prezent, din mai multe motive, dintre care conservarea unor importante bucăți din nomenclatura comunistă, a făcut posibile evenimente precum Piața Universității, nenumăratele descinderi ale minerilor sau teama continuă față de structurile fostei Securități.

Deși Petre Roman nu oferă o justificare morală pentru gestul de a-l da afară din propria țară pe regele Mihai, o explicație oferită românilor după o perioadă atît de lungă este de apreciat. La fel, o informație fascinantă pentru cei care își închipuiau că dialogul între putere și opoziție era absent, este cea pe care o oferă Petre Roman în legătură cu propunerea pe care Corneliu Coposu i-a făcut-o la un moment dat - anume de a sprijini reîntorcerea regelui Mihai în țară și de a schimba regimul de atunci cu o monarhie constituțională în care Roman să

dețină rolul de conducător al guvernului. Putem remarca aici retrospectiv, abilitatea extraordinară de care Corneliu Coposu dădea dovadă. Printr-o mișcare inteligentă, cooptarea unui personaj ce se bucura de oarece suport electoral și care putea oferi garanția faptului că monarhia nu este un lucru atât de rău pe cât părea, Coposu urma tradiția guvernelor provizorii din perioada interbelică de sub oblăduirea monarhului. Din culisele politice, putem afla, chiar dacă pare de neimaginat, cum, într-un dialog între Andrei Pleșu și președintele de atunci (și de acum), Ion Iliescu, primul află cu stupeoare că celui din urmă îi este ascultat telefonul. Un rol destul de important pe parcursul acelei perioade îl are încă, din dialogul celor doi, Securitatea statului, acum transformată în SRI. Modul în care se fabricau dosare (lui Pleșu și chiar lui Roman) dintr-o rutină moștenită din comunism, conspiraționism care l-ar încînta chiar și pe Raul Girardet, ascultarea fără discernămint chiar și a telefoanelor celor ce dețineau puterea politică, au caracterizat viața politică din această perioadă, destul de recentă pentru a șoca la modul senzațional.

Afectat de imaginea pe care i-a oferit-o participarea într-un cabinet format în marea sa majoritate din oameni care aveau un trecut nu tocmai curat, Pleșu pare să-și fi păstrat alura morală deosebită, moștenire a perioadei disidente. Pe de altă parte, odrasle de vechi nomenclaturiști, precum Petre Roman, și-au dovedit școala politică și au demonstrat că au fost singurii, datorită circumstanțelor care i-au adus în zilele acelea atenției publice, care puteau constitui, mai mult sau mai puțin, un guvern-alternativă. Conservarea vechilor structuri și apucăturile autoritare au condus inevitabil la momente de tensiune și, cum spuneam mai devreme, chiar la menținerea maleficelor structuri ale Securității.

Destul de des putem întâlni numele lui Virgil Măgureanu, eminența cenușie care conducea în acel moment SRI-ul și care pare să fi avut un rol deosebit în toate acțiunile și scandalurile politice din acei ani. Extrapolînd și întorcîndu-ne în 2002, putem vedea influența conservării vechilor structuri de cadre în cadrul SRI, condus pînă nu demult de Măgureanu, care acum oferă României, în demersul aderării la NATO o imagine nu tocmai bună. Andrei Pleșu precizează la un moment dat că pe marginea subiectului "Măgureanu" se pot scrie nenumărate teze de licență și chiar de doctorat. Subiectul este foarte vast iar SRI-ul este o instituție care pare să fi influențat negativ imaginea Pieței Universității și implicit decizia arbitrară a puterii de atunci de a o dispersa prin intermediul violenței. Auto-aprecieri excesiv de măgulitoare care au trecut în mod inevitabil de cenzura obiectivă a editoarei Elena Ștefoi, altfel excelentă în demersul său (guvernul Roman ca primul guvern non-comunist din Estul Europei; programul de reformă economică din 1991 ca cel mai radical din regiune; etc) marchează ici și colo locurile în care subiectivitatea autorilor o ia razna față de realitate. Asemenea derapaje sunt puține și nu afectează substanțial cartea. Reproșul cel mai important ce se poate face însă îl privește pe domnul Roman: în vreme ce Andrei Pleșu, eliberat pe moment de constrîngerii politice, în caz că le-a simțit vreodată, joacă sincer cu toate cărțile la vedere, fostul premier lasă permanent impresia că se lasă angajat în retușarea propriei imagini.

Pleșu povestește trecutul, Roman îl reinterpretează ca pe o variabilă a carierei politice curente. Nu poți scăpa ca cititor de impresia că ce se vede e doar jumătate din Roman - cea care, ori pentru că e deja publică - ori se dezvăluie oricum din istoriile interlocutorilor, constituie subiect de discuție. Și nici aceea toată: povestind pe larg încercările eșuate de a media între Piața Universității și Iliescu în 1991, Andrei Pleșu nu ne spune de pildă ce l-a împiedicat pe Roman să încerce un dialog cu demonstrații. Exact în asemenea puncte ale dialogului, fostul premier putea să reia inițiativa unor clarificări, dar nu o face.

În afară de cele menționate, mai putem afla în carte povești picante despre securistul care, înainte de 1989 îl urmărise pe Andrei Pleșu la Tescani și care vine acum la cel din urmă exprimându-și admirația pe care se pare că a a nutrit-o dintotdeauna față de ministru și spunându-i că i se fabrică dosare. Este o lume fantastică, marquesiană, dar savuroasă în același timp, atât pentru cel care a trăit evenimentele din acea perioadă fără să știe ce se întâmplă, lăsat în necunoaștere, izolat prin numeroase manipulări în turnul său de fildeș, cât și pentru studentul dornic să cunoască istoria la modul în care aceasta a fost făcută.

La un preț destul de ridicat dar în condiții grafice și de calitate excelente, Transformări, Inerții, Dezordini (22 luni după 22 decembrie 1989) este o carte care trebuie cu siguranță citită.

Emanuel Răuță

D. Stark, L. Bruszt, *Traietorii post-socialiste. Transformarea politicii și a proprietății în Europa Centrală și de Est*, Editura Ziua, București, 2002

G. Eyal, I. Szelenyi, E. Townsley, *Capitalism fără capitaliști. Noua elită conducătoare din Europa de Est*, Editura Omega, București, 2001.

