The emergence of a new political right-wing club in the European Parliament raises legitimate questions on the nature of European Radical populism. What, if anything, have Le Pen’s voters in common with Vadim Tudor’s ones? Is populism in ‘old Europe’ the same animal as populism in ‘new’ Europe, at least enough to generate a common European platform? And how far can it still go? Prior to EU accession it would have been quite inconceivable to have such parties in government in the new member countries. Presently, not only we find them as government associates in Slovakia and Poland, but elements of their discourse feature more and more frequently in those of mainstream parties. Whenever you have an electoral populist syndrome, the most skilful electoral manipulation cannot prevent such parties to eventually reach power. Traditionally, populism was associated a “development crisis,” causing social and psychological disruption following aggressive modernization and leading to an idealization of the pre-change period. We find some similarities of the present context with the historical one, which generated populism. In ‘old’ Europe globalization and an elite-led EU project strayed many voters. In the ‘new’ Europe, the major overhaul caused by the transition from command to market economy compares well to the early 20th century contexts when populism developed. Both instances cannot but favor populism as a frame of mind that follows abrupt societal transformation, defined by fear of and resistance to change, nostalgia for a golden period and a sort of persecution syndrome.