The institutional change on the level of Executive-Legislative relationships initiated through the Putin Presidency, although less visible than the prolonged stand-offs between Yeltsin and the Congress or the consequences related to the adoption of the 1993 Constitution, is apt to produce results at least as spectacular. Certainly some of the features of the Putin presidency provide positive prospects for the State-Duma’s functioning: the last four years of office proved that until now, the President has sought to give the legislation he initiates the legitimacy of parliamentary control and approval, and that he is committed to keep the Duma the main stage for law-making. On the other hand, further obstruction of party participation in government formation, administrative pressure on political parties through the 2001 party law, the transformation of regional elites into enemies of federal parties through maneuvering in and around the Federation Council, and, most of all, recent State Duma elections suggest that the Duma’s part in the near future will remain subsidiary.