Undeva, într-un colț al Irlandei, un irlandez este întrebat: „Care este cel mai bun drum spre Dublin?” El se gândește puțin și răspunde: „Nu porni de aici”. Bancul ilustrează foarte bine situația Europei Centrale și de Est în drumul său spre capitalism. Întrucât Europa de Est nu întrunește condițiile clasice din care a pornit și s-a dezvoltat capitalismul occidental, cea mai bună soluție ar fi să nu pornim de aici. Nu există nici resursele, nici fundamentele construirii acestui tip de capitalism. Cum va arăta capitalismul din aceste state dacă condițiile de plecare sînt diferite de cele ale capitalismului clasic? Va fi însă acesta un capitalism identic cu modelul occidental sau diferențele generate de condițiile inițiale vor fi atât de adînci, încît vom fi îndreptățiți să susținem că avem de-a face cu un alt tip de capitalism? Aceasta este provocarea sociologiei neoclasică care, spre deosebire de sociologia clasică nu mai este preocupată de condițiile apariției capitalismului în vest. Dacă pentru sociologul clasic acest fenomen reprezenta un miracol, ale cărui origini și cauze se cereau a fi elucidate, pentru neoclasiци, martori ai înfloririi capitalismului în toate colțurile lumii, marele miracol ar fi evoluția acestor capitalisme spre o singură destinație, reproducînd aceleași structuri și relații de piață. De aceea, întrebarea sociologiei neoclasică este: „Cum sînt formate și diversificate sistemele capitaliste actuale în condițiile variate ale transformării capitaliste?”. Două recente apariții editoriale în traducere românească - „Traietorii post-socialiste. Transformarea politicii și a proprietății în Europa Centrală și de Est” de D. Stark și L. Bruszt (Ed. Ziua, 2002) și „Capitalism fără capitaliști. Noua elită conducătoare din Europa de Est” de G. Eyal, I. Szelenyi și E. Townsley (Ed. Omega, 2001) – încearcă să ofere răspunsuri acestei întrebări.

O serie de presupuziții și argumente similare creează afinități organice între cele două lucrări. Mai întîi de toate, autorii ambelor studii se războiesc cu teoria economiei neoclasică, pentru care există un singur proiect de construire a capitalismului, iar problema statelor aflate în tranziție este, pur și simplu, o problemă de copiere a instituțiilor funcționale ale capitalismului occidental. Respingînd această „ortodoxie neoliberală”, autorii vor propune în locul ideii

„capitalismului prin proiect“ (capitalism by design) teza „capitalismelor comparative“ (Neil Fligstein).

Pentru a nu cădea în optimismul lipsit de realism al neoliberalilor și pentru a nu păcătui prin pesimismul excesiv al teoreticienilor involuționiști (Borowoy), inspirați din teoria dependenței de trecut (Past dependency), D. Stark și L. Bruszt propun o reinterpretare a celei din urmă, elaborând noțiunea de dependență de cale (path dependency). Un simplu joc de cuvinte, dar care schimbă radical abordarea asupra viitorului statelor aflate în tranziție. Teoria dependenței pornește de la ipoteza că rețeaua de moșteniri instituționale ale ordinii politice anterioare (socialism) determină evoluția noilor forme în perioada următoare schimbării de regim. Plastic spus, societățile postcomuniste construiesc capitalismul nu pe ruinele socialismului, ci cu ruinele socialismului.

Pentru a-și argumenta teoria, Bruszt și Stark apelează la exemplele oferite de istoria recentă a desprinderii de socialism, investigând îndeaproape cazul mai multor state din Europa Centrală. Traectoria evoluției unei țări (pathway) poate fi trasată prin analiza fundamentelor, a back-ground-ului pe care s-a produs desprinderea de comunism (extrication) și a arhitecturii de construcție a tranziției la capitalism. Particularitățile acestor căi sînt generate de interacțiunea dintre a) reformatori și radicali și b) elitele conducătoare și opoziție.. De exemplu, în Ungaria, unde opoziția era slabă, iar elita conducătoare fracturată, democrația care a rezultat a fost articulată după principii liberale, bazată pe consens și includere. Acest lucru nu s-a întîmplat în Polonia, unde existența unei opoziții puternice și structurate a compromis procesul de consolidare democratică. Tot modul în care s-a produs desprinderea de socialism - reunificare în Germania, compromis în Polonia, consens și competiție electorală în Ungaria și capitulare în Cehia.- a influențat și strategiile de privatizare din fiecare țară. Concluzia autorilor este că nu avem o singură tranziție spre capitalism, ci o pluralitate de tranziții. Diferențele din interiorul Europei Centrale și de Est infirmă existența unui singur concept universal și abstract de capitalism și democrație, punînd în lumină o multitudine de forme ale acestora.

De aceea, atunci cînd se întrebă ce soluție trebuie adoptată pentru a restructura economia post-socialistă, Stark și Bruszt evită atît opțiunea neoliberală, cît și pe cea neo-etatistă. Dacă primii consideră că cea mai bună cale de a construi o piață este însăși piața liberă, pentru neo-etatiști cheia miracolului o reprezintă existența unui stat coerent și puternic, după modelul dirijismului sud-asiatic. Stark și Bruszt depășesc dualitatea stat puternic-piață liberă, afirmînd că punctul de sprijin în construcția capitalismului îl reprezintă rețelele sociale și societatea civilă. Nici soluția etatistă, nici cea neo-liberală nu funcționează în Europa de Est, pentru că atît statul, cît și piața sînt foarte slabe. În schimb, aici există rețele sociale puternice, dezvoltate de-a lungul deceniilor. Acestea rețele (asociative și deliberative) reprezintă condiția funcționării răspunderii extinse (*extended accountability*), concept elaborat de autori prin combinarea noțiunii de includere lărgită (*expanded embedeness*) a lui Peter Evans și cel de răspundere pe orizontală (*horizontal accountability*), utilizat de Guillermo O'Donnell.

