This paper investigates the reform movement of public service quotas in Bangladesh, emphasizing the effects of grassroots corruption within an authoritarian system and the resulting challenges to national governance. The research indicates that corruption among local officials undermines public resource allocation, exacerbates social inequality, and widens the wealth gap. Additionally, it significantly hampers policy implementation, eroding public trust in the government and fueling social discontent and instability. The spread of corrupt practices also weakens anti-corruption agencies, making them vulnerable to political interference and limiting their effectiveness. The lack of transparency and accountability in anti-corruption efforts further diminishes policy credibility and suppresses public engagement. This paper analyzes the shortcomings of current anti-corruption mechanisms, particularly the independence of these agencies, and highlights the importance of social oversight and public participation in improving political transparency and governance efficiency. It concludes with policy recommendations to enhance government capabilities and promote social equity, aiming to provide theoretical support and practical guidance for governance modernization in Bangladesh and beyond.

(DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.16273619)