Conceptul de răspundere extinsă presupune în mod implicit o doză de

neîncredere în capacitatea elitelor post-socialiste de a ghida de sine stătător procesul de tranziție. Afirmatia conform căreia tranziția de la socialism la capitalism nu este echivalentă cu o trecere de la plan la piață, ci de la plan la clan, în care clanului i se atribuie vizibile conotații peiorative, este grăitoare în acest sens. Perspectiva lui Eyal, Szelenyi și Townsley asupra rolului elitelor este total diferită, iar acesta este abia începutul diversificării părerilor. Chiar dacă autorii ambelor cărți se recomandă ca fiind reprezentanți ai sociologiei neoclase, Bruzt și Stark se revendică din gândirea durkeimiană, în timp ce Eyal, Szelenyi și Townsley sînt continuatori ai tradiției weberiene, deplasînd centrul de greutate dinspre rolul rețelelor sociale spre rolul actorului individual și insistînd asupra rolului elitelor în procesul de transformare.

Szelenyi, Eyal și Townsley critică, alături de Stark și Bruzt, teoriile economiei neoclase, dar se arată la fel de sceptici și în privința teoriei dependenței de cale. Autorii sugerează o sinteză a teoriilor neoclase și cele ale dependenței de cale prin plasarea actorilor în centrul analizei, propunînd propria lor teorie: „ajustarea traiectoriei“. Pentru a-și argumenta propria teorie, autorii fac apel la teoria lui Bourdieu despre diferitele tipuri de capital și teoria weberiană despre societățile de status și cele de clase. Schimbarea socială constrînge indivizii la o re-adaptare a diferitelor tipuri de capital, ca o condiție a supraviețuirii în noile condiții și structuri sociale. Astfel, în trecerea de la capitalism la socialism, adică de la o societate în care capitalul economic este cel mai important înspre o societate în care deținerea capitalului politic (specie a capitalului social) devine vitală pentru menținerea la vîrfurile piramidei sociale, indivizii au fost nevoiți să-și dezvolte acel tip de capital care era solicitat de noile condiții, adică să își ajusteze traiectoria. Această teorie confirmă deopotrivă presuposițiile economiei neoclase, conform căreia există modele de comportament și de instituții care sînt copiate și adoptate noului context post-comunist, cît și a teoriilor dependenței de cale, pentru care moștenirea fostelor instituții generează consecințe în prezent.

La fel ca și Stark și Bruzt, Eyal et al. sesizează diferența între condițiile de apariție a capitalismului occidental și cele ale capitalismului din statele Europei Centrale și de Est. Capitalismul occidental a avut ca forță motrice existența unei clase de proprietari aflată în plină ascensiune. Această clasă lipsește cu desăvîrșire în Europa post-socialistă, unde practic nu există proprietari individuali, ci doar proprietari multipli (bănci, fonduri de investiții). Această realitate justifică presuposiția existenței unui capitalism fără capitaliști. Autorii menționează că acest lucru nu este valabil și în cazul Rusiei, unde avem capitaliști fără capitalism și unde se validează teoria capitalismului politic a lui Elemér Hankiss (care susține că ex-nomenclatura sovietică a fost cea care s-a îmbogățit în urma schimbării din anii 90, orientînd sensul tranziției într-o direcție care să o favorizeze). În Europa Centrală, însă, adevărații profitori ai tranziției sînt elitele culturale, care și-au asumat misiunea istorică a construirii capitalismului în regiune. Această tentativă reprezintă cel de-al treilea val al proiectului burgheziei culturale - *Bildungsburgerturn* - inițiat încă în secolul XIX, și relansat de către mișcarea dizidentă în anii 60-70 ai secolului al XX-lea. Dacă tranziția de la

feudalism la capitalism a fost înfăptuită de burghezia economică, tranziția de la socialism la capitalism va fi realizată de către burghezia culturală. Această particularitate constituie specificul capitalismului central și est-european. Cum va arăta însă acest capitalism? Fie că se va finaliza prin apariția unei clase de proprietari, fie că va evolua spre un capitalism managerial (capitalismul după capitaliști), el va fi diferit de capitalismul occidental avansat. Concluzia autorilor este, de fapt, teza întregii lucrări, conform căreia nu putem vorbi de un singur tip de capitalism, ci doar de capitalisme comparative.

Această teză a lansat o serie de polemici ardente în *American Journal of Sociology* (vol.106, nr.4/2001). Discuția cea mai aprinsă a fost cea provocată de teoreticianul post-socialist Michael Burowoy, care acuza sociologia neoclasică de a fi abandonat preocupările sociologiei clasice privind limitele capitalismului. A compara capitalismul cu socialismul este o apologie a acestuia, fapt care îi plasează pe autorii celor două lucrări în rîndurile celor care celebrează sfîrșitul istoriei și triumful capitalismului anunțat de Francis Fukuiama. Burowoy propune în locul acestei critici imanente o critică teleologică a capitalismului, de pe o poziție exterioară acestuia și anume cea a post-socialismului. Dar atît Bruszt, cît și Szelenyi rămîn fideli tradiției lor din tinerețe, cînd dezvoltaseră prin anii 70 o critică alternativă a comunismului. Critica lor era una din interiorul sistemului comunist, fiecare autor propunînd o reconceptualizare a acestuia în termenii pozitivi ai socialismului de stat. De aceea, critica pe care o vor aduce capitalismului va fi tot una imanentă, cei doi autori considerînd că „este suficient să demonstrezi, așa cum face Foucault, că fenomenele supuse investigației sînt arbitrare, fără a dovedi că trebuie înlocuite cu forme mai raționale.(...) Soluțiile la problemele post-comuniste pot veni numai din imaginația critică a celor care trăiesc în condițiile sociale analizate, nu de la analiști care măsoară realitatea în funcție de o alternativă imaginară“(p. 335).

Poate că acest îndemn ne lipsește de tentația marilor proiecte ale „schimbării la față“, împotmolindu-ne în cenușiiul luptei cotidiene, unde inamicii nu au chip de monstru, iar noi nu avem alura salvatorului. Dar afirmația autorilor are mult mai mult bun simț și pragmatism decît toate grandioasele proiecte alternative, urmate inevitabil de o cădere în „praxisul cotidian“ (Sartre). În ultimă instanță, a accepta ideea unor capitalisme multiple înseamnă a recunoaște inegalitățile capitalismului latino-american, autoritarismul paternalist al capitalismului sud-asiatic și toate deficiențele capitalismului din statele post-socialiste, pentru că aceste realități sînt incompatibile cu idealul unui capitalism generator de prosperitate și democrație. dar pentru a îmbunătăți aceste realități, trebuie să pornim de la ele, adică să pornim de aici.

Victoria Timofte

Charles Tilly, *Revoluțiile europene* (1492-1992), Iași Editura Polirom: 2002 pre' 119.000 lei

Schimbarea socială, schimbarea politică și revoluția sînt teme fundamentale ale științei politice care fac parte din aceeași familie de concepte. Din acest motiv, foarte mulți autori care s-au oprit asupra unuia dintre conceptele menționate, au surprins, voit sau nu, elemente definitorii ale celorlalte. Concluzia care poate fi trasă de aici este că cea mai mare parte a lucrărilor care vorbesc despre schimbare socială, schimbare politică sau revoluție trebuie citite dintr-o perspectivă mai largă care să cuprindă fiecare dintre aceste concepte. Acesta este sensul în care trebuie înțeleasă și lucrarea de referință a lui Charles Tilly, „Revoluțiile europene (1492 – 1992)“.

Renumit sociolog și istoric american, format la Harvard și Oxford, Charles Tilly este unul dintre cel mai importanți autori ai științei politice, concentrîndu-și activitatea de cercetare mai ales pe temele schimbărilor sociale și politice. „Revoluțiile europene (1492 – 1992)“ face parte din ciclul de lucrări „Construcția Europei“ apărută la inițiativa a cinci edituri de limbi și naționalități diferite cu scopul de a clarifica procesele construirii Europei.

Obiectivul anunțat al seriei „Construcția Europei“ pune în lumină structura și stilul lucrării lui Charles Tilly. Astfel, dincolo de a fi o simplă reflectare a unor procese revoluționare care au avut loc în Europa ultimei jumătăți de mileniu, lucrarea reprezintă o sinteză a evoluțiilor și schimbărilor sociale care au marcat existența continentului. Este vorba de cinci secole de istorie europeană caracterizate prin războaie, revolte, răscoale, construcții statale, schimbări de regim, toate derulate pe fondul apariției proceselor de urbanizare și industrializare. Stilul în care a fost realizată cartea, bogată în date și statistici asupra conflictelor, scoate în evidență tentația autorului pentru metodologia istoriografică de analiză.

Lucrarea începe cu un demers teoretic asupra conceptului de revoluție. Din punctul de vedere al analizei proceselor revoluționare, cu toate că însăși Tilly își exprimă dubiile asupra pretenției studiului de a oferi un model unic de analiză, trebuie totuși reținute două concepte esențiale, situațiile revoluționare („două sau mai multe grupuri de putere formulează revendicări serioase, incompatibile, pentru a controla statul sau pentru a se constitui într-un stat“¹ și consecințele revoluționare („transferul puterii de la cei care o dețineau înainte de apariția suveranității multiple la o coaliție aflată acum la conducere, care poate include și unele elemente din vechea coaliție“²). Cele două concepte stau la baza modelului de analiză a lucrării, oferind totodată pilonii uneia dintre cele mai clare definiții ale revoluției („...o revoluție majoră implică pe de o parte o diviziune în organizarea statală - o situație revoluționară solidă - și pe de altă parte un transfer semnificativ al puterii – o consecință revoluționară gravă“³).

Studiul continuă cu o introspecție a schimbărilor sociale și politice din

1 TILLY, Charles, *Revoluțiile europene* (1492 – 1992), 2002, Polirom, Iași, p. 21

2 ibidem, p. 26

3 ibidem, p. 27

Europa de după 1489. Sînt analizate revoluții, răscoale și războaie civile în țările de Jos, Peninsula Iberică, Balcanii și Ungaria (capitolul 3), un capitol dedicat revoluției engleze (capitolul 4) și una dintre cele mai pertinente analize a revoluției franceze (capitolul 5). Ultimele două capitole sînt dedicate mișcărilor revoluționare din Rusia, cu un accent deosebit asupra evoluțiilor din secolul XX și momentului revoluționar 1989 cu consecințele sale asupra Estului Europei.

Deși îi acordă un spațiu restrîns, generat de prudența istoricului față de analiza unor evenimente apropiate în timp, capitolul referitor la momentul 1989 conține o serie de elemente de interes mai ales din punctul de vedere al sentințelor date de autor în contextul unei întrebări care încă frămîntă: au fost evenimentele din 1989 din Estul Europei revoluții? Tilly apreciază că în 1989 au existat situații revoluționare, care au generat urmări datorită transferului puterii către coaliții de guvernare absolut noi, numai că aceste consecințe revoluționare nu au fost peste tot la fel de profunde. În diagnoza cazului românesc autorul apreciază că a existat o situație revoluționară, dar consecințele revoluționare îndoielnice ridică semne de întrebare în ceea ce privește asocierea calității de revoluție evenimentelor din 1989.

„Revoluțiile europene (1489 – 1989)“ se află la prima apariție editorială în limba română, beneficiind de o prezentare plăcută. Cartea face parte din galeria operelor rare care au meritul de a fi accesibile, cu un stil apropiat de cititor, fără a marginaliza însă cerințele științificității.

Remus Ștefureac

Gândirea politică ieri și azi, Editura Institutului de Teorie Socială, București, 2000, 206 p, preț 30000 lei

Sub egida Academiei Române și, îndeosebi, a secției sale intitulată, destul de bizar aglutinant, de „filozofie, teologie, psihologie și pedagogie“, un institut inutil și anacronic își face reclamă. Fiindcă scopul publicitar al acestui volum sare în ochi. El începe cu „mesaje“ ca pe vremuri, semnate de actuali și viitori academicieni, continuă cu un lung interviu al directorului Institutului de Teorie Socială, de altfel difuzat la radio la timpul său, și se încheie cu alocuțiuni omagiale – inclusiv una a președintelui Iliescu

-, extrase de presă și fotografii. Acestea din urmă ar putea forma un adevărat album de familie: figurile care apar acolo aparțin, în mare majoritate, nomenclaturii academice din anii 70-80, atâta doar că cei care erau pe atunci secretari de secții, deci slujbași de rang inferior, au fost promovați „prof. dr.“, sau directori de institute.

Prilejul cu care a avut loc această expoziție teratologică este împlinirea unui deceniu de când s-a înființat, pentru a salva personalul de la Istoria partidului – pe care domnul Șerban Papacostea refuzase a-l adopta în bloc la Institutul „N. Iorga“, precum i se propusese de către d-l Iliescu – un nou institut al Academiei. Numele acestuia s-a completat după zece ani, adăugându-se la Teoria Socială și Politologia. Caracterul de impostură al titlului emfatic, care revendică și patronajul spiritual al lui Rădulescu-Motru (discutabil din alte motive asupra cărora nu e locul să insistăm), reiese din „Tabelul nominal cu salariații Institutului“. La loc de cinste figurează acolo bătrînul stalinist Ionescu-Gulian, Ion Ilincioiu, specialist în răscoalele țărănești (încă un supraviețuitor de la Istoria Partidului), sau mai tînărul sociolog Dan Dungaciu, colaborator al lui Ilie Bădescu, ceea ce spune destul despre aceste profiluri intelectuale. Numărul invidiabil de șapte bibliotecari sugerează o bibliotecă imensă, pe cînd numărul de operatori de calculatoare, șase și ei, arată că cercetătorii nu sînt încă deprinși cu procesarea electronică. Lista ia sfîrșit cu șoferul și femeia de serviciu. Academia întreține așadar aproape 60 de persoane, dintre care jumătate personal TESA, o cheltuială greu de îndreptățit prin activitatea științifică a acestui Institut.

În același volum și-au găsit locul șase comunicări „în semn de exemplificare majoră pentru creativitatea teoretică a colectivului de cercetare“. Una este o compilație despre „la raison d’Etat“ (absența din bibliografie a lucrării fundamentale a lui Friedrich Meinecke pe această temă descalifică acest exercițiu



scolastic). Alta este o nedisimulată critică a globalizării, teză care a fost desigur apreciată de public, avînd în vedere din cine era compus acel public, (cf. fotografiilor). Citarea unor opere de Leoncavallo și Verdi în ultimul text aduce o notă absolut insolită, înveselitoare.

Dintre autorii de comunicări lipsește tocmai directorul institutului, dar acesta este prezent, în schimb, cu nu mai puțin de trei interviuri. Într-unul din ele, Stelian Neagoe afirmă că „toate lucrările noastre – cărți, reviste – au acest conținut politologic“, ceea ce justifică denumirea pe care Institutul o primise chiar de la început, din ianuarie 1990, dar pe care, în martie, Academia a preferat să o amputeze, „pentru o vreme“, de referirea prea explicită la „știința politicii“. Cu toată sinceritatea, domnul Neagoe declară: „nu puteai să desființezi Academia de Științe Social-Politice și a doua zi, pe ruinele ei, să înființezi Institutul de Științe Social-Politice“. Într-adevăr, îmi amintesc că, în acel ianuarie 1990, domnul Mihai Drăgănescu, pe atunci vicepreședinte al Consiliului de Miniștri, era dispus să reînființeze ASSP, tot sub conducerea lui Mihnea Gheorghiu, dar sub numele, împrumutat de la Institutul Franței, de „Academia de Științe Morale și Politice“. Această inițiativă a putut fi blocată atunci, cînd prudența îi îndemna pe conducătorii abia instalați ai țării să mai aștepte „pînă ce apele se vor fi ales și se vor fi liniștit“ (citez din același interviu, p. 131). Acum, s-ar zice, drumul revenirii la trecut s-a bătătorit.

Salutînd apariția volumului ca o victorie a democrației, un părinte profesor de la Teologie își exprima recunoștința față de Dumnezeu că institutul există. Ce să spunem altceva decît: „mare-i grădina lui Dumnezeu“!

Andrei Pippidi

Marius Tudor și Adrian Gavrilesu,
Democrația la pachet. Elita politică în România postcomunistă, Editura Compania 2002, preț 120.000 lei



Un prieten îmi semnala zilele trecute apariția unei cărți „excepționale“ despre elita politică autohtonă. Nu pot să spun că sunt neîncredător din fire, dar cel puțin curiozitatea m-a determinat să arunc un ochi pe noua apariție. Am putut constata astfel cu plăcere, că autorii cărții au aceeași formație ca și mine – absolvenți ai unei Facultăți de Științe Politice din București – iar unul dintre ei, Adrian Gavrilesu, este de mai mulți ani editorialist la Adevărul. Am presupus, înainte de a citi cartea că noul val adus de Townsley Szeleny și Eyal privind noua elită politică din Europa Centrală a influențat doi tineri autori de la noi să aibă aceeași inițiativă.

Cartea celor doi tineri a însemnat, la prima vedere, privind la volumul mare de anexe, un efort apreciabil, o documentare riguroasă și îndelungată. Încercând să cuprindă aproape toate domeniile în care elitele și-au făcut simțită prezența după 1990, cartea cuprinde o enormă cantitate de muncă. Am sperat ca lucrarea să nu reflecte lipsa de maturitate a unor tineri fără antecedente în domeniu, să aibă o metodologie și o consistență sănătoasă.

Într-adevăr, cartea trece aproape prin toate paradigmele elitelor din acest secol, începând cu Weber, Croce, Mosca, Michels și până la Ortega y Gasset și Lasch, dar imensul panou de referințe teoretice nu se transpune din păcate într-un riguros tablou metodologic. Problema textului se găsește în stilul jurnalistic și implicat axiologic, aproape invectiv, dar necompletat cu o schematizare și o structurare cantitativă necesare unui demers de știință politică. Într-adevăr, viața și clasa politică nu s-au profesionalizat, sondajele arată clar cum oamenii nu cred că acest fenomen ar fi avut loc, dar în lipsa unor dovezi empirice clare rămâne cumva la discernământul cititorului să culeagă aceste informații și să construiască un ansamblu coerent.

Tema aparatcic-ilor moșteniți și convertiți arbitrar la valorile democratice nu este una nouă, și a fost amintită în primele volume post decembriste (vezi V. Pasti, M Miroiu, *Starea de fapt*; Stelian Tanase cu ale sale *Revoluția ca eșec sau Elite și Societate*, dar apelul la asanare morală și la critica acestora nu mai are nici o relevanță, este chiar redundant dacă nu se face într-un cadru propriu și prin metode științifice. În acest caz, autorii puteau aduce argumente solide pentru a demonstra originea acestor nomenclaturişti reconvertiți și modul în care aceștia s-au opus sistematic inițiativelor legislative menite să purifice societatea românească. Tipologizarea acestora este forțată pentru a servi scopului celor doi autori, dar aceasta nu servește unui demers științific. Un aspect m-a surprins destul de neplăcut, determinându-mă să scriu aceste rânduri și anume, ipotezele

forțate ale autorilor noștri. La un moment dat, aceștia spun că inginerii au monopolizat viața politică a României postcomuniste în defavoarea unor actori specializați. Cei doi nu greșesc când militează pentru o specializare a politiciii, Lipset milita la rândul său pentru asta. Cazul Germaniei este elocvent pentru cât de funcțional este un Parlament format în marea sa majoritate din personaje cu studii în domeniul politic. Dar nu asta este problema, ci faptul că cei doi lansează niște teorii fantastice pentru a da seama de numărul mare de politicieni cu studii tehnice în guvernele postcomuniste.

Printre ipotezele lansate ar fi formarea, în timpul comunismului a inginerilor în urma unui acord încheiat între structuri de conducere și facultățile tehnice, absența obiectului muncii pentru ingineri, ce ar fi determinat intrarea acestora în politică (plauzibil, dar fără nici o dovadă cantitativă) și multe altele.

Explicația mai simplă, ușor observabilă poate fi următoarea: construcția socialismului necesită mulți ingineri, iar căderea guvernului comunist în 1989 i-a lăsat pe drumuri, partidele se fac cu oameni și cu bani, ori inginerii, pe lângă faptul că au fost prezenți într-un număr mare, au avut și o apetență antreprenorială mai mare, meseria lor fiind de așa natură. Au făcut bussines de succes iar, cum partidele au nevoie de oameni cu bani, i-au cooptat.


Poate ar trebui să ținem cont și de faptul că școlile de științe politice de genul Ștefan Gheorghiu au fost discreditate, iar absolvenții lor au avut un recul în a intra în politică. Acestea sunt doar ipoteze, empiric decît pe criterii destul de psihologice și cazone. Imi cer scuze că le-am folosit, dar încerc să atrag atenția că nu este deloc util să amestecăm jurnalismul cu științele politice. Nu poți arăta cât de neprofesionist este guvernul măsurînd formația profesională, sexul și numărul de candidaturi fără oarece corelații în acest sens. Competența sau profesionalismul sunt date de criterii precum: numărul de legi bune, politicile publice promovate și implementate, democratizarea. Criteriile autorilor pot fi de asemenea relevante, dar acest lucru nu este demonstrat nicăieri în această carte.

Ceea ce nu poate fi contestat acestei cărți este cuprinderea. Teoria bine desenată și informațiile destul de precise provenite din analiza guvernelor postcomuniste pot fi utile. Dar a spune că provincia este frustrată datorită reprezentării mai slabe, iar dezideratul unirii de la 1918, și anume cel de a avea reprezentanți guvernamentali în egală măsură din toate provinciile naționale, este acum călcat în picioare, este deja cam mult. În afara faptului că ne sunt oferite niște procente care dau seama de cîți miniștri există și din ce provincie provine fiecare, nu se spune nimic despre felul în care este „înjosit“ idealul unirii de la 1918. Speculații se mai fac și pe tema Consiliului Național de Apărare, cum că ar coopta anumiți studenți pentru a-i pregăti să devină noua elită politică. Conspiraționismul și zvonurile nu încetează să fie vehiculate nici măcar într-o lucrare pretins științifică.

Părțile bune ar fi: efortul reușit de a strînge tot acest material, deosebit de util, precum și partea calitativă care analizează preponderent discursul elitei, calificat corect ca „limbă de lemn“, diluată totuși, dezvăluirile privind scandalurile bisericești, tipologizarea corectă a partidelor care tind să devină invariabil „oligarhice“, după cum le definea Michels.

Morala este urmatoarea: înainte de a începe să scrii o carte de științe politice, trebuie să lași subiectivitatea deoparte, să urmărești crearea unei metodologii sănatoase, care să poată demonstra ceva și nu în ultimul rând, să nu te pierzi în descriptivism neglijindu-ți astfel scopul - cel de a defini cine este, cum este și de ce este astfel elita politică postcomunistă.

Emanuel Răuță



Alina Mungiu-Pippidi. *Politica după comunism*, Humanitas, 2002, 279 de pagini, preț 80 000.

Planul cărții este circumscris de modelul din pagina 10, care delimitează didactic structura politică (instituțiile formale), de instituțiile informale sau mentalități și de cultura politică, definită în termeni clasici ca totalul credințelor, opiniilor și afectelor despre politică. Acest plan societal este la rîndul său delimitat de un plan individual, în care fiecare dintre cele trei are o reflecție, statusul politic (resursele personale), sistemul normativ propriu cu relevanță pentru politic și identitatea politică, internalizarea unei culturi politice.

Capitolele urmăresc sistematic, pe baza teoriei politologice anglo-saxone în special, cu ipoteze clare și construind modele explicative, domeniile mari ale vieții politice românești, orientarea democratică, naționalismul și identitatea națională, comportamentul de vot, etc. Capitolele 7 și 8, despre presă și intelectuali, cele mai puțin conforme cu canoanele politologiei moderne și mai „românești” sînt cele mai pasionante la lectură, de la trioul Eliade, Noica, Cioran la Adrian Sîrbu sau Sorin Vîntu, nelipsind nimeni dintr-o trecere în revistă care va stîrni polemici și contestări. Carte de clasă pentru studenții în științe politice, conține în anexe chestionarul unei cercetări ample de opinie publică, tabelul cu variabile și nenumărate regresii. În text acestea sînt povestite mai uman, în anexe găsim coeficienții, eroarea standard, etc. Politologia românească începe să fie mai politologică, deci mai „fundamentată pe modele”, ceea ce e foarte bine pentru studenți. Nu știm însă dacă asta nu va nemulțumi pe vechii cititori ai Alinei Mungiu-Pippidi, și dacă aceștia vor fi consolați doar de capitolele șapte și opt pentru atîtea modele în rest, sau dacă vor gusta ideea că „Miorița” poate fi testată ca o teorie. Lucrarea va deveni referință obligatorie pentru specialiști. E regretabil că pe alocuri româna e la limita umanității, fiind evident tradusă din lucrări publicate în reviste anglo-saxone, și nu tradusă cu o maximă fluență. Din acest punct de vedere e o netă diferență de la capitol la capitol, cele scrise în românește direct fiind mult mai lizibile.

POLSCI REVIEWS: PROS AND CONS

Pavel Câmpeanu, *Ceaușescu, anii numărătorii inverse*, Polirom, 2002, 309 pagini, preț 150 000, și **Egon Balaș**, *Voința de libertate*, Editura Fundației Culturale Române, București, 200, 533 de pagini, preț 150 000

Amintiri a doi comuniști din ilegalitate, care arată mai ales că studiul comunismului românesc a fost și este în continuare ocupația istoriei recente, și nu a sociologiei. Așa cum ne sînt înfățișați anii stalinisti, prin memoriile-reflecții de acest tip, sau volume de studii ca cele ale lui Dennis Deletant sau Stelian Tănase, accentul cade pe grupul de la vârful partidului și luptele interne din cadrul acestui grup. Societatea e complet neglijată în aceste cărți, și

poate că într-adevăr era neglijabilă. Cu certitudine eroii acestor volume credeau că operează pe un teren virgin și dincolo de represiune nu exista mare interes pentru reacțiile unei societăți forțate să se transforme atît de profund și de brutal. Cîtă vreme un mic grup are o putere nelimitată asupra unei societăți întregi, studiul obsesiv al relațiilor din acel grup, deși seamănă mai mult cu unul biologic decît cu unul sociologic, are desigur justificare. Conflictul Dej/ Pauker rămîne tema dominantă, dar interesul cărții lui Egon Balaș, care pare să fi avut surse mai apropiate decît Câmpeanu, este că are dovezi că a fost de fapt un conflict între Dej și Luca, în care Dej cîștigîndu-l pe Iosif Chișinevski, iar Ana luînd neoportun partea lui Luca, istoria s-a scris în favoarea celor dintîi. Întrebarea importantă pentru cititorul care citește din prisma științei sociale este dacă avem motive să credem că comunismul românesc ar fi diferit în vreun fel dacă bătălia se tranșa invers. Lipsa de importanță atribuită politicilor în mai toate aceste volume sugerează că nu, tot aceleași politici ale Moscovei ar fi fost urmate în orice circumstanță....De asta, ce să-i faci, studiul stalinismului românesc rămîne nesociologic...






Securiștii partidului. Serviciul de cadre al PCR ca poliție politică (coordonator **Marius Oprea**), Institutul Român de Istorie Recentă, Polirom, 2002, 358 de pagini, preț 150 000


Colecție de documente inedite și senzaționale, arhiva Comitetului Municipal de partid Brașov, conține și câteva studii din care două de științe sociale. Interesul principal al volumului este dezvăluirea managementului cotidian al supravegherii în interiorul partidului, care pare să fi fost la fel de rutinier și extensiv ca și cel al Securității. Aflăm din studiul despre securiștii partidului, numiți informatori voluntari, semnat de Andreea Năstase și Stejărel Olaru, că securiștii partidului

erau cei cu dosar curat, funcție, și de profesie activiști de partid sau în „organe” sau intelectuali. Muncitorii erau semnificativ mai puțin infiltrați, conform modelului de regresie multiplă al autorilor, poate din cauză că se credea că nu au nivelul necesar pentru a supraveghea pe alții sau li se puteau oferi mai puține stimulente ca intelectualilor. Studiul, împreună cu cel la fel de interesant al Ioanei Cârstocea despre autobiografiile din arhivă, aruncă o lumină înfricoșătoare asupra celei mai neglijate părți în studiul totalitarismului românesc, invazia vieții private și dispariția graniței dintre sfera privată și cea publică, greu de refăcut astăzi

Cristian Preda, *România postcomunistă și România interbelică*, Universitatea din București și Editura Meridiane, București, 2002, 152 pag, preț 70.000 lei

Încercare atipică de a compara sistemul electoral postcomunist cu cel interbelic, cu alte cuvinte, un sistem proporțional în condiții de veritabil vot universal cu un sistem majoritar în condițiile unui vot redus la populația masculină. Se pune întrebarea ce au în comun cele două sisteme ca să poată fi comparate, autorul oferind răspunsul imprecis că „prin ambiții și anumite rezultate”. Autorul declară că scopul acestei tentative este de a vedea influența sistemului de vot asupra sistemului de partide, dar cum nu discută nicăieri alți factori care influențează sistemul de partide și nu utilizează nici o metodologie care ar putea pune în relație cauzală, fie și bivariată, pe cele două, concluzia finală, că avem de a face în amândouă cazurile cu regimuri „care asumă logica proporționalistă pentru a produce efectele tipice ale scrutinului majoritar”, este cu totul în aer. Lipsesc și titluri de bază ale discuției despre scrutin, nu numai din dezbaterea contemporană, cât mai ales cele clasice ale dezvoltării politice, care discută regimurile electorale europene în prima perioadă a secolului XX (Stein Rokkan, de exemplu). Finalmente, există motive fundamentale pentru care un subiect de dezvoltare politică trebuie tratat ca dezvoltare politică, iar unul comparativ, ca atare, deci nu punând alături două momente în timp din istoria politică a unei societăți, deci plasarea de la început a acestei lucrări contra logicii metodologice face ca efortul de a documenta statistica electorală interbelică să fie superfluu, câtă vreme datele nu probează, finalmente, mare lucru. Cele 152 de pagini sînt o succesiune de speculații (cum ar fi că regimul electoral interbelic a dus la creșterea regionalismului și sectarismului, lucru imposibil de probat cu metodologia folosită de autor), alăturate unor statistici în mare măsură irelevante. Aceasta nu înseamnă că folosind o perspectivă asumat longitudinală, pe de o parte, deci de dezvoltare politică, sau una real comparativă, deci cu alte sisteme electorale ale epocii, și cu controalele adecvate, adică cu alți factori care influențează sistemul de partide pe lângă scrutin, autorul nu ar putea ajunge la un rezultat valid, dacă vrea să se lămurească și să ne lămurească și pe noi cum stau lucrurile. Lucrarea de față este însă de nivelul unui referat de doctorat fără îndrumător, cazul, din păcate, al multor lucrări de oameni tineri la noi, în care buna ambiție profesională se împiedică de lipsa unei orientări teoretice și metodologice adecvate, arătînd finalmente imaturitatea disciplinei în România.






George Voicu, *Zei cei răi*. Cultura conspirației în România postcomunistă, Polirom, 2000, 245 de pagini, preț 70 000

Nimeni nu ar putea să nu fie de acord cu teza generală a lui George Voicu conform căreia România e bîntuită de conspiraționism, nici că demersul de a colecta citate conspiraționiste din gazete ocazionale, cotidiene de tip tabloid sau cărți apărute la edituri obscure nu e de un real folos pentru comunitate. Volumul are multe citate interesante, unele savuroase. Ca lucrare științifică e însă greu de plasat undeva, dacă nu în zona incertă a unui eseism de mare vogă la noi. Voicu nu are propriu-zis o abordare

teoretică, nu e nici antropolog (de la Girardet la Verdery toți cei care au scris despre conspiraționism lipsesc), nici psiholog social (nici o referire la marea tradiție teoretică și empiricistă de studiu a conspiraționismului ca parte a gândirii dogmatice și autoritare la psihanalistii marxiști sau Theodor Adorno și grupul „personalității autoritare“), ca să nu mai vorbim de sociologie, deoarece nu există nici o cale să ne dăm seama dacă altcineva în afară de autorii citați de Voicu împărtășește aceste convingeri (deși sondaje s-au făcut). În sfârșit, deși apărută în colecția de „Științe Politice“, cartea nu are nici o legătură cu politologia. Nu ne lămurim la sfârșit în nici un fel care e legătura între conspiraționism și antisemitism, care e cauza, care e sindromul, ce deosebește elita conspiraționistă românească de cea similară de dreapta din alte țări europene în care alți autori ca dl. Voicu, în diverse perioade din secolul XX, au compilat citate similare, etc. Iar acestea sînt întrebările fundamentale. Sînt românii veritabil mai conspiraționiști ca alții? Are conspiraționismul culoare politică, sau e folosit de toate ideologiile? E conspiraționismul în sine un sindrom cognitiv, sau de personalitate, cu ce îl găsim asociat, și așa mai departe. Finalmente, e simptomatic că sursele și trimiterile teoretice nu sînt deloc diferențiate în volum, care nu are referințe. Cititorul nu poate decît să regrete că materialul nu poate fi retopit, așezat pe o bază teoretică, adresînd de asemenea cîteva întrebări de cercetare clare.

Globalism și dileme identitare. Perspective românești, Alexandru Zub și Adrian Cioflâncă (editori), Editura Universității Alexandru Ioan Cuza, Iași, 2002, 320 de pagini, preț neprecizat


În patru limbi și polimorf, acest volum de studii conține numeroși autori români și cîțiva străini care discută despre identitate și globalizare din perspective variate, antropologie, știință politică, istorie, psihologie. Mulți autori tineri, unii interesanți, alături de mai cunoscuții Sorin Antohi, Andrei Corbea, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, sau editorul Alexandru Zub. Introducerea acestuia e paradigmatică pentru lipsa de ideologie din spatele volumului, care are meritul, ajutat de perspectiva pluridisciplinară, de a nu fi nici deconstructivist, nici naționalist, și a fi în general la o distanță bună de orice „ism”, cum se cuvine unei cărți academice. Alexandru Zub precizează, de altfel, că națiunea trebuie văzută ca un fenomen de termen mediu sau lung, și studiată împreună, și nu împotriva unor fenomene ca globalizarea, care, fără a fi mai puțin postnaționale, sînt departe de a prevesti o lume fără state națiuni, ci doar una în care acestea trăiesc la un alt nivel de comunicare și schimburi în general.



Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Sorin Ioniță (coordonatori), **Politici publice. Teorie și practică**, Polirom, 2002, 350 de pagini, preț 150 000.

Carte-istrument pentru clasă, cu o primă secțiune teoretică (Leslie Pal, Ioniță și Pippidi), urmată de studii și recomandări în domeniul educației, politicilor sociale, justiției, mediei publice, etc. Pigmentată de texte scurte, tradiționale, recitite ca politici publice de editori, ai unor Iorga, Madgearu sau Stere, care răsună altfel în contextul unui volum atât de modern. Textul lui Sorin Ioniță despre guvernul expandabil, cunoscut din Early Warning Reports ale SAR, e reluat în acest volum, în care Cristian Ghinea publică un

studiu despre politizarea administrației sau „perseverența în greșeală”, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi unul despre corupție „(nu e corupție, ci comportament administrativ arbitrar generalizat)”, iar Daniel Dăianu și alții unul despre cine a câștigat sau pierdut tranziția (cine a pierdut, a pierdut de-a binelea, cine a câștigat a câștigat pe termen scurt). Volumul umple un gol simțit în universități și în administrația centrală, reflectând și progresele făcute și cele încă de făcut ale tinerei științe Politici Publice în România.



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ECONOMIC PERSONAL ȘI SPRIJINUL PENTRU INTEGRAREA
EUROPEANĂ ÎN STATELE CANDIDATE**

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